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ABSTRACT
Global integration -  the lowering of barriers to the movement of goods and services, 
capital and labour across borders -  is one of the most important issues confronting Small 
States in the new millennium. However, the existing literature focuses, in the main, on 
developed countries or large developing countries. This thesis extends the literature by 
deriving measures o f capital account liberalisation in small states and explores, through 
the use of panel data techniques, the impact of the removal of capital account restrictions 
on economic growth and volatility in these states. After the introduction (Chapter 1), 
Chapter 2 presents a survey of the recent literature on capital account liberalisation in 
developing countries. Details on the theoretical models of capital account liberalisation, 
the historical development of capital controls, indices of capital account restrictions, as 
well as the empirical evidence on the effects of capital account openness in developing 
countries are presented. Chapter 3 outlines a variety of indicators used to quantify the 
ease with which capital can move across borders and identify their weaknesses. This 
chapter also derives these indicators for a sample of 51 small states between 1970 and 
2004. Using the database developed in Chapter 3, Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis extends 
the existing literature on the link between capital account liberalisation, growth and 
economic volatility. Chapter 6 concludes and presents policy recommendations. The 
results obtained show that capital account liberalisation, on average, increases per capita 
growth in small states by approximately 4 percent per annum, with little impact on 
output volatility.
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CHAPTER 1 -  INTRODUCTION
Capital account liberalisation is the elimination of administrative and legal controls on 
international capital flows. The removal of capital controls is being primarily driven by 
commitments under bilateral or regional trade agreements. Removing these controls, 
according to economic theory, should provide greater opportunities for diversifying risk, 
lead to a more efficient allocation o f world savings and, by reducing microeconomic 
distortions, boost investment, productivity and economic growth. However, the 
evidence from developing countiies that have liberalised is not convincing: see the 
Mexico crisis of 1994-1995 and the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.
Small states may be even more vulnerable to the negative effects of opening the capital 
account due to their vulnerability to economic shocks. Consequently, these countries 
have traditionally employed capital controls as a means of offsetting the vulnerabilities 
posed by size (Easterly and Kray, 2000). John Williamson, Chief Economist for the 
South Asia Region at the World Bank, in the Keynote Address to the Second Annual 
Indian Derivatives Conference (1998) notes:
'"''If capital account libéralisation is as dangerous as it appears to he, 
one needs to ask whether it brings great benefits that need to be 
traded o ff against the risk ... [this requires] empirical investigation 
o f whether these benefits amount to enough to have an 
econometrically detectable impact on the growth rate. "
This thesis examines whether the removal of these controls can be beneficial for small 
states. Investigating the impact of liberalisation in small states is also important since 
most previous studies have excluded these countries from their databases, principally 
because of data limitations, as well as their relatively small size. There are 51 countries 
classified as small states in the world according to the United Nations. These small, 
low-lying coastal countries share similar sustainable development challenges, including 
small population, lack of resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natural disasters, 
excessive dependence on international trade and vulnerability to global developments. 
In addition, the benefits of economies of scale are unexploited and there are high 
transportation and communication costs, and costly public administration and 
infrastructure.
Armstrong and Read (1998) note that there are three traditional demarcations of small in 
the economic literature: (1) the ability of a country to influence its own terms of trade;
(2) sub-optimality; and, (3) size measures using thresholds. The traditional assumption 
used in most open economy models is that the country is so small that it is a price taker 
in world markets for its imports and exports: it cannot influence its own tenns of trade. 
The main drawback of this approach is that this definition, although theoretically quite 
useful, classifies a number of large countries as small, for example, Australia and 
Canada. Alternatively one may categorise ‘smallness’ based on some notion of the 
minimum efficient scale of output, since most small states are unlikely to have a large 
enough domestic market to allow for the exploitation of economies of scale. Indicators 
used in this instance range from aggregate economic activity to geographic area (see 
Armstrong and Read, 1995). However, there is no commonly accepted 
definition/approach to identifying the minimum efficient scale. As a result, some 
authors use arbitraiily chosen thresholds for various social and/or economic indicators, 
such as population and gi'oss domestic product, to demarcate small states (see for 
example Robinson, 1960, who defines small states as those with a population below 15 
million persons and Armstrong, De Kervenoael, Li and Read, 1998, who use an upper 
limit of 3 million persons).
Small states have six key common characteristics:
• Small domestic size. As a result of the small size of domestic demand, the unit 
cost of production in most small states will be relatively high, as demand restricts 
the use of a minimum efficient scale or plant. The country’s size will also likely 
limit the amount o f domestic competition since only a small number of firms 
might find it feasible to engage in a particular area of production.
Limited resource base. Besides a limited population, most small states are not 
normally endowed with abundant natural resources and even if they do have 
natural resource endowments, the country may not have the capital necessary to 
exploit the resource.
Narrowness of output and exports. Given the limited resource base most small 
states tend to specialise in the production and export of a narrow range of goods 
and services.
Openness to trade. The small states narrow resource base also implies that it has 
to depend on trade with other countries to satisfy local consumption and for a 
large proportion of inputs used in domestic production. Thus although the 
country might have high tariffs, conventional indicators o f openness such as 
exports and imports as a proportion of GDP will usually exceed world averages 
(see Table 1.1).
Vulnerabilitv. The characteristics o f small states often make them relatively 
more subject to changes in external conditions. These states are usually quite 
susceptible to natural disasters and other meteorological conditions. The recent 
case of the effects that Hurricane Ivan had on Grenada is a prime example. The 
International Monetary Fund, in their 2005 Article IV Consultation Report on 
Grenada (available at www.imf.orgL notes that while the average cost of natural 
disasters is around 2% of GDP, Hurricane Ivan in Grenada is estimated to have
led to damages valued at over 200% of GDP. Table 1.1 shows that the variance 
in GDP growth in small states is more than six times greater than for the world 
economy.
Social Homogeneitv. One of key advantages of a small state, however, is that 
they usually possess a greater degree o f social homogeneity and cohesion that 
encourages the formation of social capital that indirectly contributes to economic 
growth.
Briguglio (1995) attempts to capture the disadvantages faced by small states through an 
index of economic vulnerability. The index explicitly accounts for three of the broad 
disadvantages encountered by these states: (1) exposure to foreign economic conditions 
(proxied by trade to GDP); (2) insularity and remoteness (ratio of transport and freight 
costs to exports), and; (3) proneness to natural disasters (economics costs of such events 
between 1970 and 1989). The index is calculated for 114 countries and the results 
suggested that while many small states may appear relatively prosperous, in terms of 
GDP per capita, these countries are relatively more vulnerable to exogenous shocks and 
therefore “fragile in the face of forces outside their control”. When this index is 
incorporated into a cross-country growth regression for small states, the coefficient on 
the variable was significant but positively correlated with long-run growth performance 
(Armstrong and Read, 2002). This counter-intuitive result seems to have occurred due 
to the use of openness as a measure of exposure to foreign economic conditions. If there 
is strong positive correlation between openness and growth in small states, this might 
offset the potential negative effects of insularity and remoteness as well as proneness to 
natural disasters.
The characteristics o f small states also have direct implications for monetary, exchange 
rate and overall macroeconomic policy. The narrowness of domestic output implies that 
output tends to very inelastic with respect to relative price changes, as labour and other 
factors may not be easily redeployed into the production of other goods and services. 
Helleiner (1982) notes that expenditure switching measures, such as changes in the
exchange rate, are unlikely to address any balance of payments difficulties that small 
nations may encounter. Armstrong and Read (1998) also add that since currency 
markets in these countries are likely to be relatively thin, exchange rates may be 
relatively volatile and influenced by structural problems. Given the openness of the 
economy, such volatility is likely to feed through to the domestic economy and impact 
on production costs and overall price stability. Exchange rate variations can also result 
in a redistribution of income, as devaluation tends to benefit exporters and disadvantage 
the purchasers of imported goods, while an appreciation negatively affects domestic 
exporters and assists the consumers of imported goods.
One way many small states have sought to protect their economies from the potential 
effects of exchange rate volatility has been to choose some form o f a fixed exchange rate 
system (Khatlchate and Short, 1980). There are four broad possible choices in this 
regard: (1) dollarisation; (2) a currency board; (3) a peg to a major trading partner, or;
(3) a managed float. In the case o f dollarisation, the small state adopts the currency of 
another country as its medium of exchange and medium of account. The main 
advantage of adopting another country’s national currency is the small state essentially 
ties its price level to that of the larger, more credible country. The common cuirency 
guarantees domestic price stability, once foreign prices are stable. Price stability, 
however, comes at the cost o f monetary independence: dollarised economies by 
definition can not maintain an independent monetary stance since the country has no 
control over the volume of money. Exchange rate as well as price stability can also be 
obtained through the use of a currency board arrangement. Unlike dollarization, the 
small state maintains its own currency but each dollar of locally issued notes and coins 
are backed by foreign reserve investments. In addition to the loss of monetary 
independence, cuiTency board arrangements tend to have a built-in deflationary bias as 
the domestic money supply only expands if there is an improvement in the balance of 
payments. To overcome this deflationary bias, the small state could instead fix its 
currency against that of a major trading partner or some basket of currency. When used 
in conjunction with controls over capital flows, the country can exert some degree of 
monetary independence subject, however, to the maintenance o f the exchange rate peg.
Monetary independence may also be achieved without the use of capital controls if the 
country intervenes in the foreign exchange market to maintain the peg. Under this 
system, the level of reserves needed for the central bank of a small state to intervene in 
the foreign exchange market would have to be prohibitively large.
Related to the issue of monetary independence is sovereignty. Armstrong and Read 
(2000) consider the role that national sovereignty has on the performance of small states. 
The hypothesis is that small dependencies of colonial powers, by drawing on the 
resources available from the métropole, may better be able to reduce the limitations of 
size. Utilising a database of 105 countries, the Armstrong and Read (2000) report that 
dependent territories have historical had higher values for GDP per capita when 
compared to sovereign states, even after allowing for other key determinants of 
economic development. These results seem to support the hypothesis that dependency 
can offset the intrinsic disadvantage of size.
Easterly and Kraay (2000), while aclaiowledging that small states have a higher rate of 
volatility of gi’owth and terms of trade shocks, recommend that these countries should 
diversify these risks by opening up their economies to international capital movements. 
Read (2004), in contrast, notes that globalisation could constitute a significant challenge 
to the future growth of small states. Due to the high specialisation in these countries, an 
exogenous shock could have important consequences. For example, the pressure 
imposed on small states in relation to their offshore financial sectors can negatively 
impact on those islands that have sound regulatory frameworks in place and depend on 
the sector for their economic viability.
This thesis therefore investigates the issue by developing indicators o f capital account 
openness as well as estimating the impact that liberalisation has on growth and volatility. 
Chapter 2 surveys the previous literature to explore the effects of capital account 
liberalisation on developing countries and obtain policy suggestions for small states that 
are considering opening their capital accounts. Chapter 3 provides quantitative 
measures of capital account restrictiveness to investigate whether there has been any
change in the use of capital controls over time in these countries. Three broad groups of 
indicators are presented: ex-post macroeconomic indicators, regression-based indicators 
and qualitative indices. The essay finds that some small states seem to have reduced 
restrictions on capital flows during the period, particularly during the 1990s, however, 
some -  particularly low income territories -  still maintain restrictions. Chapter 4 
investigates whether those countries that did liberalise experienced faster rates of 
economic growth. A basic model of economic growth, which uses the key variables 
found in the literature to be the main determinant of growth is specified and then 
estimated using a GMM estimator to account for the endogeneity of some of the 
explanatory variables. When this model is augmented with capital account liberalisation 
indicators, the results suggest that liberalisation had a positive and statistically 
significant impact on economic growth, boosting per capita growth in small states by an 
estimated 4 percent per annum. Chapter 5 then examines if this process o f liberalisation 
had any statistically significant impact on economic volatility, since in many instances, 
countries may be more interested in the impact that policy changes have on economic 
volatility than economic growth. Through the use of panel GMM techniques to 
investigate the empirical determinants of volatility in small states, the study finds that 
there is not a simple linear relationship between volatility and capital account 
liberalisation: by itself capital account liberalisation increases volatility, however, more 
developed countries and those with more open trade policies, had lower rates of 
fluctuation after opening their capital accounts. Chapter 6 summarises the main findings 
of the study and provides policy recommendations.
Table 1.1: Social and Economie Indicators for Small States
Country
GDP Trade as a 
Gross National Volatility Percentage 
Income Per Capita, (1971- o f GDP,
Population, 2004 2004 (US Dollars) 2004) 2004 (%)
Africa
Cape Verde 495,171 3,193 4.923 100
Comoros 777,262 442 2.871 37
Guinea-Bissau 1,539,712 168 8.074 73
Mauritius 1,233,176 5,099 4.014 111
Sao Tome and Principe 152,964 381 6.021 143
Seychelles 83,639 8,564 5.873 158
Anguilla 12,014 10,306 8.124 n.a.
Antigua and Barbuda 80,518 9,318 4.427 129
Aruba 98,205 19,968 3.984 190
The Bahamas 318,762 14,670 7.337 111
Barbados 268,881 10,252 3.483 109
Belize 264,321 3,417 3.684 114
The British Virgin Islands 21,745 40,287 5.541 n.a.
Cuba 11,244,985 2,931 6.500 34
Dominica 78,534 3,342 6.433 115
Dominican Republic 8,767,870 2,680 3.858 106
Grenada 102,254 3,727 4.296 105
Guyana 750,232 977 5.025 199
Haiti 8,406,941 470 4.412 50
Jamaica 2,639,224 3,042 3.725 100
Montserrat 4,198 11,143 9.282 n.a.
The Netherlands Antilles 180,870 17,183 3.245 n.a.
Puerto Rico 3,931,950 13,736 2.767 93
St. Kitts and Nevis 42,189 8,077 3.260 93
St. Lucia 159,466 4,192 5.388 125
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 118,428 3,139 6.587 112
Suriname 446,460 2,345 5.345 66
Trinidad and Tobago 1,301,307 8,403 5.279 91
United States Virgin Islands 111,584 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Asia and the Pacific
American Samoa 57,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain 715,820 14,500 13.610 142
The Commonwealth o f  the Northern Marianas 76,000 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands 18,074 2,933 5.576 51
Fiji 840,814 3,095 4.767 120
French Polynesia 252,692 20,485 4.756 37
Guam 161,650 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati 96,377 1,517 13.945 88
Country Population, 2004
Gross National 
Income Per Capita, 
2004 (US Dollars)
GDP 
Volatility 
(1971- 
2004)
Trade as a 
Percentage 
o f GDP, 
2004 (%)
Maldives 321,196 2,239 5.090 178
Marshall Islands 59,721 2,377 8.731 124
The Federated States o f Micronesia 124,560 2,286 7.090 89
Nauru 13,386 4,667 5.574 89
New Caledonia 232,617 17,533 7.739 46
Niue 2,156 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau 19,853 5,706 14.157 89
Papua New Guinea 5,771,947 743 12.265 90
Samoa 183,746 1,997 3.611 103
The Solomon Islands 465,793 512 7.775 118
Timor-Leste 886,835 404 11.564 n.a.
Tonga 101,982 2,060 8.024 86
Tuvalu 10,396 2,098 10.283 126
Vanuatu 207,331 1,322 8.535 133
Memo
Average for Small States 6,477 6.453 104
World 6,396 1.479 48
Sources: UN Population Division, World Population Prospects, 2004; World Bank Development Indicators 
2004; United Nationals Main National Accounts Aggregates
CHAPTER 2 -  A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON CAPITAL 
ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION
This Chapter provides a survey on the recent evidence of the effects of capital account 
liberalisation on developing countries. Such an investigation can give valuable policy 
advice to small states considering the removal of capital account restrictions and those 
that may want to pursue further liberalisation. After this section, Section 2.2 examines 
theoretical models of capital account liberalisation and the benefits that should accrue to 
countries pursuing this policy path. Section 2.3 presents a historical summary o f the 
development of capital controls, Section 2.4 looks at how to empirically estimate capital 
account restrictiveness, and Section 2.5 surveys empirical studies of capital account 
liberalisation in developing countries, assessing the impact on cost of capital, equity 
returns, investment, economic growth and instability, policy discipline, inflation, 
exchange rates, trade and interest rates. Section 2.6 gives a survey of the main criticisms 
against capital account liberalisation and Section 2.7 summarises the policy advice 
provided in the literature for countries considering removing capital account restrictions. 
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.1 WHAT ARE CAPITAL CONTROLS?
Capital controls are government limits placed on the use of the foreign exchange market 
to make payments related to international financial activity. The most common
10
restrictions on the capital account are exchange or quantitative limits on capital 
movements, taxes on financial transactions and dual or multiple exchange rate regimes.
Quantitative controls are usually composed of restrictions on portfolio, real estate, 
and/or direct investments of both residents wishing to invest abroad as well as non­
residents wishing to invest in the country. Ceilings can also be placed on the external 
asset and liability positions of domestic financial institutions or on the domestic 
operations of foreign financial entities. In Korea, for example, the government has kept 
a tight rein on long-term foreign investment (Eichengreen, et. al., 1999) and some 
governments in other countries have regulated the portfolio choice of investors (see 
Baldcer, 1996 and Park and Song, 1996).
Taxes on international financial transactions, for example, interest equalisation taxes, 
attempt to eliminate the difference in yields between domestic and foreign investments 
and restrict either inflows or outflows. A mandatory reserve requirement is one example 
of a price-based capital control. This type of capital control requires foreign investors to 
deposit a percentage of their capital investment with the central bank for a minimum 
period. These measures have been employed in countries such as Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, the Czech Republic and Malaysia, and attempt to discourage short-term 
flows, while not hindering long-term direct investment.
Although a dual exchange rate regime is not strictly speaking a capital control, it can be 
used to limit capital flows. With dual exchange rates, the authorities usually have 
differing rates for commercial and financial transactions. In most cases, policymakers 
attempt to stabilise the commercial rate but allow the exchange rate for financial 
transactions to depend on market forces. As a result, it can have a dampening effect on 
capital flows (Rogoff, et. ah, 2003), as foreign investors wanting to move their funds 
may be subject to greater exchange rate risk.
Capital controls have been used for a number of purposes in countries across the globe. 
In many small states, these controls have been employed to ensure either the stability of
11
the exchange rate or the peg. In these instances capital controls ensure that uninhibited 
capital flows either into or out o f the country do not place unnecessary pressure on the 
nation’s exchange rate. This is particularly important for small states, as one large 
capital transaction can have a significant effect on the movement of the country’s 
exchange rate. Policymakers in small states are hence confronted with three typically 
desirable, but contradictory objectives (known as the monetary policy trilema): (1) 
stabilise the exchange rate; (2) free movement of capital or; (3) independent monetary 
policy. Since only two out of these three objectives are mutually consistent, by fixing 
the exchange rate and utilising capital controls, small states are compelled to surrender 
control over monetary policy oriented toward domestic objectives.
Capital controls have also been used as a preventative measure against capital outflows 
during a financial or currency crisis, to obtain tax revenue and to limit foreign ownership 
in the domestic economy. The intuition behind drawing on capital controls during a 
crisis is that it should help to slow down the outflow of foreign exchange (because of 
increased risk perceptions) and allow the government time to implement corrective 
policies (see Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991; Cuddington, 1986).
Dooley (1996), however, in surveying the previous literature on the effectiveness of 
capital controls, note that “the power of capital control programmes to affect other 
important economic variables, such as the volume or composition of capital flows, 
changes in international reserves, or the level of the exchange rate, is, however, 
generally not supported by the data.” Edwards (1989) and Edwards and Julio Santaella 
(1993), analysing banking crises in developing countries, show that the private sector 
was still able to circumvent capital controls on outflows in the months prior to a crisis 
(similar results are reported by Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Cuddington, 1986, and; 
Edwards, 1999).
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) observe that one of the most frequently exploited 
methods of evading capital controls has been under- and over-invoicing of exports and 
imports. With this system, exporters would under-invoice a foreign customer and then
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make use of the excess funds to invest in foreign assets. Foreign and local agents can 
also evade capital controls through leads and lags in which trading firms pre-pay or 
delay payments for imports or exports. For example, an importer may pay early for 
goods in exchange for a discount thereby permitting the firm to effectively lend money 
to foreign economic agents. Another channel is through transfer pricing by 
multinationals (the prices assumed, for the purposes of calculating tax liability, to have 
been charged by one unit of a multinational company when selling to another (foreign) 
unit of the same firm). By adjusting its transfer prices, inter-company transfers can 
enable these entities to shift funds into and out of the country.
Given the inability of controls to prohibit capital outflows during a crisis, some countries 
have attempted to put in place controls on short-term inflows. For example, a deposit 
reserve requirement could be used to eliminate any benefits that potential short-term 
investors see in the economy by raising the cost of investment. De Gregorio, Edwards 
and Valdes (1998) as well as Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998) both report that these type 
of controls have been effective in the case of Chile in affecting the composition of 
capital inflows, shifting them away from short-term flows, while still not discouraging 
long-term capital flows. Edwards (1999) also argued that these controls seemed to have 
also protected Chile from small external shocks; however, they were less effective in 
shielding the country against contagion emanating from large external shocks.
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) argue that because of the uncertain macroeconomic 
and political environment in many developing countries, expected returns tend to be 
lower. As a result, domestic savers may wish to hold a larger proportion of their capital 
overseas, thereby limiting the amount of funds available for domestic investment. 
Capital controls can be used in this situation to ensure that domestic funds are available 
to domestic investors. From the 1950s to 1970s, nationalist movements sprung-up in 
most developing countries, resulting in many states seeking independence from colonial 
powers and also a desire to restrict foreign ownership of domestic firais, resources and 
real estate. Capital controls were in this instance put in place to limit foreign ownership. 
Although, these controls ensure that most of the rewards from domestic resources accrue
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to nationals, they also limit the benefits available from foreign direct investment such as 
attaining new technologies. In addition, restricting capital raises inflation through two 
channels: (1) by keeping capital in the home economy it allows the government to tax 
wealth and interest income, and; (2) since it led to higher inflation, it allows government 
to raise revenue through the inflation tax (the reduction in value to holders of existing 
money balances due to the issuance of new money is termed the inflation tax).
2.2 THEORETICAL MODELS OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
LIBERALISATION
One o f the fundamental concepts o f economics is that with perfect information, perfect 
capital markets and perfect competition, the equilibrium achieved with the competitive 
market system is pareto efficient: there is no other feasible allocation which makes some 
individual better off and no individual worse off (see Smith, 1776 for a deductive 
derivation of this concept and Bator, 1957, for a more formal derivation). This theorem, 
although based on strong assumptions, has influenced economic thinking on issues 
related to taxation, tariffs, education, health care and, of course, capital controls.
One of the most influential papers to apply this concept to the capital account was Lucas 
(1982). Lucas showed that it was possible for countries to diversify away output shocks 
by opening their capital account. The author first notes that no two countries are exactly 
alike. Some countries, such as those in Latin America, have traditionally specialised in 
the production of agricultural commodities. In contrast, Middle Eastern countries, 
because of their resource endowment, usually focus on the production of energy related 
goods or services. The specialisation of production in commodities implies that 
domestic consumption can be significantly affected by shocks to either domestic 
production or price. Lucas shows that one possible solution is for residents in each 
country to hold a portion of their portfolio in foreign stocks or assets.
The model assumes a two-country pure exchange economy with a single representative 
agent in each nation (this implies that there are no domestic market imperfections). The
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“home” country has a stochastic endowment of national output given by A', while the 
“foreign” country has a stochastic endowment of output illustrated by Y. The “home” 
country’s consumption of domestic and foreign output is given by X/, and y ,,. The 
“foreign” country also consumes both local and foreign outputs and these are given by 
Xj. and y j . .
Following Cole and Obstfeld (1991), the specialised case of isoelastic-preferences is 
examined. The social planner’s problem is therefore of the following form:
Maximise ^  »— — -------- -t-(l-^u)#— -------  (2.1)1 - p  1 - p
subject to
X / , + X / = Y ,  y „ + y ^ = Y  (2.2)
where p  1 (a discount factor), 6 is the weight that determines the relative 
consumption of home and foreign output, and p  is the planner’s weight that determines 
relative national wealth in equilibrium; both 6 as well as p  are bounded between 0 and 
1. The solution to the problem implies that each country consumes:
X,, — ÀX, Xf  = (1 -  A)X (2 3)
where A = --------- !------—  andcr = 1 / p . Using Equation (2.3) one will notice that thei+[(i-p)/pr
ratio of marginal utilities from consuming any good is constant across states of nature. 
Countries therefore effectively insure each other against country-specific output shocks.
Beginning with Lucas (1987), many authors have attempted to estimate the gains from 
international risk sharing. Lucas, using a calibrated model o f the US economy, 
estimates that the gains from risk sharing are only one third of one percent. Similar 
results are reported by Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Backus, Kehoe and Kydland 
(1992). One may argue that the benchmark case of the US economy does not provide a 
true picture of the gains from international risk sharing, since the level of development
15
of the domestic financial market may provide greater opportunities for self-insurance 
through intertemporal domestic reallocations. However, Mendoza (1995) and Tesar 
(1995), both using calibrated woiid-economy models, find risk-sharing gains similar to 
the magnitude reported in previous studies. One of the only studies to report large gains 
from risk sharing is Pallage and Rob (2000) who examined the case of very poor 
countries. The empirical results above obviously would imply that a country is not 
significantly better or worse off because of its decision to maintain a closed capital 
account.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), however, specify the question a bit differently: instead of 
asking ‘what are the gains from international risk sharing?’, they ask ‘what is the cost of 
exclusion from world capital markets?’ The authors report that with parameters derived 
from real-world data on developing countries, the penalty from future exclusion from 
world capital markets range from just 5% GDP for Colombia to 53% for Lesotho.
Economic models suggest that an open capital account can also assist in ensuring an 
efficient allocation of world savings. Figure 1.1 is the so-called Metzler (1960) diagram, 
and it presents savings and investment schedules for ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ country. 
‘Home’ has an autarky interest rate of while ‘foreign’ savings are paid an interest rate 
o f r ^ ,  where Examining, first, the case of perfect capital immobility,
equilibrium is given by A and A' for the ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ country.
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Figure 1.1: Metzler Diagram, Capital Flows from Low to High Interest Rate 
Countries
Interest rate, r Ititere st rate, r7*
Capital Outflows
I—
Capital Inflows
Now
Savings, SA  Savings, S' A '
Investment, / Inve stment, /
consider the case of perfect capital mobility, with citizens of either country allowed to 
freely move their savings to and from their country. Equilibrium occurs at interest 
rate 7% which is above but below 77 . Capital flows from ‘home’ to ‘foreign’ to take
advantage of comparatively higher interest rates, resulting in an expansion in aggregate 
savings at home. As a result, investment in the ‘foreign’ country rises above that 
obtained in the equilibrium without capital flows. Agents in both countries are better 
off, as savers in the ‘home’ country benefit from higher interest rates, while those in the 
‘foreign’ country are able to expand their investment by employing relatively cheaper 
funds.
Indeed, the rise in investment should also result in greater growth in the “foreign” 
country. MacDougall (1960) was the earliest author to emphasise the importance of 
foreign investment flows, particularly for developing countries, as it can facilitate the 
transfer of not only finance for potential projects but also lead to the diffusion of 
technical and managerial knowledge or so-called “learning by doing” effects. Numerous
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authors since then, such as Beithélemy and Démurger (2000), Borensztein, De Gregorio, 
and Lee (1998), and Grossman and Helpman (1991) have investigated these effects. 
Since the main results o f the models are quite similar, only Borensztein, De Gregorio, 
and Lee (1998) are examined in detail.
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) utilises a neoclassical model of firm growth 
to examine the interaction between foreign capital flows and growth. The authors’ 
model show that foreign capital flows, measured in the study by the proportion o f capital 
goods produced by foreign firms, has a positive impact on the country’s long-term 
growth rate. This effect works through two channels: reducing the cost of introducing 
new varieties of capital and expanding the existing stock of skilled labour employed in 
the production of goods and services.
If  capital flows tend to result in greater growth in capital receiving countries, this should 
imply some degree of international income convergence. Building on this notion, Barro, 
Mankiw and Sala-l-Martin (1995) construct a neoclassical model of growth in which 
countries that are more open to capital, converge at a faster rate than closed economies. 
To account for this result, the authors note that while the physical capital to human 
capital ratio in closed economies is constant, for open economies the ratio initially starts 
at a high level due to capital flows financing physical capital investment. This, however, 
results in diminishing returns to human capital setting in much faster, and since 
convergence is inversely related to the capital share, economies that are more open 
exhibit a faster rate of convergence.
In addition to growth, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002) argue that a reduction in 
restrictions on capital flows can result in higher levels of aggregate efficiency or total 
factor productivity (TFP). The authors employ a two-country model, with one 
homogenous good and three periods. Output is produced with Cobb-Douglas 
technology and the economy is populated by two agents: capitalists and workers. In the 
model, the benefits of liberalisation (higher welfare of domestic workers) result not from 
the flows that the country may receive, but because it leads to the development of the
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formai, efficient sector. In addition, it reduces the equilibrium level of taxation on 
capital by making it more mobile.
By making capital more mobile, it also lowers the cost o f capital. Eun and 
Janakiramanan (1986) considers a two country world — ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ In the 
‘home’ country there are M,^ risky assets available and in ‘foreign’ there are Mj. risky
assets. There are no restrictions in the ‘home’ country on foreign investment; however, 
‘foreign’ restricts foreign investment so that the aggregate proportion o f the number of 
shares outstanding of any foreign firm is no more than <5 (an exogenously determined 
constant). Assuming no capital market imperfections and that each investor allocates his 
or her investable funds to maximise expected utility of end-of-period wealth, subject to 
his or her budget constraint, the authors show that the more severe the <5 constraint the 
higher the premium the ‘home’ investors have to pay. Therefore, liberalisation should 
reduce the cost of capital.
Alessandria and Qian (2005) also argue that capital account liberalisation can, under 
certain circumstances, strengthen the role o f financial intermediaries, leading to an 
improvement in the number o f investment projects. Building on the endogenous 
financial intermediation models of Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986), the authors 
consider a model with an infinite number of economic agents, with each agent endowed 
with one unit o f a single good that can either be consumed or invested. A subset of the 
agents is also endowed with an investment project. To finance the project the agent 
must borrow. To account for the characteristics of developing countries, the author 
assumes that the economy’s endowment is too small to fund some of the investment 
projects. With the opening o f the capital account, the domestic rate of return on loans 
will be the same as that on the international market. Alessandria and Qian (2005) report 
that depending on the level of financial sector development, indexed by the effectiveness 
and the cost of monitoring technology, opening up the capital account strengthens the 
incentives of banks to monitor entrepreneurs and results in a larger number of projects 
with positive net present values.
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Many authors, such as Qian and Roland (1998) and Obstfeld (1998), also argue that 
capital account liberalisation punishes wasteful or corrupt governments with capital 
flight and can therefore induce them to pursue good policies (lower fiscal deficits, 
introduction of legislation to protect property rights and limit monetisation o f the fiscal 
deficit). However, Cai and Treisman (2005) present a model to show that when regions 
or countries are significantly different in terms of natural resources, human capital, or 
infrastructure, better-endowed units may compete away capital from less-endowed 
counterparts. As a result, there is no significant change in the resource-scarce country 
and policy may be even less business friendly. Rogowski (2003) reports similar results.
The theoretical literature surveyed above suggests that capital account liberalisation can 
have positive benefits for small states in terms of international risk sharing, capital 
inflows, growth, international income convergence, aggregate efficiency, domestic 
institutions and policy discipline. Many of the assumptions on which these theoretical 
predictions are based, however, do not always hold in the real world. Consequently, the 
real world effects of liberalisation may differ somewhat from the theoretical 
expectations. The following sections attempt to provide a survey of the literature on the 
empirical effects of capital account liberalisation.
2.3 THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL CONTROLS
Capital controls did not exist in the early years of the development of most small states. 
Since they were colonies of larger developed countries (see Table 2.1) -  employed to 
produce basic commodities, for example, cane sugar, beet sugar, cotton, spices, and the 
like — funds tended to flow freely between the colony and the métropole (or mother 
country o f the colony). Capital inflows to the colony were used to finance the 
production of the next year’s crop and general administration. Similarly, funds flowed 
from the country to colonial rulers to repay loans, the remittance of profits and 
consequently the savings of emigrants fi om the colonial country (see Green, 1991).
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Table 2.1: Small States and their M étropole
Country Métropole
Africa 
Cape Verde 
Comoros 
Guinea-Bissau
Mauritius
Sao Tome and Principe 
Seychelles
Portugal
France
Portugal
Portugal, The
Netherlands, France 
and Britain 
Portugal
France and Britain
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Anguilla
Antigua and Barbuda 
Aruba
The Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
The British Virgin Islands
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic 
Grenada
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Montserrat
The Netherlands Antilles
Puerto Rico 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
United States Virgin Islands 
Asia and the Pacific
American Samoa
Britain
Britain
Spain and The
Netherlands
Britain
Britain
Britain
Britain
Spain
France and Britain 
France and Spain 
Britain
The Netherlands and 
Britain
Spain and France
Britain
Britain
The Netherlands 
Spain and the United 
States o f America 
Britain
France and Britain 
France and Britain 
The Netherlands 
Britain
The Netherlands and 
the United States of 
America
The Netherlands, 
Britain, Gemiany 
and the United 
States o f America
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Country Métropole
Bahrain Portugal and Britain 
The United States o f
The Commonwealth o f the Northern Marianas America
Britain and New
Cook Islands Zealand
Fiji Britain
French Polynesia France
Spain, Japan and 
United States of
Guam America
Kiribati Britain
The Netherlands and
Maldives Britain
United States of
Marshall Islands America
United States of
The Federated States o f Micronesia America
Nauru Australia
New Caledonia France
Niue New Zealand 
United States of
Palau America
Germany, Britain
Papua New Guinea and Australia
Samoa New Zealand
The Solomon Islands Britain
Portugal and
Timor-Leste Indonesia
Tonga Britain
Tuvalu Britain
Vanuatu Britain
Sources: CIA World Factbook
Cooper (1999) reports that the modem form of capital controls seem to have arose in 
France during the final years of World War I. In order to finance its war efforts, France 
was forced to rely on its monetary reserves and loans from the United States of America. 
In order to shore-up its reserves, France, on 3 April 1918, instituted a broad exchange 
control law designed to inhibit capital outflows. Residents were required to seek 
permission from the Ministry of Finance to export capital, such as securities or funds for 
the purchase o f securities (Dulles, 1929, p.223). This law remained in place until 1927 
and allowed the country to ease the deflationary adjustment necessary for a reversion to 
the gold standard in the same year. Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) report that during these
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interwar years, rising fiscal and external trade deficits led most countries to implement 
some form of capital control; even Germany, also, as part of its war effort, implemented 
a system of controls of payments to foreigners that were kept in place even after 
Germany’s surrender (Moulton and McGuire, 1923, p. 166).
After subsiding somewhat in the late 1920s, capital controls emerged again in the 1930s 
as countries sought to deal with the 1931 international financial crisis. In this year, 
Austria, Germany and Hungary suffered currency crises while Britain reported huge 
capital outflows. Accordingly, most countries, re-adopted exchange controls in that 
year. The budding popularity o f capital controls also reflected national disenchantment 
with traditional neoclassical type policies and the emergence o f more government 
intervention and control in the economy.
World War 11 not only left most countries with large debts, but also significant controls 
on trade and capital flows. Consequently, a new post-war international financial 
institution was created, the International Monetary Fund, after a United Nations 
conference convened in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, U.S. in July 1944. The 
governments represented at the conference sought to re-build international economic 
cooperation and thereby avoid a repetition of the economic policies that had contributed 
to the Great Depression. Indeed, Article V lll of the IMF Articles of Agieement states, 
“subject to the provisions o f Article Vll, Section 3(b) and Article XIV, Section 2, no 
member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the making of 
payments and transfers for current international transactions.” Capital controls, rather 
than diminishing, proliferated between 1950 and 1970 (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998).
During the 1950s and 1970s nationalists’ movements sprung up in most small states, 
leading to most states seeking independence fi’om colonial powers. France, for example, 
gave independence to all of its African colonies in 1960, while Britain gave most of its 
colonies independence between 1960 and 1970. Developing countries, following the 
state-led path to development, shunned foreign direct investment in favour of national 
champions/state-run enterprises (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998) and implemented complex
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systems of control consisting of quantitative regulations, tariffs, permits, multiple 
exchange rate regimes and capital controls. To finance national development plans, 
developing countries therefore utilised funds from multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank and aid donors, which flowed freely from the two Cold War combatants.
With the collapse of Bretton Woods and most developed countries abandoning fixed 
exchange rates, capital controls were no longer necessary. Between 1974 and 1975, the 
USA eliminated its restrictions on capital outflows while Germany liberalised controls 
on capital inflows. The United Kingdom, under Prime Minister Thatcher, abolished 
capital controls, while Japan followed in 1980. The decision by the European 
Community to establish a single market by 1992 implied greater freedom of capital to 
move freely within the EU.
As the import-substitution policies pursued by most developing countries failed to 
deliver results and the two oil shocks of the 1970s ravaged some economies, most states 
were forced to adopt even stiffer controls on the flow of capital. Capital controls were, 
however, relaxed somewhat in the 1990s, as governments tended to rely more on private 
markets in pursuit of economic development. Nevertheless, in many developing 
countries capital movements remained unchanged or were even more restrictive than in 
the 1960s (Cooper, 1999). Chile, for example, had a long history o f controls on capital 
account flows and transactions that started in the 1930s and continued through the mid- 
1970s. These controls were gradually liberalised in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but 
were tightened because o f the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s (Gallego, 
Hernandez Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, 1999).
2.4 QUANTIFYING CAPITAL ACCOUNT RESTRICTIONS
While it is easy to state whether or not a country had capital controls or not, quantifying 
these controls is somewhat more difficult. The intensity, coverage and type of controls 
vary from country to country and over time. Economic researchers have employed 
numerous types of indicators in an attempt to quantify capital controls. These proxies
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can be categorised into three groups: ex-post macroeconomic indicators, capital account 
restrictions indices and regression-based indices.
Assuming that that capital controls restrict capital flows, the integration of capital 
markets can be evaluated by the quantity of capital that flows across borders (Eken, 
1984; Feldman, 1986; Levich, 1987). Therefore, a larger volume o f cross-border 
transactions is reflective of greater capital market openness; to allow for cross-country 
comparisons, most authors express capital flows as a ratio of gross domestic product. In 
a similar vein. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) utilise annual estimates of portfolio and 
direct investment assets and liabilities as a ratio of gross domestic product. Assuming 
that uncovered interest parity holds, one alternative to these measures is the difference 
between onshore and offshore interest rates, as these two rates should equilibrate in the 
absence of capital controls. These measures of capital account restrictions, however, 
tend to be correlated with the monetary, fiscal or exchange rate policy stance, the returns 
offered by domestic markets and even political circumstances.
Given the drawbacks of macroeconomic indicators, researchers have also developed 
indices o f capital controls to track all changes in restrictions within and between 
countries. One of the simplest of these indices is a dummy variable that takes a value of 
one if a country has restrictions on capital outflows and zero if it does not. This 
information is usually derived from various editions of the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER): Building on this 
approach, Quinn (1997) employs coding rules to capture not only the presence of, but 
also the intensity of capital controls. The author assesses a nation’s financial restrictions 
on exchange payments and receipts for the import of goods, services and capital. Quinn 
uses a scale o f zero (if import payments are forbidden) to two (if transactions are free). 
These indices are derived for 64 countries over the period 1958 to 1989. Similar 
approaches are developed by Montiel and Reinhart (1999) and Haggard and Maxfield 
(1996). One of the major drawbacks of this index approach is that two independent 
researchers coding the data may not necessarily arrive at the same measure of financial 
openness.
25
Most regression-based indices of capital account restrictions begin with some basic 
theoretical model from which an empirical prediction is derived. Feldstein and Horioka 
(1980), building on the fundamental recognition that in a closed economy the return on 
savings is the national marginal product of capital. This implies that domestic savings or 
investment can only rise if the return on capital offers a high enough reward to postpone 
consumption. In a country where capital is perfectly mobile, however, additional 
savings will leave the country if  the foreign rates of return are above those that exist 
domestically. Therefore, when capital is free to flow between countries net-of-tax rates 
of returns should be equalised and there should be no strong relation between savings 
and investment.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) however find tha t^  was about 0.89 when gross savings 
were used or 0.94 when net savings were employed. The authors take this result “as 
evidence against world capital mobility and in favour o f a close relation between 
domestic investment and savings . . .” This finding has puzzled economists ever since 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000), and has prompted significant research into this area (see 
Coakley, Kulasi and Smith, 1998, for a survey of this literature). Coakley, Kulasi and 
Smith note that “in the face of a variety of replications, the Feldstein-Horioka result of a 
high cross-section association between saving and investment rates is remarkably 
robust.”
Given the controversy with the Feldstein and Horioka (1980) approach, Aizenman, Pinto 
and Radziwill (2004) develop a measure of capital mobility that is instead based on the 
ratio of cumulative discounted gross national saving and gross national investment -  the 
share of domestic capital that was financed by domestic savings. However, the 
criticisms of the Feldstein and Horioka correlations also apply to Aizenman, Pinto and 
Radziwill’s measure as well.
Based on the theoretical model developed by Edwards and Klian (1985), some studies 
have sought to estimate the degree of capital mobility by exploiting information from the
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behaviour of the coefficients o f an interest rate determination model. Edwards and Khan 
note that if the capital account were completely closed, domestic market-clearing 
interest rate ( / ) would be given by the weighted sum of the uncovered interest parity 
interest rate, /* , and the domestic market clearing rate, j :
/ = V 7/*+(I-i//)/, 0 < y / < l .  (2.4)
The coefficient is an index of capital mobility, and takes a value of zero with perfect 
capital immobility and one when there are no restrictions on the flow of capital.
Edwards (1985a, 1985b), Edwards and Khan (1985), Edwards (1986), Haque and 
Montiel (1990), Haque, Lahiri and Montiel (1993) and others use this approach to 
estimate the degree of capital mobility in developing countries. Most estimates are 
within the 0 to 1 range, but are unexpectedly high. Maloney (1997), however, criticises 
the approach for insufficiently explaining how the averaging of closed and open 
economy interest rates arise from the behaviour of individuals. The author therefore 
suggest that i// is not a measure of openness but a gauge of how easy it is to reallocate 
ones portfolio if the capital account is closed.
Korajczyk (1996) and Levine and Zervos (1998) employ the capital asset pricing model 
and international asset arbitrage pricing theory to derive measures of integration. The 
authors assumes that there exists a weighted portfolio of stocks with excess returns 
denoted by P ; firm level observations on stock returns from 24 markets are used to 
estimate the weighted portfolio. A regression of the following form is then estimated:
R^ , = a,. + b^ P^  + , / = 1,2, . . . , 777; / = 1,2..., r, (2.5)
where m is the number o f assets, t time, and R is the excess return on asset / or the 
return on asset m above the risk-free rate. If  markets are perfectly integrated, then the 
intercept {a. )  should be zero:
=«2 =*■'= ^ • (2.6) 
The estimates of a.  from Equation (2.6) can be employed as measures of financial 
integration. Eichengreen (2001) argues that the above equation does not adequately
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capture financial integration, as returns will vary according to the characteristics of the 
underlying assets.
2.5 THE EVIDENCE ON CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
2.5.1 CAPITAL FLOWS, COST OF CAPITAL. AND EQUITY RETURNS
One o f the fundamental arguments in favour o f capital account liberalisation is that the 
removal o f controls on financial flows should result in an increase in flows from the low 
return to the high return country and allow international risk sharing (see Obstfeld, 1994; 
Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2000). Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2005) 
examine the main determinants of capital inflows into 23 developing countries between 
1970 and 1993. The dependent variable, the average of capital inflows during the 
period, is regressed on institutional quality, distantness, capital controls (measured using 
an approach similar to Johnston and Tamirisa, 1998), GDP per capita, inflation 
volatility, human capital and bank credit. The author reports that capital controls have a 
significant negative impact on capital inflows but have an insignificant effect on capital 
flow volatility. Johnston and Ryan (1994) and Bartolini and Drazen (1997) obtain 
similar findings, but note that capital controls do not effectively prevent outflows in 
developing countries, as mis-invoicing may be used to evade capital controls and that 
the easing of restrictions on capital outflows, as a part of a broad set of policies aimed at 
reducing financial repression, is often associated with large capital inflows
Based on the Metzler diagiam presented earlier, capital account liberalisation should 
result in a convergence in the cost or capital across countries, as capital flows from the 
low interest rate to the high interest rate country. Bakaert and Harvey (2000) employ the 
Gordon giowth model, which assumes that dividend yields is the ratio of dividends to 
the cost of capital less the growth rate of dividends, to examine the effects of capital 
account liberalisation on the cost of capital. In the Gordon growth model the price of a 
stock ( P  ) is given by:
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P = - ^  (2.7)k - g
where D  refers to dividends, k is the cost o f capital and g  is the expected growth rate 
of dividends. If the expected rate o f growth of dividends is constant as liberalisation 
takes place, then the change in dividend yields following a liberalisation should 
coiTespond to the change in the cost of capital. Bakaert and Harvey control for a number 
of other factors that could possibly affect emerging market returns such as asset 
concentration, stock market development, micro structure effects, macroeconomic and 
political effects. The authors report that opening the capital account reduces the cost of 
capital, but not by much, about 5 to 15 basis points. Stulz (1999) notes that there are 
two key drawbacks with this approach: expected returns are not constant and since the 
data are noisy, the valuation model will not hold for every stock price.
Alternatively, Henry (2003) assumes that if liberalisation reduces the cost of capital, one 
should notice a one-time revaluation of stock prices. Using data on 18 developing 
countries and an index of stock market liberalisation, Henry plots dividend yields against 
the contemporaneous value of the cost of capital, as well as five years prior and after 
liberalisation. The results presented suggest that average yields fall by about 240 basis 
points because of liberalisation (from 5% prior to liberalisation to 2.6% five years after 
liberalisation). The author goes on to argue that if the cost of capital declines investment 
should in turn expand. Using the same approach as outlined above, Henry estimates that 
the growth rate of the capital stock rises by 1.1 percentage points after liberalisation. 
The main drawback of the results presented in Henry’s study is that the fall in dividend 
yields could occur as a result o f a number of other factors not explicitly considered by 
the author, for example, negative news about the future prospects for the firm or 
industry.
As an alternative to the Gordon growth model, the capital asset pricing model can also 
be employed to test for the effects of liberalisation. In a completely closed market 
where the assumptions of the CAPM model holds, investors would only care about the 
expected return of their portfolio and the variance. In a more integrated capital market.
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it is likely that domestic returns could be correlated with the return on foreign stocks 
(Chan, Karolyi and Stulz, 1992). Durham (2000) using data on 12 developing countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Korea, Mexico, Thailand, Colombia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Taiwan, and Venezuela) employ the CAPM approach to investigate the 
effects of liberalisation. After controlling for value (price to equity ratio and dividend to 
price ratio), macroeconomic (namely inflation), demographic and country risk measures, 
the author reports that liberalisation is not a robust determinant of stock market 
performance.
Kim and Singal (2000) use weekly stock market indices for 16 developing countries and 
report that, on average, emerging countries’ stock markets also tend to become more 
efficient (Fama, 1970, suggests that, at any given time, prices fully reflect all available 
information on a particular stock and/or market, therefore in efficient markets no 
investor has an advantage in predicting a return on a stock price, and returns should be a 
random walk) after opening-up. De Santis and Imrohoroglu (1997) estimate a number 
of models to describe the dynamics of returns in emerging market countries (Greece, 
Turkey, India, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, China, Thailand, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela). The authors use a deterministic two- 
regime model that allows the conditional mean and variance o f returns to change with 
market liberalisation. De Santis and Imrohoroglu find that market volatility does not 
significantly change after liberalisation, but increases the probability of observing big 
surprises. The authors argue that gieater participation by foreign investors broadens the 
market and thereby reduces market volatility.
Bekaert and Harvey (1997), using data on 20 emerging market countries from the 
International Finance Coiporation database of the World Bank, examines the correlation 
between local market volatility and capital market liberalisations. The authors examine 
models that explicitly account for the non-normality of returns, time-varying conditional 
means (to account for departures ft om the efficient market hypothesis) and the degree of 
capital market liberalisation. The model estimated is of the following form:
30
In <jf 13 + g, (2.8)
where <j  ^ is the conditional variance and X  is a matrix of explanatory variables such as 
asset concentration, stock market capitalisation to GDP, exports plus imports as a ratio 
o f GDP, market microstructure (the cross-sectional standard deviation of each index’s 
component stock returns and the cross-sectional mean absolute deviation, both relative 
to average stock market returns), exchange rate variability as a proxy for inflation 
variability, political and credit risks. Bekaert and Harvey find that volatility tends to 
decline in most countries after liberalisation (by about 6%). The authors subjected the 
model to various robustness checks; however, the results did not significantly change.
Kim and Singal (2000) also assess the effects that stock market liberalisation has on 
market volatility. They argue that with the integration of world markets, stock market 
volatility should decline as risks are diversified. The authors use autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework to model the volatilities o f 20 developing 
countries. These volatilities are then examined prior to and post liberalisation to identify 
whether there is a significant decline. Kim and Singal estimate that volatility falls on 
average from 10.8% to 9.5% post liberalisation, with the largest decline in volatility 
occurring in the fourth and fifth years after liberalisation.
Based on the theoretical findings of Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), Henry (2000a,b) 
argues that if liberalisation reduces the cost of capital, then holding expected future cash 
flows constant, equity prices as well as investment in the liberalising country should rise, 
as the fall in the cost of capital makes some projects, that previously had a negative net 
present value, viable. Using data on 12 developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and 
Venezuela) and a database of stock market liberalisation dates, both official 
announcement dates and implementation dates, the author estimates the following panel 
data model:
R^ , = a,. + Y libéralisé.j + g,., (2.9)
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where i?,., is the stock market return in country f and time t,  a  are country-specific 
dummies, liberalise is a dummy variable that is equal to one eight months prior to and 
preceding liberalisation and zero otherwise and s  is an error term with normal 
properties. Estimating Equation (2.9) the author observe that liberalisation results in a 
26% rise in total stock market value in US dollar terms, after accounting for changes in 
macroeconomic fundamentals such as stabilisation policies, trade liberalisation, 
privatisation and the easing of exchange controls.
By way of a database of 20 developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Portugal, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe), Kim and 
Singal (2000) compare excess dollar returns prior to and post liberalisation, where 
excess returns are computed as the change in the market index (in US dollars) less the 
monthly riskless rate obtained on 3-month Treasury bills. Similar to Henry (2000a,b), 
the authors report that stock market returns tend to rise immediately after liberalisation, 
due to a growth in demand, but subsequently declines as domestic firms are able to 
access lower cost funds from international investors.
Henry (2000b) draws on a sample of 11 developing countries that have liberalised their 
stock market to examine if  these countries experienced an investment boom after 
liberalisation. The writer regresses the growth rate in real private investment on three 
liberalisation dummies that take a value of 1 in the year of liberalisation, as well as one 
to three years after and 0 elsewhere. Henry finds that the average growth rate of private 
investment jumps by 23 percentage points above the sample mean in the first year after 
liberalisation, 27 percentage points in the second and 17 percentage points in the third. 
Henry tries alternative estimation methodologies but the study’s findings did not change 
substantially. Levine and Zervos (1998), exploiting a mixture of 24 developed and 
developing countries, and the CAPM liberalisation measure, report similar findings.
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De Melo and Tybout (1986) present a case study of the effects of financial liberalisation 
on investment in Uruguay. The authors note that when capital is unconstrained, the real 
price of capital and expected growth play major roles. However, if the domestic market 
is financially repressed this relation does not hold. The authors therefore regress private 
investment as a ratio of GDP as a function of current and lagged real income growth, 
money growth, the real interest rate, the real exchange rate and lagged investment. De 
Melo and Tybout estimate the model for the entire sample period, 1962 -  1983, and use 
the cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) test to test for the presence of structural 
breaks, as well as comparing coefficient estimates obtained in various sub-periods. The 
author attributes such breaks to liberalisation, even though they could just be due to the 
rejection of the model or other shocks. De Melo and Tybout report an upward shift in 
the investment function after liberalisation as well as a greater correspondence between 
investment and interest rates and investment and the real exchange rate.
It is interesting to note whether liberalisation raises not only domestic, but also foreign 
direct investment. To do this, Henry (2000b) regresses the ratio of foreign direct 
investment to private investment on four liberalisation dummies that capture 
contemporaneous as well as lagged effects up to three years after the event. The author 
finds that in the majority of countries, the ratio tends to rise one to three years after the 
capital market liberalisation.
The empirical evidence on the effects of capital account liberalisation on financial 
variables seems to be quite positive. Greater financial integration, by increasing the 
amount of investable funds, seems to reduce the cost of capital and thereby foster gi eater 
investment. The rise in investment, by improving the prospects for firms, results in 
higher stock prices, a reduction in stock market volatility and reduction in the 
predictability of stock market returns. The main caveat to these studies is that they 
usually draw inferences from a small sample o f countries (less than 20) for which data is 
available. As a result, it is debatable whether these findings may hold for a set of over 
155 developing countries.
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2.5.2 ECONOMIC GROWTH AND INSTABILITY
Quinn (1997) presents one o f the earliest investigations of the relationship between 
financial integration and growth. The author augments a growth regression (containing 
initial GDP per capita, investment share, secondary-school enrolment, primary-school 
enrolment, government share, growth of government share, dummies to distinguish 
socialist countries and those that had a revolution/coup, region dummies, giowth of 
domestic credit, export share and civil liberalities variables) with a capital account 
restrictiveness index developed by the author. Quinn reports that international financial 
integration had a statistically significant and positive impact on average growth between 
1960 and 1989, with liberalisation raising annual long run growth by about 1.6% per 
year. The author, however, only give results using a broad indicator called financial 
openness, of which capital account integration is a component, and therefore does not 
allow one to disentangle the effects due to just capital account liberalisation.
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundlad (2001), with a stock market liberalisation dummy as a 
measure of liberalisation and a sample of both developed and developing countries, 
obtains similar results to those reported by Quinn (1997). However, the authors also 
subjected their model to a wide variety of experiments including an alternative set of 
liberalisation dates, different groupings of countries and four different time-horizons for 
measuring economic growth. The results did not change appreciably. Henry (2003), on 
the other hand, employs data on just 18 developing countries and an index of stock 
market liberalisation to evaluate the effects of capital market liberalisation. The author 
plots output per worker five years prior and after liberalisation and finds that, on 
average, output per worker rises by 2.3 percentage points.
Edwards (2001) focuses specifically on the growth experience of emerging economies 
after capital account liberalisation. Using the Quinn index of liberalisation, the study 
evaluates the effect o f liberalisation on both giowth and total factor productivity. The 
author finds that the coefficient on liberalisation is positive, after controlling for the 
effects of the standard variables used in cross-country growth regressions, only for those
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emerging market countries that have achieved a certain level of financial development. 
Klein and Olivei (1999) report similar results.
Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) dispute the results reported by Edwards (2001). 
They note that weighting the obseiwations by initial GDP implies that rich countries 
have more influence on the overall regression estimates and that the exclusion of current 
account openness could potentially bias the results, as this is likely to be correlated with 
capital account liberalisation. Instead, the authors report that the impact of financial 
liberalisation depends on the degree of macroeconomic stability rather than income.
Klein (2005) also examines the relationship between capital account liberalisation and 
growth, but the author allows for the effects that institutional quality can have on the 
success o f greater financial integration. The paper argues that countries with poor 
institutions do not benefit fully from liberalisation, as both domestic and foreign 
investors face relatively higher risks o f expropriation. Klein exploits data on 71 
countries between 1976 and 1995. Klein estimates five growth models where average 
growth is regressed on initial income, an indicator of openness as well as various 
specifications that allow growth to depend on institutional quality in a linear and 
quadratic fashion, the rate of convergence which depends on the proportion of years a 
country had an open capital account and allows the effect of capital account 
liberalisation on growth to vary with each quintile of institutional quality. Klein finds 
that capital account liberalisation does have a positive impact on growth; however, the 
estimated effect varies with institutional quality. The study also reports that upper- 
middle-income countries tend to benefit the most from liberalisation.
Although most of the previous studies report gains from liberalisation, a number of other 
studies -  using a wide cross-section of countries -  find no significant relationship 
between liberalisation and growth. The most widely cited of these are Rodrick (1998), 
Kraay (1998) and Edison, Levine, Ricci and Slok (2002). Rodrick makes use o f a 
database of 100 countries as well as the Share measure of liberalisation between 1975 
and 1989. He observes no significant relationship between liberalisation and growth or
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inflation and investment. Kraay, on the other hand, draws on a variety of liberalisation 
indicators including the Share, Quinn index and a measure based on actual net capital 
flows (1985-1997), however, all the liberalisation indicators were not significant. 
Edison, Levine, Ricci and Slok find no significant relationship between growth and 
financial integration; however, the authors report a positive relationship with variables 
such as educational attainment, financial development, and government integrity, which 
are likely to be positively correlated with growth.
Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok (2004) attempt to reconcile these differences found in the 
literature by estimating regressions that encompass the essential elements of previous 
studies. The paper observes that integration has an insignificant effect on growth except 
when interacted with government reputation or GDP. Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok 
suggest that these results could imply that an intermediate level of development may be 
a precondition for a country to benefit fi'om capital account liberalisation.
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004) argue that policymakers are more interested in 
growth volatility rather than average growth. The early theoretical literature on the topic 
was outlined in Lucas (1982) who argued that it was possible for a country to diversify 
away output shocks by opening its capital account. The model, however, assumes the 
absence of financial market frictions and the independence of savings and investment 
decisions. The stringency o f these assumptions has been the main basis of attack by 
authors against full capital account liberalisation, most notably, Stiglitz (2000). Stiglitz 
argues that liberalisation does not lead to greater stability, since capital flows are pro­
cyclical -  they increase when the economy is expanding and fall during economic 
downturns. Thus while capital flows do not necessarily cause business cycle 
fluctuations, they can exacerbate them.
Indeed, Mendoza (1994), using a stochastic dynamic business cycle model of a small 
open economy model considers the effects of loosening these assumptions on the Lucas 
predication that volatility should fall as a result of capital account liberalisation. The 
author finds that removing the assumption o f independent savings and investment
decisions breaks the link between output volatility and capital account liberalisation, but 
not consumption and investment volatility.
Early, theoretical models of the volatility-liberalisation relationship employed a 
neoclassical (or IS-LM) approach, while more recent papers exploit the New Open 
Economy Macroeconomic framework, which is more grounded in microeconomic 
theorising. One of the early neoclassical papers was Razin and Rose (1994). These 
authors evaluated the effects o f country-specific and global shocks on the volatility- 
capital account openness relationship. Razin and Rose assume a small open economy, 
which is subject to productivity shocks. The results show that capital account 
liberalisation increases the volatility of investment when the shocks are long-lasting and 
idiosyncratic. In line with traditional theory, the authors report that opening the capital 
account allows for better consumption smoothing and therefore reduces consumption 
volatility.
Baxter and Crucini (1995), using a two-country equilibrium model with restricted asset 
trade, find that the absence o f complete financial integration may not be important if 
shocks have low persistence or are transmitted rapidly across countries. However, if 
shocks are highly persistent or are not transmitted internationally, then financial 
integration could lead to greater economic volatility.
More recent models use the new open-economy macroeconomic (NOEM) models 
developed by authors such as Svensson and van Wijnbergen (1989) and popularised by 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995); for a survey o f the NOEM approach see Lane (2001). The 
main features of these models are optimisation-based dynamic general equilibrium 
modelling, nominal rigidities and market imperfections and the incorporation of 
stochastic shocks. Imperfect competition, where agents have market power, permits the 
explicit analysis of pricing decisions, rationalises demand-determined output in the 
short-run (since prices are set above marginal cost) and third, provides an explicit role 
for activist monetary policy intervention, as market power implies that equilibrium 
production is usually below the social optimum. In addition, the general equilibrium
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framework assumes that all agents act under perfect foresight, with households deriving 
their optimal consumption path, asset holdings and labour supply and firms employing 
labour to produce differentiated goods.
Authors such as Sutherland (1996), Senay (1998) and Buch, Dopke and Pierdzioch 
(2002), all exploit the NOEM approach to examine the impact of capital account 
liberalisation on volatility. The authors assume that households incur transaction costs 
when undertaking positions in international financial markets. This therefore leads to a 
gap between domestic and foreign interest rates and implies that internationally traded 
domestic and foreign financial assets are imperfect substitutes. The link between 
financial integration and volatility is then evaluated by studying the effects of monetary 
and fiscal shocks on output and consumption. The main predictions of these models is 
that the impact of financial integration on output volatility depends on the nature of the 
shocks: when the economy is subject to monetary policy shocks, financial integration 
increases the volatility of output and decreases the volatility of consumption, while the 
opposite is the case for fiscal policy shocks. Senay (1998) also combines the assumption 
of transaction costs in financial markets with the imperfect integration of the goods 
market. However, the main predictions of the model are similar.
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999) and Kouparitsas (1996) show that the 
relationship between liberalisation and volatility may be non-linear due to the effects of 
financial development and overall economic development. Aghion, Bacchetta and 
Banerjee use a dynamic open economy model with one tradeable good and one 
nontradeable good, which is an input in the production process of the tradeable good. 
They further assume that firms have credit constraints, with less developed firms facing 
tighter credit constraints. Aghion, Bacchetta and Baneijee’s results suggest that 
liberalisation may actually destabilise the economies of countries at an intermediate 
stage of development. The authors therefore recommend that countries postpone full 
capital account liberalisation until they reach a certain level of financial development. 
Similar findings are obtained by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001).
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Kouparitsas (1996) uses a real business cycle model with asymmetric trade between the 
North (developed) and the South (less developed). Both the North and the South trade 
in primary and manufactured goods. However, the North for the most part imports 
primary products from the South, which then uses these items to produce manufactured 
goods that are sold to the South. This set-up implies that without international financial 
markets, output and expenditures in the North and South should be highly correlated, 
and that the terms of the trade o f the South is highly volatile. In contrast, financial 
market integration allows agents to better pool risks, and the volatility of consumption 
should decline in both regions. However, due to its size, the North benefits less than the 
smaller southern countries. Building on this framework, Kose (2002), therefore argues 
that terms of trade shocks should also be included in the relationship between capital 
market liberalisation and economic volatility.
The predictions from the theoretical literature therefore seem to suggest that there should 
be a non-linear link between capital account liberalisation and economic volatility. 
However, many of the early empirical studies in the literature ignored the possibility of a 
non-linear relationship. For example, Razin and Rose (1994) exploiting data on 138 
countries between 1950 and 1998 report that there is no significant statistical 
relationship between various measures o f financial openness and the volatility of 
consumption, investment and/or output. Similarly, Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) 
using observations on 60-74 countries for two periods (1960-1978 and 1979-1997) 
report that the magnitude of the private capital flows variable has no significant 
influence on growth volatiltity.
However, evidence o f non-linearity has been indirectly reported by Buch, Doepke and 
Pierdzioch (2002). Based on observations on OECD countries for 40 years, the authors 
find that monetary and fiscal policy shocks have been the main sources of business cycle 
fluctuations in the 1980s and 1990s, when most countries opened their capital accounts. 
Similarly, authors such as Denizer, lyigun and Owen (2000), O’Donnell (2001), and 
Calderon, Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005), using data on a wide cross-section of 
countries, explicitly take into account the effects of financial development on the
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volatility-liberalisation relationship. In line with the theoretical models, all the authors 
report that business cycle volatility depends on the degree of financial development, 
with those countries with more developed financial sectors being better able to reduce 
output volatility through financial integration.
Similarly, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundbald (2004) based on series for 95 countries find 
that equity market liberalisation (also regarded as a measure o f financial development) 
leads to a significant decline in both output and consumption volatility that is larger than 
overall capital account liberalisation. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2004) employ the 
IMF’s 0/1 dummy and estimate and an equity market liberalisation indicator, and the 
authors report that consumption volatility falls by 1.7%.
Some empirical studies have also attempted to test whether the non-linear relationship 
between financial integration and macroeconomic volatility also depends on whether the 
country has a diversified trading regime and the size of the economy. Kose, Prasad, and 
Terrenes (2003), Kose (2002) and Senhadji (1998), which all draw on cross-country 
databases, show that countries with an undiversified trade structure are more susceptible 
to terms of trade shocks and foreign demand shocks after financial integration. Kose, 
Prasad and Terrenes (2003) also find that after gross capital flows pass a particular 
threshold, it has a negative impact on volatility. Kose and Prasad (2002) note that small 
states that exhibit higher degrees o f trade and financial openness tend to be more prone 
to terms of trade shocks.
The link between capital account liberalisation on growth, as shown in this section, is 
somewhat fragile. What seems to emerge from many studies examined in this section is 
that liberalisation in o f itself does not guarantee greater growth. Certain institutional 
factors, such as investor protection legislation and good supervisory standards, are 
important if a country is to fully exploit the potential benefits from opening its capital 
account. If these institutional factors are absent, then liberalisation may have little or no 
impact on growth and may actually increase income volatility.
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2.5.3 EXCHANGE RATES
Since the literature usually finds a positive relationship between gieater financial 
integration and capital flows, some writers have attempted to examine what impact these 
flows have on a country’s exchange rate. However, there does not seem to be a robust 
relationship between the two variables. Calvo, Leidermand and Reinhart (1996) 
investigate the effects of large capital inflows on the real exchange rate in Asia and Latin 
America during the 1990s, They note that in Asia, the capital flows resulted in a rise in 
the share of investment in GDP, while in Latin America consumption expenditure 
increased. In Latin America, therefore, these flows resulted in inflation and an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Consequently, many countries in the region were 
forced to tighten fiscal policy and capital control measures in order to curb shot-term 
capital inflows and lengthen the maturity period of capital inflows.
Similarly, Edwards (2000), using a vector autoregression approach, empirically 
examines the dynamic effects o f capital inflows on the real exchange rate of Latin 
American countries. The study reports that, prior to liberalisation, there is an inverse 
relationship between the two variables. After liberalisation, however, this relationship 
was reversed. Although the magnitude and degree of persistence differed between 
countries, all countries reported that the large capital inflows of the 1990s led to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Edwards attributes his findings to a shift in the 
intertemporal elasticity of aggregate demand that led to a change in the extent of 
consumption smoothing and distribution of expenditure over time as well as the supply 
of elasticity o f nontradables, leading to a rise in inflation.
In a more explicit test o f the effects of capital controls on exchange rates, Edwards 
(1999), employing monthly data from June 1991 to September 1998, estimate a vector 
autoregression to examine the relationship between changes in the Chilean reserve 
requirement on capital inflows and the real exchange rate. The variables included were, 
the tax equivalent of the controls, the Chile-US bilateral real exchange rate, the rate of 
devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, and domestic interest rates. The paper
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observes that the tax on capital flows did not have a significant effect on Chile’s bilateral 
real exchange rate.
Kim and Singal (2000), making use of monthly data on inflation for 17 emerging market 
countries, also assess the effects that stock market liberalisation has on nominal 
exchange rates. Exchange rates are expressed in US dollars per unit. For most 
countries, the change in the exchange rate after liberalisation is not significantly 
different from zero or that the rate o f depreciation is significantly lower post­
liberalisation compared to after liberalisation. Kim and Singal then go on to assess the 
effects that stock market liberalisation has on nominal as well as real exchange rate 
volatility. Volatility of exchange rates is important since it increases the risk premium 
attached to cross-border transactions. The authors use autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to fit the volatilities of exchange rates in 
developing countries. These volatilities are then examined prior to and post 
liberalisation to identify whether there is a significant decline. Kim and Singal estimate 
that the volatility of nominal and real exchange rates tends to fall after liberalisation.
Rather than explicitly examining the link between capital controls and exchange rates, 
Glick and Hutchison (2005) considers whether restrictions on capital flows is associated 
with a lower or higher probability of an exchange rate crisis. The authors employ 
observations on 69 developing countries between 1975 and 1997. Restrictions on 
international payments are proxied by indices developed from the IMF’s Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Glick and Hutchison report that 
restrictions on capital flows are associated with a higher probability o f an exchange rate 
crisis, even after controlling for various macroeconomic restrictions and institutional 
factors.
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2.5.4 TRADE
If  capital account liberalisation significantly affects a country’s exchange rate, this 
should imply that a country’s level and composition of trade could change as well. 
Tamirisa (1999) make use of data on 40 developed, developing and transition countries, 
along with a gravity equation to examine the relation between trade and the removal of 
capital controls. Capital account liberalisation is measured using the approach outlined 
by Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) and the study reports that exchange and capital 
controls tend to be barriers to trade in both developing and transition countries but not in 
industrial states.
Aizenman and Noy (2004) exploits a larger database that contains annual series for 84 
countries between 1982 to 1998 to investigate the Granger causal relationship between 
financial and trade openness. Financial openness is measured as the sum of total capital 
inflows and outflows as a percent o f gross domestic product, while trade openness is the 
average sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP over the previous five years 
to smooth out any fluctuations due to temporary changes in the terms of trade. To 
control for the effects that missing variables might have on their results, the study 
includes a dummy variable to indicate a functioning democracy, as well as measures of 
corruption, inflation, per capita gross domestic product, the government’s budget surplus 
and the world interest rate. Aizenman and Noy report that there tends to be a two-way 
feedback relationship between the two variables: financial openness (Granger) causes 
trade openness while trade openness (Granger) causes financial openness. In addition, 
most of feedback between the two variables can be attributed to Granger causality rather 
than simple correlation between the two variables.
In contrast, Goldberg and Klein (2000) proxy capital mobility by the amount of foreign 
direct investment flows a country receives. They provide a simple partial equilibrium 
model to show that foreign direct investment into an industry increases output by 
providing more capital and by raising the marginal product o f labour. If  the industry 
was a net exporter, FDl increases exports, while if it was net Importer, FDl increases
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imports as these firms draw labour away from net exporters. To test this hypothesis 
empirically, the authors employ detailed sectoral trade and FDl inflow data between the 
United States and eight Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela) over the period 1972 to 1994. Using a cross- 
section equation, Goldberg and Klein regress net exports on US real GDP, domestic real 
GDP, the real exchange rate, and FDl inflows to a particular sector as well as FDl 
inflows to all other sectors. The authors obtain mixed results with FDl increasing 
exports in some countries but reducing it in others.
2.5.5 POLICY DISCIPLINE
One of the conventional arguments for opening up the capital account is that it has a 
disciplinary effect on the conduct o f national macroeconomic policies (see Fischer, 1998 
and Stiglitz, 2000). This assertion is based on the assumption that international capital 
flows tend to be highly sensitive to macroeconomic policies (responding negatively to 
bad monetary and fiscal policies). As a result, governments should be induced to 
conduct better macroeconomic policies. One should therefore find that capital account 
liberalisation is inversely related to governments’ fiscal deficit and inflation.
Kim (2003) tests this hypothesis using data on 54 industrial and developing countries 
between 1950 to 1989. Capital account liberalisation is measured via a 0/1 IMF 
liberalisation dummy, which is allowed to take intermediate values if the country has 
only liberalised its current account but not its capital account. Using three-stage least 
squares to control for endogeneity in some o f the explanatory variables, the budget 
deficit is expressed as a function o f capital account liberalisation, the yearly average 
number of executive changes, the average number of months a government lasts, the 
yearly average number o f coalition governments, the external current account balance as 
a percentage o f GDP, the exchange rate regime, the degree of central bank 
independence, the yearly average number o f leftist governments and trade openness (the 
sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP). The author’s results suggest that 
there exist a strong negative correlation between capital account liberalisation and the
44
fiscal deficit, with full liberalisation leading to a 2.3% improvement in government’s 
fiscal balance, holding all other factors constant. The analysis also showed that the 
disciplinary effect is stronger in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime and, 
surprisingly, weak central bank independence.
Building on the results reported in Kim (2003), Tytell and Wei (2004) present a simple 
theoretical model, backed up by empirical results to support the hypothesis about the 
disciplinary effect o f capital account liberalisation. The model considers a small open 
economy with one domestic firm and n foreign firms. Production depends only on 
productivity and the capital stock. The domestic capital stock is fixed, but the capital 
stock of foreign firms depends on the government’s policy rule (the probability of 
choosing either good or bad policies). Using backward induction, the authors show that 
the probability of government pursuing good policies is positively related to financial 
integration, and the number of foreign firms. Tytell and Wei then draw on data on 62 
countries (22 industrial and 40 developing) for the period 1975 to 1999 (the data is 
averaged over five-year non-overlapping sub-periods to smooth out business cycle 
fluctuations). Financial integration is measured as the ratio of total foreign assets and 
liabilities as a share of GDP. The budget deficit is then regressed on inflation, financial 
integration, government changes, government coalitions and trade openness. The 
authors, however, could not find evidence in support of the hypothesis that financial 
integration leads to smaller fiscal deficits.
Similarly, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) attempt to investigate whether the 
business cycle correlation of capital flows, fiscal or monetary policy has changed 
because of capital market integration. The authors exploit a database of 104 countries 
between 1960 to 2003. The sample is then split into two periods: 1960-1979, which they 
assume as the pre-liberalisation period, and 1980 to 2003, the post-liberalisation period. 
However, no significant change in either the correlation of the business cycle with 
capital flows or fiscal policy is observed (they were procyclical in both periods). There 
are two main drawbacks with Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh’s (2004) approach: not all
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countries liberalised during the 1980s and the results reported may be due to other 
factors unrelated to capital account liberalisation.
Grunberg (1998), in a primarily descriptive article provide two explanations as to why 
greater financial integration might actually lead to a deterioration in government’s fiscal 
balance. The author notes that capital controls might actually be a source of revenue for 
many developing states (for example a tax on capital outflows). In addition, since 
liberalisation implies that a larger proportion of economic activity is conducted either 
abroad or by non-national companies tax revenues usually fall, as foreign income is 
untaxed. The reduction in revenue is also met with a concomitant increase in the 
demand for public funds for retraining, social insurance, education, security, public 
transport and telecommunications. A government with inadequate preparation for 
capital account liberalisation also incurs increased expenditure as a result of bailing out 
banking crises. These two factors could possible account for the negative relationship 
reported by Tytell and Wei (2004).
Turning to inflation, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) provide one of the earliest attempts 
to examine the relationship between capital account openness and inflation. The authors 
use a panel of 61 countries over the period 1973 to 1989 and find that greater restrictions 
on capital account transactions and convertibility is associated with higher inflation. 
Gruben and McLeod (2001 and 2002) examine the effects of liberalisation using a 
financial integration indicator similar to that developed by Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) 
and data on 112 countries (20 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
or OECD and 82 developing countries). The authors regress inflation on liberalisation 
as well as a number of macroeconomic control variables (initial per capita GDP, trade 
share, political stability, government surplus and central bank openness). Gruben and 
McLeod report that liberalisation can reduce annual inflation by about 3% per annum. 
These results were robust to changes in the econometric model and methodology such as 
the inclusion of trade openness, and allowing for outliers, heteroskedasticity, 
institutional variables as well as the potential endogeneity of capital controls.
46
Kim and Singal (2000), using monthly data on inflation for 17 emerging market 
countries, calculate what the authors refer to as excess inflation (actual inflation less 
average inflation prior to liberalisation all divided by the standard deviation of inflation). 
Via parametric and non-parametric tests, Kim and Singal report a significant decrease in 
inflation after liberalisation. The authors also assess the effects that stock market 
liberalisation has on inflation volatility using autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models to fit the volatilities of the developing countries. 
These volatilities are then examined prior to and post liberalisation to identify whether 
there is a significant decline. Kim and Singal estimate that volatility fell in nine out of 
the 17 countries after liberalisation.
Tytell and Wei (2004) employ data on 62 countries (22 industrial and 40 developing) for 
the period 1975 to 1999 (the data is averaged over five-year non-overlapping sub­
periods to smooth out business cycle fluctuations). Financial integration is measured as 
the ratio of total foreign assets and liabilities as a share of GDP. Inflation is regressed 
on the budget deficit, financial openness, exchange rate flexibility, annual number of 
central bank governors, trade openness and a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
the country is an industrial country. The authors find that capital account liberalisation 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on inflation, and increases the 
probability of a transition fiom a low to moderate inflation environment.
While the literature seems to yield ambiguous results as it relates to the fiscal deficit and 
greater financial integration, there appears to be a robust inverse relationship between 
inflation and higher financial integration. These results may imply that liberalisation 
does not cause governments to pursue conservative spending policies, but rather changes 
the way it finances the fiscal deficit, i.e. less borrowing from the central bank and maybe 
more foreign borrowing or domestic paper issues. Unfortunately there are no studies 
that explicitly examine the impact that liberalisation has on the pattern of financing of 
government’s deficit as well as debt.
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2.5.6 INTEREST RATES
One other factor that can also influence a country’s fiscal deficit is the interest rate. If 
rates rise after liberalisation then the government’s debt service cost could expand as 
well. Edwards (1985a) in modeling the behaviour of interest rates, explicitly allows for 
the role of open economy factors. The author estimates an equation similar to that given 
in Equation (2.4) using quarterly data on Colombia for the period 1968 to 1982. 
Edwards reports that in more open economies the differentials between domestic 
nominal interest rates and world interest rates plus expected devaluation and risk 
premiums tends to be corrected quite quickly. Similar results are found by Edwards 
(1986) for Chile.
Honohan (2000), using data on money market interest rates between 1960 and 1996, 
examines the dynamic pattern of long- and short-term interest rates and measures the 
speed of adjustment of developing countries’ interest rates to external interest rate 
shocks before and after liberalisation. The author reports a general rise in real interest 
rates after the opening o f the capital account but also an increase in interest rate 
volatility. In contrast, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) investigating the effects of 
restrictions on capital flows in a panel of industrial and developing countries, find that 
capital controls are associated with lower domestic interest rates. The authors interpret 
this finding as supporting the view that greater financial integration limits international 
arbitrage in asset markets.
2.6 CRITICISMS OF MODELS OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
LIBERALISATION
In recent years, capital market liberalisation has drawn harsh criticism by some 
economists, especially Joseph Stiglitz. This author has written numerous articles 
arguing the case against financial integration (see Stiglitz, 2000, 2004a and 2004b). 
Stiglitz’s main contention is that “financial and capital market liberalisation -  done 
hurriedly, without first putting into place an effective regulatory framework” can do
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more harm than good. In most articles, Stiglitz focuses on short-term speculative flows 
rather than foreign direct investment, which is not as volatile and therefore should not be 
as disruptive.
Stiglitz notes that the case for capital account liberalisation is based on theoretical 
models that have fairly strong assumptions: perfect information, perfect capital markets 
and perfect competition. These assumptions are unlikely to be applicable to any 
country, especially developing states. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that 
capital market liberalisation is more likely to lead to instability, as capital flows tend to 
be pro-cyclical. Therefore as the economy enters a downturn in the business cycle, 
capital is likely to flow out o f the country (or the rate of growth will slow) accentuating 
the decline in economic activity.
Khan and Zahler (1985) note that “developing countries were being continually 
appraised of the benefits o f outward-looking policies ... [however], sharp declines in 
growth rates ... and the increases in current account deficits to levels that were no longer 
sustainable, exerted considerable pressures on the authorities [in developing countries] 
to retreat from the policies they had earlier announced.” The authors develop a dynamic 
general equilibrium model to examine the transitional macroeconomic effects of changes 
in barriers to trade and capital flows and the simultaneous liberalisation of trade and 
capital flows. Khan and Zahler report that the removal of capital controls leads to large 
capital inflows, augments liquidity, resulting in an increase in aggregate demand and a 
deterioration in the external current account deficit. Since the capital inflows generated 
by the interest rate differential are not adequate to cover the current account deficit the 
country loses international reserves. The negative effects of opening up the capital 
account can also be magnified by inconsistent domestic policies and an adverse 
international climate.
The link between liberalisation and financial crises has recently been reported in many 
studies (see Breuer, 2004 for a survey on the literature on currency crises). Glick and 
Hutchison (1999), using a sample o f 90 countries covering the period 1975 to 1997 and
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the 0/1 IMF dummy variable to indicate the absence or presence of capital controls, 
report that banking and twin (banking and currency) crises have primarily occurred in 
developing countries, especially in the 1990s, and were also more likely in financially 
liberalised emerging-market economies. Similarly, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), 
observe that financial liberalisation also preceded most banking sector crises. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) explicitly considers the link between banking 
crises and financial liberalisation in 53 countries between 1980 and 1995. The authors 
report that while banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalised financial markets, 
the link between liberalisation and the fragility of banks weakens when the country has a 
strong institutional environment.
In contrast, Glick, Guo and Hutchison (2006) argue that one of the reasons capital 
account liberalisation may be associated with greater vulnerability to currency crises is 
because of the special characteristics of countries that choose to liberalise. These 
countries are more likely to have macroeconomic imbalances, financial weaknesses, 
political instability and institutional problems. To obtain unbiased estimates the authors 
explicitly model the sample selection problem in their econometric model. 
Nevertheless, the authors state, “all of our results suggest that, even after controlling for 
sample selection bias (and obtaining unbiased estimates), capital restrictions are 
associated with a greater likelihood of currency crises.” These results are in stark 
contrast to previous studies that usually link the removal of capital controls to currency 
crises. The authors further calculated that countries without controls are between 5-28% 
less likely to experience a currency crisis.
2.7 POLICY OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
LIBERALISATION
Khan and Zahler (1985) note that since opening the capital account in some 
circumstances can result in a deterioration in the nation’s external position, it is 
important that liberalisation be supported by active domestic macroeconomic
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management, external financing and international reserves. However, given the limits to 
the amount of international reserves a country can accumulate and the amount of 
borrowing that can be undertaken, some tightening in fiscal and monetary policies might 
be necessary to constrain public and private sector spending.
Aizenman, Lee and Rhee (2004) note that many developing countries, especially those 
in Asia, are being more pro-active in the management of their international reserves and 
debt positions. These reserves have been seen as a tool to buffer the economy from 
sudden stops in capital flows. The authors provide a theoretical model to account for the 
possibility that sudden stops could lead to significant output losses due to increased 
banking cost and/or crises. In this situation, international reserves reduce the probability 
o f a liquidity crisis and as a result increases welfare. Aizenman, Lee and Rhee also 
estimate a model of the demand for international reserves and find empirical evidence 
supporting their hypotheses using data on South Korea.
Breuer (2004) summaries many of the options that countries have employed to deal with 
the effects of capital account liberalisation. These can be disaggregated into four 
categories: (1) controls on short-term financial flows; (2) functions of a lender of last 
resort; (3) governance, and; (4) surveillance.
Most financial crises result from large capital inflows accordingly many countries 
attempt to limit this potential source of instability through limits on financial flows. 
These controls may be placed on the volume o f inflows or outflows to limit capital 
flight. One of most cited examples is that of Chile. Chile has a special policy called an 
unremunerated reserve requirement where foreign investors have to deposit 30% of their 
funds at the central bank at zero interest rate. This measure was implemented to 
increase the cost on short-term capital inflows as the longer the maturity o f the 
investment the lower the relative cost of the deposit requirement. This policy has 
enabled the country to maintain a manageable level of capital inflows and restrain the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. Colombia also introduced a similar system in 
September of 1993, but with the reserve requirement varying by the maturity period.
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Although these measures can have some short-term value, financial derivatives can be 
used to circumvent controls on short-term capital flows.
Johnston (1998) explains that capital account liberalisation should be viewed as only one 
aspect of financial sector liberalisation. As a result, the role of authorities should be to 
establish an appropriate regulatory fr amework. The author therefore recommends that 
developing countries, especially, should first develop financial institutions, markets and 
instruments, adopt international standards of account and time disclosure of information 
and expand its supervisory capacity. In countries where banks are the main 
intermediaries of capital flows, banks’ interest rates and credit policies could encourage 
firms to borrow abroad and under pricing of credit could distort the domestic yield 
curve. Johnston (1999) also observes that with greater freedom of capital movements, 
the covered interest rate parity condition is more likely to hold. As a result, inconsistent 
interest or exchange rate policies could lead to significant outflows. The author 
therefore notes that if the country’s exchange rate is fixed, monetary policy will not have 
enough autonomy to serve as both a tool for achieving domestic macroeconomic 
objectives as well as stabilising short-term capital inflows. Similarly, if the country has 
an inflation target, the exchange rate can no longer be used to achieve external current 
account objectives.
Based principally on the McKinnon’s (1973) insights, the notion of sequencing of the 
capital account liberalisation process has been viewed as a usefril tool to allow countries 
to obtain the maximum benefits and minimise risks from liberalisation. The 
conventional sequence is that a country should first achieve macroeconomic stability, 
develop domestic financial institutions, markets and instruments and then liberalise the 
capital account. Johnston (1998) note that while, “certain rules about sequencing capital 
account liberalisation -  for example, countries should liberalise long-term flows before 
short-term flows, and foreign direct investment before portfolio investment -  have the 
appeal of simplicity, the fungibility of capital, [however], makes their practical 
application difficult.”
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Good governance -  rules, policies, guidelines, practices and the institutions and 
institutional framework that reduce uncertainty in transactions -  has also been put 
forward as another policy option to assist countries that are opening up their capital 
account. Breuer (2004) notes that governance covers a range of issues: data 
dissemination at the country level and transparency in the transactions of financial and 
non-financial entities.
Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) recommends that based on experiences of countries 
that have had difficulty sustaining an open capital account, it is important that they 
implement certain policies before liberalising capital flows. They suggest that countries 
introduce policies that help decrease the differences between domestic and external 
financial market conditions, such as reducing the financing of the fiscal deficit through 
money creation, as well as lowering or eliminating restrictions that inhibit labour and 
goods market flexibility. Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez also recommend the elimination 
of taxes on financial income that could result in abrupt capital outflows as well as 
strengthen the safety and soundness of the domestic financial system.
More recently, Prasad and Raj an (2005) propose to offset the sometimes-negative effects 
of too much capital inflows after the process of liberalisation by securitising these 
capital inflows through the issue of shares in a closed-end mutual fund(s) to domestic 
residents in domestic currency. The proceeds obtained could then be used to purchase 
foreign exchange fiom the central bank and then invested abroad. The proposal places 
the burden of sterilisation on the private sector rather than government and allows 
domestic residents to diversify their portfolio. The Central Bank of Barbados employed 
a similar type of policy known as a ‘second tier reserve’ programme. Under this scheme 
commercial banks, pension funds and insurance companies are allowed to invest, up to a 
specific limit, in foreign markets each year with the understanding that they could be 
required to repatriate the investments at the request of the Central Bank. Allowing these 
financial entities to invest overseas in a carefully monitored environment has the 
additional benefit of removing from the system funds that could further spur consumer 
lending and imports.
53
The main limitation of the approach proposed by Prasad and Raj an (2005) is that it 
assumes that the country in question has a large amount of reserves, over and above 
what is essential for prudential purposes. Indeed, the Central Bank of Barbados had to 
discontinue it ‘second-tier reserve’ scheme in 2005, as commercial banks continued to 
expand credit despite being allowed to invest part of their portfolio overseas. The 
assumption of unlimited foreign exchange reserves is unlikely to hold in most 
developing countries.
2.8 SUMMARY
Small states because of their size, limited resource base, narrowness of output and 
exports and vulnerability usually have a higher rate of volatility of growth and are more 
susceptible terms o f trade shocks. One possible policy solution to this problem is to 
diversify away these shocks by opening up their economies to international capital 
movements. This Chapter therefore provides a survey o f the evidence to-date on the 
effects of capital account liberalisation, particularly in relation to developing countries.
While prior to the early twentieth century most small states had fairly open capital 
accounts, with resources flowing freely between the métropole and colony, the 
uncertainty caused by the world economic recession in the early 1900s and the two 
World Wars saw both developing and developed countries adopting capital controls. 
However, while developed states gradually removed these controls in the 70s and 80s, 
most developing countries maintained, and in some instances strengthened, their 
controls to protect their newly independent nations.
While theory suggests that opening the capital account should allow a country to 
diversify away economic shocks, increase capital inflows, expand economic growth and 
efficiency and encourage governments to pursue good policies, the empirical evidence 
with regard to these theoretical predictions are in some instances debatable. Many 
studies, for example, have reported mixed results as it relates to impact of capital 
account integration on growth, exchange rates, trade and policy discipline. In the case of
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economic growth, most recent studies only find a link between greater financial 
integration and growth after controlling for the level of development o f the country as 
well as institutional quality.
Despite the uncertainty of the relationship between capital account liberalisation and 
some macroeconomic variables, the impact o f liberalisation on financial variables seems 
to be quite robust. Greater financial integration, by increasing the available stock of 
investment funds, reduces the cost of capital and can lead to an expansion in investment. 
Moreover, the rise in investment, by improving the prospects for firms, can result in 
higher stock prices, a reduction in stock market volatility and lead to more efficient 
market returns. In addition, the popular belief of the positive link between financial 
integration and volatility (growth and stock market) is not validated by the empirical 
literature. The majority o f studies report that capital account liberalisation has a 
negative or no effect on economic volatility. The study also reports an inverse 
relationship between inflation and integration; however, the nature of this relationship is 
not yet well understood in the literature.
One of the key drawbacks of the capital account liberalisation literature is the variety of 
indicators used to quantify restrictions. Indicators of financial integiation range ftom 
ex-post macroeconomic indicators such as private capital flows and interest rate 
differentials, to capital account restriction indices derived ftom the IMF’s Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and regression-based indices 
derived from aggregate macroeconomic relationships. The wide variety of indicators 
used makes it difficult for researchers in the field to compare and replicate results. In 
addition, many of the indicators used in the literature are not calculated for most small 
states and are therefore excluded ftom many research databases.
Research on capital account liberalisation although advancing rapidly is still a relatively 
new area of study. As a result, a number of issues have not yet been examined in the 
literature. These include such topics as the impact of capital account liberalisation on 
the monetary transmission process, deficit financing and government debt. Capital
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account liberalisation could influence the monetary transmission process since domestic 
firms no longer have to source financing solely from local commercial banks or other 
domestic financial institutions. As a result, a rise in domestic interest rates by the local 
authorities might not have the intended effect as economic agents may simply substitute 
high cost domestic funds for low cost foreign funds. Similarly, since governments can 
easily access capital markets with an open capital account, it might chose to use more 
foreign funds to finance its deficit. This could have positive effects on inflation (by 
reducing the monetisation of the fiscal deficit), but by pushing up the country’s external 
debt it also increases the vulnerability of the nation. In addition, some of the topics 
examined in this study, such as interest rates, fiscal deficit and trade are in need of 
further theoretical and empirical investigation.
Appendix
Table A2.1: Siimmaiy of the Capital Account Openness Literature
Variable Positive Negative No Effect
Capital Flows Alfaro, Kalemii-Ozcan and 
Volosovych (2005)
Cost o f Capital
Johnston and Ryan 
(1994)
Henry (2003)
Equity Returns Henry (2000a)
Bakaert and 
(2000)
Harvey
Durham (2000)
Investment
Kim and Singal (2000) 
Henry (2000b)
Levine and Zervos 
(1998)
Investment Volatility 
Economic Growth
De Melo and Tybout 
(1986)
Klein (2005)
Henry (2003)
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundlad 
(2001)
Kim and Singal (2000)
Bakaert and Harvey 
(1997)
De Santis and Imrohoroglu 
(1997)
Edison, Levine, Ricci and 
Slok (2002)
Edwards (2001)
Arteta, Eichengreen and
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Variable Positive Negative No Effect
Economie Volatility
Quinn (1997)
Bakaert, Harvey and
Wyplosz (2001)
Klein and Olivei (1999)
Levine and Zervos (1998)
Rodrick(1998)
Kraay (1998)
Razin and Rose (1994)
Exchange Rates Edwards (2000)
Lundblad (2004)
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz 
(2001)
Kose, Prasad and Terrones 
(2003a and 2003b) 
Edwards (1999)
Trade
Calvo, Leidermand and 
Reinhart (1996) 
Aizenman and Noy Tamirisa (1999)
Kim and Singal (2000) 
Goldberg and Klein (2000)
Fiscal Deficit
(2004)
Kim (2003) Tytell and Wei (2004)
Inflation Grilli and Milesi- 
Ferretti (1995)
Gruben and McLeod 
(2001 and 2002)
Kim and Singal (2000)
Tytell and Wei (2004)
Kaminsky, Reinhart and 
Végh (2004)
CHAPTER 3 -  QUANTIFYING CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION IN 
SMALL STATES
The previous Chapter noted that capital account liberalisation could have important 
effects on the availability investment flmds, stock prices, market volatility, inflation, 
economic growth, trade and policy discipline. However, before empirical work on 
the effects of capital account liberalisation on small states can be attempted, one must 
obtain quantifiable indicators of capital account liberalisation.
Many techniques have been employed in the literature to quantify capital account 
liberalisation. Unfortunately, theory does not provide any assistance as it relates any 
single methodology. There are three broad approaches: ex-post macroeconomic 
indicators, regression-based indices and qualitative indices of capital control 
legislation. The ex-post indicators (for example, net capital flows) assume that in the 
presence of capital controls, cross border flows would be zero or miniscule. Thus, a 
rise in capital flows would suggest that the country might have liberalised its capital 
control regime. Alternatively, regression-based indices derive capital account 
liberalisation indicators by comparing estimated regression estimates to those 
postulated by economic theory. Finally, qualitative indices usually take the form of 
dummy variables, assuming a value o f one, for example, in the presence o f some 
form o f capital account restriction and zero otherwise.
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Unfortunately, because of their size and limited availability o f data, small states tend 
to be excluded from most studies that attempt to measure or quantify capital account 
liberalisation. To fill this gap in the economic literature, thirteen indicators of capital 
account liberalisation are calculated for the sample of small states. Data on 51 small 
states covering the period 1970 to 2004 is employed to generate the indicators. This 
Chapter presents the first attempt to construct such a comprehensive database for 
small states.
The remainder of this Chapter is organised as follows. After the introduction. Section
3.1 presents a detailed summary of the approaches used by previous authors and their 
shortcomings. Section 3.2 then outline the indicators used in this study as well as the 
data sources. The trends in the derived indicators of capital account liberalisation are 
then discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 concludes with a summary of the results as 
well as shortcomings.
3.1 QUANTIFYING CAPITAL CONTROLS
Country-level studies of capital account liberalisation are restricted somewhat by the 
difficulty of aggregating policies across countries and time, as the intensity, coverage 
and type of controls can vary. Economic researchers have therefore employed 
numerous types of indicators in an attempt to quantify capital controls. These proxies 
can be categorised into three groups: ex-post macroeconomic indicators, capital 
account restrictiveness indices and regiession-based indices.
3.1.1 EX-POST MACROECONOMIC INDICA TORS
Based on the notion that capital controls restrict capital flows, Eken (1984), Feldman 
(1986) and Levich (1987) propose that the integration of capital markets can be 
evaluated by the quantity of capital flow across borders. Therefore, a larger volume
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of cross-border transactions is reflective o f greater capital market openness; to allow 
for cross-country comparisons, most authors express capital flows as a ratio of gross 
domestic product. In a similar vein, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) utilise annual 
estimates of portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities as a ratio of gross 
domestic product. These measures o f capital account restrictions, however, tend to be 
correlated with the monetary, fiscal or exchange rate policy stance, the returns offered 
by domestic markets and even political circumstances.
Assuming that uncovered interest parity holds, one alternative to these measures is 
the difference between onshore ( r )  and offshore (r*) interest rates. If E, is the 
expectations operator and is the expected value at time t of the spot exchange
rate S  at r + T , the uncovered interest rate parity hypothesis can be written as:
,^5', .^7.(1 + 7;*) = 5',(1 + 7;). (3.1)
Equation (3.1) states that given expected exchange rates, onshore interest rates should 
equilibrate to offshore interest rates. This notion is exploited by Eken (1984), Ito 
(1986), Frankel and MacArthur (1988), Zevin (1992) and Obstfeld (1993), to name a 
few. Unfortunately, this approach cannot be applied to a wide cross section of 
countries, as cunency forward markets are not typically available. In addition, most 
empirical studies reject the uncovered interest rate hypothesis (see Lothian and Wu, 
2003 for a survey).
3.1.2 CAPITAL ACCOUNTRESTRICTIVESS INDICES
Given the drawbacks of the macroeconomic indicators approach, researchers have 
attempted to develop indices of capital controls to track all changes in restrictions 
within and between countries. One of the simplest of these indices is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if a country has restrictions on capital outflows and 
zero if it does not. This information is usually derived from various editions of the
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IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions: In pre- 
1996 reports, there is a summary table for each country that directly identifies the 
existence or non-existence of capital controls (line E.2) called “Restrictions on 
Payments for Capital Transactions”.
One can also specify the capital account restrictions dummy by constructing an index 
of the proportion of years in which countries had an open capital account (see Grilli 
and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Rodrik, 1998; Klein and Olivei, 1999). For example, if  a 
country’s capital account was judged to be open for 5 years out of a 10-year time 
period, then the value of the capital mobility index would be 0.5. Edison, Klein, 
Ricci and Slok (2004) refer to this measure as the share. The main problem with this 
indicator is that a value of 0.5 is consistent with an open capital account in either the 
beginning or end of the 10-year period, or also for every other year.
In 1996, the IMF revamped its reporting procedures and presented more details on 
exchange arrangements and controls; 13 categories (some o f which are further 
disaggregated) are presented compared to six in the pre-1996 reports. Given the 
additional data available, Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) built indices for 45 countries 
by calculating a simple average of all tlie 0/1 dummies for each o f the new 13 
categories (and their subcategories): capital market securities, money market 
instruments, collective investment securities, derivatives and other instruments, 
commercial credits, financial credits, guarantees, sureties and financial back-up 
facilities, direct investment, repatriation of profits or liquidation of direct investment, 
real estate transaction, personal credit movements, and provisions specific to 
commercial banks and other credit institutions. Authors such as Rossi (1990) and 
Brune, Garrett and Guisinger (2001) use a similar methodology to that of Johnston 
and Tamirisa, but extend the data back to 1989 and 1973, respectively. Miniane 
(2004) adds a 14^  ^ category on multiple exchange rate arrangements and present
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indices from 1983 to 2000 for a cross-section of 34 developed and developing 
countries.
One the main criticisms of indices of capital account liberalisation are that they do 
not provide a means of measuring the intensity of controls. Quinn (1997) attempts to 
address this issue by employing coding rules to capture not only the presence of, but 
also the intensity of capital controls. Using the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, the author also assesses a nation’s financial 
restrictions on exchange payments and receipts for the import of goods, services and 
capital. Quinn uses a scale of 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2 to account for the degree of 
restrictiveness on inflows and outflows. An index value of 0 is allocated if import 
payments are forbidden, 0 to 0.5 if the laws impose quantitative or other regulatory 
restrictions (licenses) that forbid certain economic behaviour, 1 if the transaction has 
to be approved by authorities or subject to heavy taxes, 1.5 if the exchange is taxed 
and 2 if transactions are free. The author then summed the value o f the index for 
capital inflows and outflows that produces a score ranging from 0 to 4. Quinn derives 
these indices for 64 countries over the period 1958 to 1989. Surprisingly, the study 
finds that the capital account in Latin America and other developing countries is more 
open than both OECD and East Asian countries. However, no explanation of this 
outcome is presented.
Similarly, Montiel and Reinhart (1999) develop a measure of the intensity of capital 
controls based on annual infonnation on 15 developing countries. A country is 
assigned a value o f between 0 and 2, where 0 indicates that there are no restrictions or 
taxes on capital inflows, 1 when the restrictions are in the form of “overzealous 
prudential regulations”, while a value of 2 suggests there are explicit measures 
(prohibitions, deposit requirements or financial taxes) to limit capital flows. The 
results of the study suggest that ten out of the fifteen countries would have had a
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value of 0 between 1990 and 1996. Haggard and Maxfield (1996) present a similar 
measure.
One of the major drawbacks of Quinn (1997), Montiel and Reinhart (1999) and 
Haggard and Maxfield (1996) procedure is that two independent researchers coding 
the data may not necessarily arrive at the same measure of financial openness. 
Another shortcoming of the framework is that, unlike Johnston and Tamirisa (1998), 
the technique only covers three categories and therefore does not allow one to 
identify the source of capital immobility. Nevertheless, Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok
(2004) report that the two measures are highly correlated.
Rather than assessing the laws on capital receipts and payments, Bekaert (1995), 
Buckberg (1995), Bakaert and Hai*vey (1995), Kim and Singal (2000) and Henry 
(2000) all use the 0/1 dummy approach to identify whether or not a country has 
opened its equity/stock markets to foreign investors. To identify the liberalisation 
dummy, the authors use information on official liberalisation dates, the introduction 
of American Depository Receipts, an increase in the International Finance 
Corporation’s Investibility index (the ratio of market capitalisation o f stocks that 
foreigners can legally hold to total market capitalisation) by more than 10 percentage 
points, the date of the introduction o f country funds or the date of a regime change 
obtained from a regime-switching model of net US capital flows. Bakaert, Harvey 
and Lundblad (2001) provide information on the index for 95 countries between 1980 
and 1997.
Unfortunately, indices o f capital account convertibility are usually only available at 
annual frequencies. Edison and Warnock (2003) address this shortcoming by 
developing a monthly index of the intensity of capital controls for 29 emerging 
market countries. Similar to Bakaert and Harvey (1995), an index of capital account 
openness is derived from the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) database.
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IFC calculates two indices, the global index, that represents the market, and an 
investable index, that represents the portion o f the market available to non-nationals. 
Edison and Warnock therefore specify the measure of capital account liberalisation 
as:
l - f  (3.2)
where GI is the market capitalisation of firms in the global index, while II  is the 
market capitalisation of films in the investable index. Index varies between zero to 
one, with a value of zero representing a completely open market with no restrictions 
and one suggesting that the market is closed. Edison and Warnock note, however, 
that the index could change because of asymmetric price shocks even when there are 
no changes to capital account restrictions. To obtain a smoothed series, the authors 
deflate each index by price indices to capture the effects of asymmetric price shocks 
on the global and investable indices.
3.L3 REGRESSION-BASED INDICES
A  third group of capital account restrictiveness indicators are those derived from 
regression-based models. Most regression-based indices o f capital account 
restrictions begin with some basic theoretical model from which an empirical 
prediction is derived. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) exploit the idea that in a closed 
economy the return on savings is the national marginal product of capital. As a 
result, domestic savings or investment only increases if the return on capital is high 
enough to persuade agents to postpone their consumption. Once capital is perfectly 
mobile, however, savings will leave or enter the country if there is a divergence 
between domestic and foreign rates of return. With free movement of capital 
between countries, net-of-tax rates of returns should be equalised across countries and 
the correlation between savings and investment should be relatively weak.
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To test this hypothesis, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) assess the relationship between 
savings rates and investment rates for a group of 21 OECD countries and annual data 
from 1960 to 1974. The estimated equation is of the form:
^ l \  f7  = «  + ,9 -  (3.3)
J i  J i
where is the ratio of gross domestic investment to gross domestic product of
k I  J i
f s ^country /and — is the corresponding ratio of gross domestic savings to gross 
Ji
domestic product. In a world of perfect capital mobility the value of /? should reflect 
the magnitude of the country’s share o f total world capital (about 0.10) or if the 
country is very small should be zero.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980), report that {3 was very close to 1 for various 
definitions of savings. This close correlation between savings and investment 
therefore implies that there exist restrictions on capital flows between developed 
countries. This finding was a bit surprising to most economists, as developed 
countries had opened their capital accounts since the 1980s (see Coakley, Kulasi and 
Smith, 1998, for a survey of this literature). Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987), 
Taylor (1994) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), however, argue that the Feldstein- 
Horioka approach does not provide useful information to the degree of integration of 
financial markets. Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson argue that tests of savings- 
investment correlations are joint tests of several hypotheses, many o f which have very 
little connection to capital mobility or capital controls. These tests can be influenced 
by deviations from purchasing power parity, exchange rate risk, limited integration of 
domestic financial markets, the effects of government policies, and/or when the 
economy is near a steady state where imbalances are small. Obstfeld and Rogoff 
observe that governments tend to adjust fiscal policies in response to external current 
account deficits while for corporations, if they have limited access to financial
65
markets, investment should be related to corporate savings or retained earnings. In 
the life-cycle theory of consumption, demographic changes that increase investment 
should also raise the savings rate. Indeed, Taylor reports that once one controls for 
domestic relative prices, the age structure of the population and the interaction of the 
age structure with economic growth, the savings investment correlation disappears.
Using a similar idea to Feldstein and Horioka (1980), Edwards and Khan (1985) 
estimate the degree of capital mobility by utilising information from an interest rate 
determination equation. If the capital account were completely closed, domestic 
market-clearing interest rate ( / )  would be given by the weighted sum of the 
uncovered interest parity interest rate, i *, and the domestic market clearing rate, / :
7 = 1/ 7* + ( 1 - 1/ / ) /  , 0 < 1/  < 1 . (3 .4 )
The coefficient i// can be employed as an index of capital mobility. It is bounded 
between zero (perfect capital immobility) and one (perfect capital mobility).
It is impossible to directly estimate i , however, Edwards and Khan (1985) exploit a 
demand for money equation to identify Equation (3.4). If one assumes a log-linear 
demand for money function of the usual form:
m ,lp , = A) + A^ + / ^ 2T , A  <0, A 'A  > 0  (3-5)
where m I p  \s real money balances (money deflated by prices) and is real output. 
Assuming money market equilibrium, i.e. money supply is equal to money demand, 
and solving for i , one obtains:
 ^ = - ( /^ o /A )+ ( i/A  I p - i P  2 1 )y  - ( A / A  )"^-i / p,-x ' (3.6)
Substituting Equation (3.6) into Equation (3.4) one obtains an equation that can be 
estimated to derive an empirical estimate of i/ .
Most estimates of y/ are within the 0 to 1 range, but are unexpectedly high (see 
Edwards and Khan, 1985; Edwards, 1986; Haque and Montiel, 1990; Haque, Lahiri
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and Montiel, 1993). Another criticism of the framework is that it does not provide an 
adequate explanation of how the averaging of closed and open economy interest rates 
arise from the behaviour of individuals (Maloney, 1997). Employing a model of the 
demands of agents for domestic and foreign assets subject to a wealth constraint, one 
can show that i// is not a measure of capital account restrictiveness, but the ease of 
reallocating ones portfolio if the capital account is closed.
Korajczyk (1996) and Levine and Zervos (1998) also derive an interest rate indicator
o f capital account openness. Assume that there exists a weighted portfolio of stocks
with excess returns denoted by P . One can estimate a regression of the following 
form:
A, = «, + 6, A + , i = 1,2,..., w; / = 1,2..., r ,  (3.7)
where m is the number of assets, /the time periods, and R is the excess return on 
asset / or the return on asset m above the risk-free rate. If markets are perfectly 
integrated, then the intercept, a . , should be zero:
a, = «2  = = 0 • (3.8)
The estimates of a,, from Equation (3.7) can therefore be employed as measures of
financial integration. Eichengreen (2001) argues that the above equation does not 
adequately capture financial integration, as returns will vary according to the 
characteristics of the underlying assets.
Bekaert and Harvey (1995), on the other hand, measures capital market integration 
through the use of a conditional regime-switching model. The authors note first that 
in completely integrated markets and in the absence of exchange rate risk, the 
rewards to risk is not important since it is common to all integrated countries, or more 
formally as:
A-i ] = ,^-1 cov,_, [;;;;, , ] (3.9)
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where is the conditionally expected excess return on security A in country
/, is the weighted return on the world portfolio, cov,_, is the conditional 
covariance operator and is the conditionally expected world price o f covariance 
risk for time t . In contrast, in completely segmented markets the expected return on 
the same security is:
A-i cov,_, , 7%, ] (3.10)
If the capital market switches from segmented (3.10) to liberalised (3.9) during a 
particular period, one can then model the conditional mean return as:
•E,-i [r,j ] = CO v,_, [r,,, , ]+(1 -  ÿ , ) A,cov , _ ,  , ] (3.11)
where is a time-varying index, which can be interpreted as conditional
probability of being in either the integrated or the segmented regimes.
Bekaert and Harvey (1995) estimate Equation (3.11) for a group of 12 emerging 
market countries (Chile, Columbia, Greece, India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Taiwan, Thailand and Zimbabwe) using the Hamilton (1989, 1990) regime- 
switching model where follows a Markov process with constant transition
probabilities, as well as an extended Hamilton model with time-varying transition 
probabilities (see Diebold, Lee, and Weinbach, 1995; Ghysels, 1993; Gray, 1995a 
and 1995b). The authors find that capital markets in some developing countries have 
not become more integrated.
3.2 METHODOLOGY
Thirteen indicators o f capital account liberalisation are calculated for the sample of 
small states. This Chapter presents eight ex-post indicators: net capital flows as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), portfolio investment assets as a 
percentage of GDP, portfolio investment liabilities as a percentage o f GDP, direct
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investment assets as a percentage of GDP, direct investment liabilities as a percentage 
of GDP, the sum of portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities as percentage 
of GDP, the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates and the correlation 
between domestic and foreign interest rates; three indices derived from qualitative 
information on the country (dummy variable of the existence o f capital controls, the 
proportion of years for which the capital account was not open and a dummy variable 
for the opening of the stock market to foreign investors), and two regression based 
series (a time-varying from the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) model, as in Equation 
(3.3) above and a time-varying y/ from the Edwards and Klian Model (1985) as in 
Equation (3.4).
To derive the two regression-based indicators of capital account liberalisation, 
various macroeconomic statistics are collected. The time-varying Feldstein-Horioka 
A required data on gross domestic investment and gross domestic savings. Both
series are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-Rom
(2005). To generate the time-vai'ying coefficient, the author uses a standard linear 
regression model:
= a +  p + £,
(3.12)
e,~N(0,cr^)
where e, is the residual error term that is assumed to have normal properties and the
model is estimated over t = 1...T time periods using least squares. Instead of using 
the full sample to obtain the coefficients for Equation (3.12), one starts with a small 
subset: the first k obseiwations. The equation is then re-estimated with the first ^ +1 
observations, and so on, until the sample is exhausted. This procedure provides a set 
o f recursive parameter estimates p^ for t = \...T  and is done for each country in the 
sample.
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In the case o f the Edwards-Khan time-varying y /, data on the real money supply, 
income, prices and the real foreign and domestic interest rates is required. The 
nominal money supply and nominal interest rates are taken from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics database. Both series are deflated by the GDP 
deflator, acquired from the United Nations Statistics Division database (available at 
unstats.un.org). to derive the real money supply and real interest rates. Real GDP, a 
proxy for real income, is also from the United Nations’ database.
A two-step iterative procedure is adopted to generate the time-varying i/ . In the first 
stage, Equation (3.5) is estimated using the first k observations and then employed to 
derive an approximation of / , the domestic market-clearing rate using Equation 
(3,6). The second stage obtains y/ via the following equation:
O S v / S l .  (3.13)
The model is then re-estimated using the first k + l observations, and so on, until the 
sample is exhausted. This procedure provides a set of recursive parameter estimates 
V?, for i = \,„k and t = 1...T and is done for each country in the sample. The routine
for the recursive estimation is written in the Ox 3.4 (Doornik, 2001) programming 
language,
3.3 DATA ISSUES
One of the main problems encountered by researchers looking at small states is the 
lack of data. To ensure comparability of the ex-port macroeconomic indicators a 
single international data source was employed. Obseiwations on the indicators of 
capital account liberalisation are derived for the period 1970 to 2004. However, 
because of data limitations some variables are not available for the entire sample 
period. This generated some blank cells in the database for some indicators. If these 
missing values are random, they are unlikely to significantly influence our findings.
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However, if there are systematic, blank cells could lead to biased inferences. As a 
result, the empirical section of the study spent a fair bit of time examining whether or 
not these missing values significantly influenced the overall results by undertaking 
tests for sample selection bias.
The countries classified in this study as small states are those presently included in 
the list used by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
These countries include six African territories (Cape Verde, Comoros, Guinea- 
Bissau, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles), twenty-three Latin 
American and Caribbean states (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, The British Virgin Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, The Netherlands Antilles, 
Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and United States Virgin Islands) and twenty-two 
Asia and Pacific countries (American Samoa, Bahrain, The Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Maldives, 
Marshall Islands, The Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, The Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu).
Annual observations on real and nominal GDP (US Dollars) are obtained from the 
United Nations Statistics Division database accessible at unstats.iin.org. Unlike other 
databases, such as the IMF and the World Bank, the United Nations’ databases 
includes almost all of the small states under investigation with the exception of the 
United States Virgin Islands, the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas, Guam, Niue, 
Timor-Leste or America Samoa. Data for these countries had to be sourced from 
other databases such as the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the CIA World 
Factbook Online (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/). 
The data on portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities is taken from the
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International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics CD-Rom 
(September 2005). For these series, observations are available for most countries 
from 1980. To calculate the spread as well as the correlation between domestic and 
foreign interest rates, the foreign interest rate is proxied by the interest rate on a 3- 
month US dollar deposit account (London), while the domestic interest rate was 
proxied by the short-term interest rate in each country. Both series are taken from the 
International Financial Statistics database.
Obtaining information on the three qualitative variables of interest (the existence of 
capital controls, the proportion of years capital controls were in place and existence 
o f a stock market) required significant effort since they were derived from various 
sources (see Table 3.1). Information on the existence of capital controls is also 
obtained from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (various issues). The table in the IMF’s report only provided data for 21 
out of the 51 small states. Observations for the other countries therefore had to be 
taken from other sources. Official policy decree dates are used, when they are 
available from the website of each country’s stock exchange, central bank, IMF 
Article IV Report or other reputable sources. Since the United States Virgin Islands, 
American Samoa and Puerto Rico are territories of the United States, the official 
liberalisation dates provided by Cooper (1999) for the métropole are employed for 
these countries. A similar assumption was made for the British Virgin Islands and 
the Netherland Antilles in relation to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. After 
exhausting the sources above, the United States’ State Department’s website, which 
provides summaries of economic and social developments are employed. These dates 
are then used to generate the dummy variable for the date of the removal of capital 
controls and opening of the stock market to foreign investors.
The completed database is quite unique and contains information on small states that 
is not available in either the IMF’s or World Bank’s databases. For example, most of
72
the literature cited in Chapter 2 of this Thesis excluded many of the small states when 
identifying official liberalisation dates. The combination of the indicators derived in 
this study along with other readily available databases could expand researcher’s 
understanding of capital account liberalisation. The other macroeconomic indicators 
included in the database could also be of interest to researchers looking at related 
areas such as financial development, trade patterns as well as the macroeconomic 
policy effectiveness.
Table 3.1: Sources used to Derive Liberalisation Indices
Country Existence o f Capital Controls Stock Market Liberalisation
Africa
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Cape Verde Restrictions, various issues.
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Comoros Restrictions, various issues.
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Guinea-Bissau Restrictions, various issues.
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues; Bank of 
Mauritius Mauritius, http://bom.intnet.niu/
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Sao Tome ?xx\dArrangements and Exchange 
Principe Restrictions, various issues.
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Seychelles Restrictions, various issues.
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
The stock exchange of Mauritius, 
www.semdex.com
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
Latin America 
the Caribbean
Anguilla
Antigua
Barbuda
Aruba
The Bahamas
and
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
www.eccb-centralbank.org/
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues and 
and Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
www.eccb-centralbank.org/
IM F’s Article IV Report, 
www.imf.org
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange
Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, 
www.ecseonline.com
Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, 
www.ecseonline.com
No Stock Market
Bahamas International Securities
Exchange, www.bisxbahamas.com
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Country Existence o f Capital Controls Stock Market Liberalisation
Restrictions, various issues 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues
Virgin
Thomas P. Azzara (2003)
Not Available
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues and 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
www.eccb-centralbank.org/
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues and 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
www.eccb-centralbank.org/
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues, US State 
Department (1994), 
dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/countries.htm 
1
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
www.eccb-centralbank.org/
The Netherlands IMF’s Article IV Report,
Antilles www.imf.org
Puerto Rico Cooper (1999)
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues and 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank,
St. Kitts and Nevis www.eccb-centralbank.org/
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues and 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank,
St. Lucia www.eccb-centralbank.org/
Barbados
Belize 
The British 
Islands 
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican
Republic
Grenada
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Montserrat
Barbados Stock Exchange, 
www.bse.com.bb
No Stock Market
No Stock Market 
No Stock Market
Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange,
www.ecseonline.com
Stock Exchange of
The Dominican Republic,
www.dominicanrepublicpage.com/SE.html
Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange,
www.ecseonIine.com
The Guyana Association o f Securities
Companies and Intermediaries Inc.,
www.gasci.com
No Stock Market
Jamaica Stock Exchange,
www.jamstockex.co
Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange,
www.ecseonIine.com
No Stock Market 
No Stock Market
Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, 
www.ecseonline.com
Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, 
www.ecseonline.com
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Countiy Existence o f Capital Controls Stock Market Liberalisation
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues and 
St. Vincent and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, 
Grenadines
Eastern Caribbean Securities Exchange, 
www.ecseonline.comwww.eccb-centralbank.org/
IMF’s Article IV Report,
Suriname www.imf.org No Stock Market
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues, US State 
Department (1994),
Trinidad anddosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/countries.htm Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange,
Tobago 1 www.stockex.co.tt
United States
Virgin Islands Cooper (1999) No Stock Market
Asia and the Pacific
American Samoa Cooper (1999)
Bahrain
The
Commonwealth
No Stock Market 
US State Department (2005), Bahrain Stock Exchange,
http://www.state.gOv/e/eb/ifd/2005/43 http://www.bahrainstock.com/bahrainstock/
021.htm index.asp
of
Northernthe 
Marianas 
Cook Islands
Fiji
French Polynesia 
Guam
Kiribati
Maldives
Not Available 
Not Available
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions, various issues
Not Available
Not Available
Pacific Islands Centre,
http://www.pic.or.jp/en/trade/kiribati/
top.htm
US State Department (2005),
h t t p  ://w ww. St ate. go v/e/eb/ifd/2005/43
No Stock Market 
No Stock Market
South Pacific Exchange, 
http://www.spse.com.fi/publish/home.shtml 
No Stock Market 
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
021.htm
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Marshall Islands Restrictions, various issues 
The Federated IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
States o f Arrangements and Exchange
Micronesia Restrictions, various issues
Nauru Not Available
New Caledonia Not Available 
Niue Not Available
Palau Not Available
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Papua New Guinea Arrangements and Exchange
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
No Stock Market
Port Moresby Stock Exchange,
http://www.pomsox.com.pg/
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Countiy Existence o f  Capital Controls Stock Market Liberalisation
Samoa
Restrictions, various issues, IM F’s 
Article IV Report, www.imf.org 
IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues, IM F’s 
Article IV Report, www.imf.org No Stock Market
The
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
So\omon Restrictions, various issues, IMF’s
Islands Article IV Report, www.imf.org No Stock Market
Timor-Leste
IM F’s Article IV Report, 
www.imf.org No Stock Market
Tonga
IM F’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions, various issues, IM F’s 
Article IV Report, www.imf.org No Stock Market
Tuvalu Not Available No Stock Market
Vanuatu Government o f Vanuatu No Stock Market
3.3 THE CALCULATED INDICATORS OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
LIBERALISATION
3.3.1 EVOLUTION OF THE INDICATORS
Ten-year averages for each liberalisation indicator and for each country are presented 
in Tables A3.1-3.9. Looking first at the ex-post liberalisation indicators, an upward 
movement in the volume of cross-border flows is assumed reflective of greater capital 
market openness. The data presented in Tables A3.1 and A3.2 seem to suggest that 
most small states have tended to open their capital accounts during the 1990s. This is 
somewhat later than more developed economies who removed controls on capital 
transactions during the 1980s (see Miniane, 2004).
To acquire an overall picture of this liberalisation trend, average indices for each 
indicator were obtained by calculating the sample mean over the individual country 
indices, are presented in Figures 3.1 -  3.4. The figure plots the trends in net capital 
flows, portfolio investment assets and liabilities, direct investment assets and
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liabilities as well as the sum of portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities 
(all as a percentage of GDP). Mainly due to greater foreign direct investment flows 
and, to a lesser extent, portfolio flows to small states from the early-1990s onwards, 
there has been a pronounced upward shift in the trend of these ex-post indicators.
In the case of net capital flows, however, although there was a general rise in net 
capital inflows during the period, only from 1996 onward was there a significant 
jump in this series. Net capital flows to small states in 1970 was 6% of GDP, 
fluctuating around this level until 1996. The series then jumped to a high o f 11,4% of 
GDP in 1999, but then contracted somewhat in more recent years and was estimated 
at 9.6% of GDP in 2002. In contrast, portfolio and direct investment assets and 
liabilities showed a pronounced upward shift from as early as 1990. Portfolio and 
direct investment assets and liabilities in 1970 were just 3% of GDP, rising to about 
6.5% by 1989. However, by 1996 it had reached 8% of GDP and ended the review 
period at 13.1% of GDP.
Figure 3.1: Ex-Post Indicators -  All Countries
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Figure 3.2: Interest Rate Indicators — All Countries
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Figure 3.3: Regression-Based Indicators -  All Countries
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Figure 3.4: Dummy Variable Indicators -  All Countries
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The interest rate indicators exhibited a similar shift in trend in the 1990s. 
Conventional economic theory suggests that capital controls are effective if they can 
drive a wedge between domestic and international interest rates (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
1996), Thus a rise in interest rate spreads would suggest that capital restrictions have 
become more stringent, while a reduction in spreads could imply that controls on 
capital have been loosened somewhat. The average spread between interest rates in 
small states and foreign markets, which began the 1990s as high as 6%, fell to below 
2% between 1997 and 2000 (see Tables A3.3 and A3.10 as well as Figure 3.2). There 
was somewhat of a reversal in interest rate spreads in 2001 because o f increased 
global uncertainty after 9/11.
The absolute difference between domestic and international interest rates is unlikely 
to be zero due to differences in risk profiles across countries. However, if markets 
between two countries become more integrated then the correlation between domestic
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and foreign interest rates should rise, while the spread should decline (see Akhtar, and 
Weiller, 1987). Not only has the spread between interest rates in small states and 
abroad narrowed, but the correlation between the two interest rates has also risen 
significantly since the 1990s. Figure 3.2 and Table A3.4 shows the correlation 
between domestic interest rates and those abroad has risen in most countries. While 
before 1990, the correlation between the two rates was zero or in some instances 
negative, from 1990 onward the correlation between the two series rose, with more 
than 40% of the variation in domestic interest rates being accounted for by those 
abroad. Moreover, in 15 countries the correlation coefficient was above 50% and in 
only 5 of the 34 countries, for which data is available, was the correlation coefficient 
negative or virtually zero.
Turning now to the regression based indices, as Feldstein and Horioka (1980) 
contend, if capital is free to flow between countries the net-of-tax rates of returns 
should be equalised across states and there should be no strong relationship between 
domestic savings and domestic investment. Therefore, in a world o f perfect capital 
mobility the Feldstein-Horioka p  should be equal to the country’s share of total 
world capital, which in the case o f small states would be virtually zero. Table A3.5 
and Figure 3.3 shows that the average p  for most countries is indeed relatively small 
(0.2). This estimate is significantly less than the 0.89 obtained by Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) and other authors for the OECD gi*oup of countries. However, it is 
still statistically greater than what theory would suggest and indeed there has been a 
slight upward trend in the p  during the 1990s. However, as noted by Dooley, 
Frankel and Mathieson (1987) the Feldstein-Horioka test of capital account 
liberalisation can be influenced by the deviation from purchasing power parity, 
exchange rate risk and the effects of government, all of which are likely to be present 
in small states.
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As a result, an alternative regression-based test of capital account liberalisation is 
presented: the Edwards and Khan y /. This indicator essentially gives the estimated 
importance of foreign interest rates in the determination of domestic interest rates. 
Obviously, in more open financial systems interest rates would be significantly 
influenced by what is happening abroad. Thus y/ tends to approach one, the lower 
the restrictions on the flow of capital. The Edwards and Klian y/ shows a more 
consistent trend in capital account liberalisation in small states. The indicator began 
the sample period at virtually zero and rose throughout the period, with a significant 
jump occurring between 1995 and 2000. The estimates of y/ for each country range 
from as low as 0.001 in Samoa and the Solomon Islands to as high as one in Anguilla.
The dummy variable indices depend on qualitative information about the country to 
generate indicators of capital account openness. The most basic of these takes a value 
o f one if  there are capital controls and zero if there are no capital controls. Table 
A3.7 and Figure 3.4 present the capital control dummies for each country. It shows 
that while some small states have removed legislation related to capital controls, 
reflected by the downward trend in the average for the dummy variable across 
countries. Figure 3.4 also plots the evolution of two additional dummy variables: the 
proportion of years the capital account was not open and a stock market liberalisation 
dummy variable (data for each country is presented in Tables A3.8-A3.9). The 
pattern of the other liberalisation indicators is very similar to the capital controls 
dummy variable.
The indicators presented above seem to be in general agreement that most small states 
have lifted restrictions on capital controls during the review period, particularly since 
1990. The removal of these restrictions has been followed by a significant upturn in 
capital flows as well as a reduction in the spread between interest rates in small states 
relative to those outside their borders.
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3.3.2 REGIONAL COMPARISONS
To compare the liberalisation indicators not only through time but also across 
regions, Figures 3,5-3.13 disaggregates the series into three regions, Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. For each measure, a simple 
average of all countries in that grouping is computed. Figures 3.6-3.7 present the two 
ex-post capital flow indicators. They both show that there is no real difference in the 
trends between the three regions in terms of capital flows, and just like the average 
for all countries, an upward shift is observed for all regions in the early- to mid- 
1990s.
In the case of the interest rate spread, most regions began the sample period with 
spreads close to zero but giadually expanded as capital control legislation was 
tightened in the 1970s and 1980s. However, a significant downturn in the spread is 
observed for most groupings from the early 1990s onwards, particularly for the 
African set of countries, whose spread fell from about 15% to about 2% by 2000. 
The correlation coefficient shows a similar trend, with African countries moving from 
zero or almost inverse correlation between domestic and foreign interest rates, to a 
positive correlation ratio that is close to that for the small states in Asia and the 
Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Figure 3.5: Net Capital Flows (% of GDP) -  Region
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Figure 3.6: Portfolio and Direct Investment Flows (% of GDP) -  Region
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Figure 3.7: Spread between Domestic and Foreign Interest Rates -  Region
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Figure 3.8: Correlation between Domestic and Foreign Interest — Region
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Figure 3.9: Time-Varying Feldstein-Horioka -R eg io n
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
- 0.2
-0.4
-0.6
-0.8
^  y  ^  ^  ^
I A frica------- Latin America and the C aribbean  Asia and the Pacific |
Figure 3.10: Time-Varying Edwards-Khan y / -  Region
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Figure 3.11: Dummy Variable o f the Existence o f Capital Controls -  Region
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Figure 3.12: Proportion of Years without Capital Controls -  Region
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Figure 3.13: Evolution of the Stock Market Liberalisation Dummy Variable
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The regi‘ession-based indicators tell a similar story. These indicators show -  
particularly in the case of the time-varying Edwards-Khan y/ -  that Latin America 
and the Caribbean and African group of countries witnessed a significant change in 
the indicators of openness from the mid-1990s onwards.
The dummy variable indicators o f capital account liberalisation (presented in Figures 
3.11-3.12) suggest that although these Latin America and the Caribbean and African 
countries were engaged in greater liberalisation during the 1990s, Asia and the Pacific 
group o f countries, by-and-large have the lowest legal restrictions on the flow of 
capital across their borders.
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3.3.3 COMPARISON ACROSS DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS
Rather than varying with geographic location, it is possible that nations at similar 
levels of development -  proxied by income per capita -  will exhibit similar patters of 
liberalisation. The author therefore disaggregates the liberalisation indicators into 
four income groupings: low (<US$825), low middle (US$826-US$3255), high 
middle (US$3256-US$ 10,065) and high income (>US$10,065) obtained from the 
World Bank. For each measure, a simple average of the indicator for the particular 
country grouping is computed. Table A3.11 presents the results.
Table 3.2: Income Level and Indicators of Capital Account Liberalisation
_____________________________________________________ 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04
Net Capital Flows (% o f GDP)
Low Income 7.679 9.582 5.147 5.244
Lower Middle Income 5.444 7.194 7.104 7.413
Upper Middle Income 8.140 9.833 7.850 12.237
High Income 7.784 7.109 9.528 9.599
Portfolio and Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities (% o f  
GDP)
Low Income 2.322 1.273 2.522 3.500
Lower Middle Income 0.793 2.672 5.349 7.538
Upper Middle Income 6.284 7.015 8.941 13.683
High Income 6.769 5.323 12.010 15.748
Domestic and Foreign Interest Rate Spread (%)
Low Income n.a. 3.937 8.196 3.649
Lower Middle Income -3.641 -2.491 2.840 3.274
Upper Middle Income -3.880 -2.479 0.990 2.229
High Income -1.558 -3.481 -0.908 0.642
Domestic and Foreign Interest Rate Correlation
Low Income n.a. 0.122 -0.180 0.205
Lower Middle Income -0.612 0.039 0.204 0.312
Upper Middle Income -0.588 -0.233 0.138 0.389
High Income 0.876 0.541 0.688 0.722
Time-Vaiying Feldstein-Horioka (3
Low Income -0.113 -0.096 0.063 0.202
Lower Middle Income 0.260 0.172 0.167 0.457
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1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04
Upper Middle Income 0.598 -0.107 0.160 0.130
High Income 0.019 0.170 0.083 0.123
Time-VatymgEdwards-Khan y/
Low Income n.a. 0.002 0.003 0.008
Lower Middle Income 0.008 0.079 0.117 0.098
Upper Middle Income n.a. 0.075 0.152 0.277
High Income n.a. 0.014 0.128 0.351
Dummy Variable for the Presence o f Capital Controls
Low Income I.OOO I.OOO 1.000 I.OOO
Lower Middle Income 0.667 0.636 0.600 0.650
Upper Middle Income 0.889 0.889 0.744 0.667
High Income 0.813 0.750 0.625 0.625
Proportion o f Years Capital Account was Not Open
Low Income I.OOO I.OOO I.OOO I.OOO
Lower Middle Income 0.667 0.636 0.656 0.644
Upper Middle Income 0.889 0.889 0.869 0.825
High Income 0.853 0.792 0.749 0.720
Stock Market Liberalisation Dummy
Low Income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Lower Middle Income 0.000 0.000 0.106 0.238
Upper Middle Income 0.000 0.000 0.II8 0.545
High Income 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.327
Note: Economies are divided according to 2004 GNl per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas 
method. The groups are: low income, $825 or less; lower middle income, $826 - $3,255; upper middle 
income, $3,256 - $10,065; and high income, $10,066 or more.
Looking first at the ex-post indicators, the upper-middle income and high income 
countries on average receive more capital flows. Similar to the trends highlighted in 
previous sections, there was an upward shift in capital flows during the 1990s, for 
most middle- to high-income countries. However, there was only a marginal 
expansion in cross border flows to low income nations.
A similar trend holds for most o f the other liberalisation indicators. In the case of the 
interest rate spread, the absolute spread between domestic and foreign interest rates is
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lowest in high-income countries. Only in the high middle and high-income group 
was there any significant drop in the interest rate spread during the latter half of the 
review period. Similarly, the correlation between domestic and foreign interest rates 
is greatest in the high-income group of countries (0.722) but has risen on average in 
every country grouping.
For the Feldstein-Horioka time-varying p , it was almost zero in the high-income 
group of countries. However, in the low and lower middle-income gi*oup of 
territories, most of the indicators trended upwards, indicative o f a reduction in 
financial openness. The results for the time-varying \j/ were somewhat different. 
The upper middle income and high income group of countries reported a significant 
jump in this indicator, especially from the 1990s onwards. In contrast, the weight of 
foreign interest rates in domestic interest rate determination remained at less than 0.1 
throughout most of the review period. The dummy variable indicators also suggest 
that high-income countries have removed a larger amount of the legislation restricting 
the free flow of capital into and out of their country.
3.3.4 CORRELATION BETWEEN THE LIBERALISATION INDICATORS
Table 3.3 presents the cross correlation coefficients and associated p-values between 
the 13 indicators. It shows that most of the series are significantly correlated (p-value 
< 0.010). The largest correlation ratio was between the proportion of years the capital 
account was open and the time-varying Edwards-KIian y/ as well as the dummy 
variable for the presence of capital controls and portfolio and direct investment assets 
and liabilities (expressed as a percentage of GDP).
90
28
u<1
D .u
228
c
s8
"Eu
Ou
n
m2ZCQH
III
iiJifo  z
IIJ
I Î :
« £a: .2
l i i
îîll
CL
'o S
o
I 1 Ïliîüi
W iS ÿ o qT1-2 gu. O
5S
2 1
r*- — iTi — o  ~
2 1
- I
m i
PSt lillgi "2 1 -O:1 oc1 .1 a.W51 i1 1 1 1 1
8 3 §® 89  o
l i
5 |
if I I
g-
uI!
I Î
;®5o = §  ° o  S on 5 9 8  9 8 9 80 _ -
0 2 —
o  rr g  %r o  %r s> =r
PII
5 |
2 1
oe
ill
3.3.S LIBERALISATION IN  FIXED VS. FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE 
COUNTRIES
Although many developing countries have shifted away from fixed exchange rates 
during the 1990s, many small states still restrict their currencies from freely floating. 
Since most countries usually trade with one or two key countries, fixing their 
currency against that of their larger trading partner reduces exchange risk. Fixing the 
exchange rate also allows the small country to establish the credibility of its policies 
by tying the hands o f the authorities. Figures 3 .1 4 -3 .1 6  show that countries with 
fixed exchange rates have liberalised at the same pace as those that have floating 
exchange rates. Therefore, some nations with flexible exchange rate regimes still 
seem to have capital controls, probably to reduce exchange rate volatility.
Figure 3.14: Exchange Rate Regimes and Net Capital Flows (% of GDP)
12.000
10.000  -
8.000  -
%  6.000  -
4 .0 0 0  -
2.000  -
0.000
 F ixed  Floating |
92
Figure 3.15: Existence o f Capital Controls and Exchange Rate Regimes
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Figure 3.16: Stock Market Liberalisation and Exchange Rate Regimes
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3.4 SUMMARY
Using data on 51 small states between 1970 and 2004, this Chapter derives 13 
indicators of capital account liberalisation in these countries; the first time such a 
comprehensive database has been available for small states. Three broad groups of 
indicators are presented: ex-post macroeconomic indicators, regression-based 
indicators and qualitative indices.
The Chapter finds that some countries seem to have reduced restrictions on capital 
flows during the period, particularly during the 1990s, however, some -  particularly 
low income territories — still maintain restrictions. This finding was robust to 
variations in the indicators used. Those regions that have lifted restrictions, however, 
benefited from a significant jump in capital inflows as well as a convergence in 
domestic interest rates to those available abroad. A regional disaggregation of the 
indices show that Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Asia and the Pacific 
seem to be relatively more advanced in their liberalisation process than African 
countries, which may reflect the relative disparities in development between the 
areas. Indeed, a disaggregation o f the indicators by income group reveals that 
relatively more advanced countries tend to be more open to capital flows.
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Table A3.1: Net Capital Flows (% o f GDP)
Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde 1.815 7.774 8.631 6.507
Comoros n.a. 13.404 4.551 n.a.
Guinea-Bissau n.a. 8.289 5.302 8.198
Mauritius 4.360 2.430 1.702 3.096
Sao Tome and Principe 17.877 13.758 7.708 5.855
Seychelles 8.759 12.147 2.800 7.823
Anguilla n.a. n.a. 22.060 23.875
Antigua and Barbuda 10.737 21.871 7.412 10.120
Aruba n.a. 5.076 8.826 9.170
The Bahamas 2.914 2.670 6.927 8.248
Barbados 6.202 5.030 2.072 8.658
Belize n.a. 3.856 4.645 18.582
The British Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica 4.343 7.541 11.459 9.658
Dominican Republic 4.243 2.277 1.997 4.513
Grenada 2.972 10.233 9.703 21.207
Guyana 6.521 10.228 14.357 12.024
Haiti 3.654 4.175 2.375 1.445
Jamaica 1.990 6.988 5.122 11.463
Montserrat n.a. 15.802 13.609 6.603
The Netherlands Antilles 9.142 8.365 2.071 4.853
Puerto Rico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. 14.388 17.723 27.172
St. Lucia 20.346 12.744 10.685 9.056
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 5.712 5.767 15.289 8.418
Suriname 3.342 10.191 8.230 9.087
Trinidad and Tobago 5.465 3.286 4.520 3.419
United States Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
American Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain 12.875 5.712 11.127 5.788
The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji 5.595 4.615 3.132 n.a.
French Polynesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maldives 11.355 13.684 11.052 7.935
Marshall Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Federated States o f Micronesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nauru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New Caledonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 1.375 8.960 5.283 5.477
Samoa 8.752 1.613 4.660 n.a.
The Solomon Islands 7.811 8.905 5.660 n.a.
Timor-Leste n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tonga 6.190 6.016 2.151 1.457
Tuvalu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Vanuatu n.a. 13.018 10.775 9.922
Average 6.974 8.463 7.685 9.298
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
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Table A3.2: Portfolio and Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities (% of GDP)
Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde 0.000 0.183 2.791 3.136
Comoros n.a. 0.846 0.457 n.a.
Guinea-Bissau n.a. 0.000 0.000 1.930
Mauritius 0.414 0.593 2.326 3.038
Sao Tome and Principe 0.122 0.041 5.589 7.054
Seychelles 12.575 9.829 8.298 9.156
Anguilla n.a. n.a. 23.509 33.050
Antigua and Barbuda 7.252 11.652 7.539 6.966
Aruba n.a. 0.000 11.465 14.888
The Bahamas 2.185 0.849 2.232 3.709
Barbados 3.864 1.206 2.571 5.449
Belize n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The British Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica 0.000 4.125 11.680 7.387
Dominican Republic 1.725 0.928 2.506 4.664
Grenada 0.797 3.923 9.981 27.599
Guyana 0.572 0.691 15.647 7.296
Haiti 0.918 0.440 0.295 0.225
Jamaica 0.630 0.702 4.176 16.080
Montserrat n.a. 16.621 9.906 7.351
The Netherlands Antilles 10.487 8.937 3.234 2.382
Puerto Rico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. 11.513 14.164 32.834
St. Lucia 18.711 12.614 9.036 11.347
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.119 3.031 15.259 10.459
Suriname 2.665 11.837 6.229 8.589
Trinidad and Tobago 4.237 1.872 8.501 11.141
United States Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
American Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain 10.542 4.324 31.153 43.407
The Commonwealth o f  the Northern Marianas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji 0.998 2.781 4.947 n.a.
French Polynesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maldives 0.000 1.041 2.255 1.967
Marshall Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Federated States o f Micronesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nauru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New Caledonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 1.915 4.153 4.707 4.793
Samoa 0.000 0.000 0.000 n.a.
The Solomon Islands 6.333 2.157 4.084 n.a.
Timor-Leste n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tonga 0.000 0.088 3.537 n.a.
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Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
n.a.
n.a.
3.522
n.a.
6.132
3.971
n.a.
11.785
7.496
n.a.
7.869
10.880
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Table A3.3: Spread between Domestic and Foreign Interest Rates (%)
Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde n.a. -3.940 -0.943 1.264
Comoros n.a. -1.347 6.010 0.246
Guinea-Bissau n.a. 16.870 7.800 0.512
Mauritius n.a. 0.181 5.216 6.402
Sao Tome and Principe n.a. 6.720 26.954 12.493
Seychelles n.a. -0.512 3.331 1.444
Anguilla n.a. -2.880 -1.677 0.958
Antigua and Barbuda n.a. -1.938 -0.305 1.656
Aruba n.a. -1.200 -0.282 2.450
The Bahamas n.a. -3.788 -0.089 1.084
Barbados n.a. -4.797 -0.281 0.238
Belize -1.290 0.572 3.141 3.946
The British Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica -6.470 -5.283 -1.130 0.748
Dominican Republic n.a. n.a. 10.471 15.296
Grenada n.a. -4.605 -1.280 0.766
Guyana -3,068 1.576 9.953 2.356
Haiti n.a. n.a. 4.810 8.718
Jamaica -0.185 4.127 18.309 6.268
Montserrat n.a. -3.977 -1.878 0.038
The Netherlands Antilles n.a. -4.213 -1.631 0.472
Puerto Rico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. -3.917 -0.816 1.330
St. Lucia n.a. -2.936 -0.891 1.506
St. Vincent and the Grenadines n.a. -4.847 -1.241 1.274
Suriname n.a. n.a. 6.977 7.604
Trinidad and Tobago n.a. -3.874 1.641 2.266
United States Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
American Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain -1.558 -3.513 -0.517 -0.743
The Commonwealth o f the Northern Mai ianas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji -4.318 -4.933 -2.245 -2.350
French Polynesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maldives -4.470 -4.387 1.265 4.082
Marshall Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Federated States o f Micronesia n.a. n.a. -1.405 -0.734
Nauru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New Caledonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea n.a. -1.405 1.625 1.654
Samoa -5.590 0.254 0.888 2.470
The Solomon Islands n.a. -1.156 1.974 -1.726
Timor-Leste n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tonga n.a. -4.204 0.126 2.536
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Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Tuvalu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Vanuatu n.a. -2.001 -0.963 -1.700
Average -3.369 -1.512 2.733 2.495
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
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Table A3.4: Correlation between Domestic and Foreign Interest Rates (%)
Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde n.a. n.a. -0.187 -0.231
Comoros n.a. 0.465 0.366 0.355
Guinea-Bissau n.a. 1.000 0.140 0.417
Mauritius n.a. -0.362 -0.006 0.142
Sao Tome and Principe n.a. n.a. -0.884 -0.256
Seychelles n.a. -0.766 -0.391 0.345
Anguilla n.a. n.a. 0.706 0.683
Antigua and Barbuda n.a. -0.453 0.162 0.463
Aruba n.a. 0.772 0.773 0.588
The Bahamas n.a. 0.478 0.733 0.773
Barbados n.a. 0.469 0.533 0.625
Belize -0.588 0.696 0.602 0.645
The British Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica n.a. -0.049 0.062 0.369
Dominican Republic n.a. 1.000 0.524 0.043
Grenada n.a. -0.742 0.061 0.396
Guyana 0.493 0.637 -0.119 0.020
Haiti n.a. n.a. -0.200 0.050
Jamaica -0.699 0.026 -0.548 -0.389
MontseiTat n.a. 0.730 0.652 0.756
The Netherlands Antilles n.a. -0.067 0.566 0.748
Puerto Rico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. -0.825 0.274 0.597
St. Lucia n.a. -0.130 0.476 0.629
St. Vincent and the Grenadines n.a. -0.843 0.124 0.423
Suriname n.a. n.a. 0.500 0.591
Trinidad and Tobago n.a. 0.533 0.001 -0.088
United States Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
American Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain 0.876 0.868 0.852 0.881
The Commonwealth o f the Northern Marianas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji -0.526 0.533 0.466 0.621
French Polynesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maldives n.a. -0.416 -0.403 -0.102
Marshall Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Federated States o f Micronesia n.a. n.a. 0.760 0.846
Nauru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New Caledonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea n.a. -0.014 0.120 0.474
Samoa n.a. -0.766 -0.121 0.300
The Solomon Islands n.a. -0.961 -0.625 0.190
Timor-Leste n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tonga n.a. -0.126 0.246 0.509
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Counti'y 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Tuvalu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Vanuatu n.a. 0.906 0.880 0.822
Average -0.089 0.092 0.209 0.389
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
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Table A3.5: Tim e-Vaiying Feldsteiii-Horioka
Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde n.a. 0.820 0.928 0.940
Comoros n.a. 0.428 0.063 -0.190
Guinea-Bissau 0.527 0.544 0.724 0.748
Mauritius -0.120 0.689 0.431 0.362
Sao Tome and Principe -0.307 -0.292 -0.354 -0.410
Seychelles 0.277 0.348 0.305 0.310
Anguilla n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Antigua and Barbuda 0.251 -0.204 0.149 0.125
Aruba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Bahamas -0.078 0.121 n.a. n.a.
Barbados -0.414 -0.165 -0.465 -0.478
Belize n.a. 0.126 0.196 0.116
The British Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica -0.436 -0.491 -0.251 -0.228
Dominican Republic 0.407 n.a. 0.481 0.465
Grenada n.a. -0.856 0.230 n.a.
Guyana -0.060 0.076 0.237 0.317
Haiti 0.808 -0.149 0.380 0.659
Jamaica 0.731 0.798 0.658 0.487
Montserrat n.a. 0.106 0.197 0.213
The Netherlands Antilles n.a. 0.128 0.336 n.a.
Puerto Rico 0.550 -0.170 -0.333 n.a.
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.349 0.112 0.561 0.552
St. Lucia n.a. -0.665 -0.442 -0.451
St. Vincent and the Grenadines -0.472 -0.350 -0.128 -0.113
Suriname 1.152 0.701 0.691 0.594
Trinidad and Tobago -0.224 -0.019 0.261 0.253
United States Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
American Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain n.a. 0.999 0.677 0.633
The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji 0.051 0.633 0.840 0.892
French Polynesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati -0.149 -0.519 -0.680 n.a.
Maldives n.a. n.a. -0.650 0.222
Marshall Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Federated States o f Micronesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nauru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New Caledonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea -1.482 -0.947 -0.529 n.a.
Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Solomon Islands n.a. -0.157 0.091 n.a.
Timor-Leste n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tonga 0.103 -0.174 0.134 0.166
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Counti7 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Tuvalu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Vanuatu n.a. -0.535 -0.604 n.a.
Average 0.070 0.031 0.133 0.258
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
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Table A3.6: Tim e-Vaiying Edwards-KIiaii y/
Countiy 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde n.a. 0.000 0.022 0.113
Comoros n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guinea-Bissau n.a. n.a. 0.004 0.018
Mauritius n.a. 0.015 0.061 0.586
Sao Tome and Principe n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Seychelles n.a. 0.054 0.191 0.089
Anguilla n.a. n.a. 0.668 3.420
Antigua and Barbuda n.a. 0.316 0.280 0.342
Aruba n.a. n.a. 0.014 0.028
The Bahamas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Barbados n.a. 0.028 0.009 0.332
Belize n.a. 0.008 0.035 0.089
The British Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica n.a. 0.070 0.445 0.646
Dominican Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Grenada n.a. 0.000 0.198 0.407
Guyana 0.003 0.036 0.010 0.013
Haiti n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Jamaica 0.008 0.005 0.001 0.000
Montserrat n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Netherlands Antilles n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Puerto Rico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
St. Lucia n.a. 0.138 0.007 0.050
St. Vincent and the Grenadines n.a. 0.000 0.001 0.009
Suriname n.a. n.a. 0.012 0.017
Trinidad and Tobago n.a. 0.001 0.001 0.007
United States Virgin Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
American Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain n.a. 0.000 0.007 0.040
The Commonwealth o f the Northern Marianas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji n.a. 0.004 0.075 0.004
French Polynesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maldives n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Marshall Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The Federated States o f Micronesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nauru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New Caledonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea n.a. 0.004 0.000 0.005
Samoa n.a. 0.016 0.000 0.001
The Solomon Islands n.a. 0.000 0.005 0.001
Timor-Leste n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tonga n.a. 0.367 0.564 0.474
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Countiy 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Tuvalu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Vanuatu n.a. 0.159 0.263 0.166
Average 0.005 0.061 0.120 0.286
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
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Table A3.7: Capital Account Liberalisation Dummy
Countiy 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Comoros 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Guinea-Bissau 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mauritius 1.000 1.000 0.400 0.000
Sao Tome and Principe 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Seychelles 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Anguilla n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Antigua and Barbuda 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Aruba 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The Bahamas 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Barbados 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Belize 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The British Virgin Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Dominican Republic 1.000 n.a. 1.000 1.000
Grenada 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Guyana 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Haiti 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Jamaica 1.000 1.000 0.200 0.000
Montserrat 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The Netherlands Antilles 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Puerto Rico 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000
St. Kitts and Nevis 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
St. Lucia 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.000 1.000 1.000 1,000
Suriname 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Trinidad and Tobago 1.000 1.000 0.300 0.000
United States Virgin Islands 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000
American Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
The Commonwealth o f the Northern Marianas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
French Polynesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
Maldives 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Marshall Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The Federated States o f Micronesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nauru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New Caledonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Samoa 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The Solomon Islands 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Timor-Leste 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tonga 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Tuvalu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Vanuatu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Average 0.816 0.784 0.708 0.705
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
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Table A3.8: Proportion of Years Capital Account Was Open
Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Comoros 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Guinea-Bissau 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mauritius 1.000 1.000 0.926 0.729
Sao Tome and Principe 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Seychelles 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Anguilla n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Antigua and Barbuda 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Aruba 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The Bahamas 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Barbados 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Belize 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The British Virgin Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cuba n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Dominican Republic 1.000 n.a. 1.000 1.000
Grenada 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Guyana 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Haiti 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Jamaica 1.000 1.000 0.869 0.668
Montserrat 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The Netherlands Antilles 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Puerto Rico 0.823 0.334 0.199 0.152
St. Kitts and Nevis 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
St. Lucia 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Suriname 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Trinidad and Tobago 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.698
United States Virgin Islands 0.823 0.334 0.199 0.152
American Samoa n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bahrain 1.000 1.000 0.794 0.607
The Commonwealth o f the Northern Marianas n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Fiji 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
French Polynesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guam n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Kiribati 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059
Maldives 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Marshall Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The Federated States o f Micronesia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Nauru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
New Caledonia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niue n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Palau n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Papua New Guinea 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Samoa 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The Solomon Islands 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Timor-Leste 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tonga 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Tuvalu n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Vanuatu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Average 0.833 0.802 0.786 0.765
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
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Table A3.9: Stock M arket Liberalisation Dummy
Countiy 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Cape Verde 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Comoros 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Guinea-Bissau 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mauritius 0.000 0.000 0.600 1.000
Sao Tome and Principe 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Seychelles 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Anguilla 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
Antigua and Barbuda 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
Aruba 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The Bahamas 0.000 0.000 0.100 1.000
Barbados 0,000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Belize 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The British Virgin Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cuba 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dominica 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
Dominican Republic 0.000 n.a. 0.900 1.000
Grenada 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
Guyana 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Haiti 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Jamaica 0.000 0.000 0.800 1.000
Montserrat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
The Netherlands Antilles 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Puerto Rico 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
St. Lucia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.800
Suriname 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Trinidad and Tobago 0.000 0.000 0.700 1.000
United States Virgin Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
American Samoa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bahrain 0.000 0.000 0.100 1.000
The Commonwealth o f the Northern Marianas 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cook Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fiji 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
French Polynesia n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Guam 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kiribati 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maldives 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Marshall Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The Federated States o f Micronesia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nauru 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
New Caledonia 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Niue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Palau 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Papua New Guinea 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Samoa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The Solomon Islands 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Timor-Leste 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tonga 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Country 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-2004
Tuvalu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vanuatu 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Average 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.263
Note: n.a. means not applicable.
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CHAPTER 4 -  CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION AND GROWTH
Chapter 3 of this thesis provided 13 indicators o f capital account liberalisation for 
small states between 1970 and 2004. These indicators show that some countries have 
eased restrictions on capital flows over the period, particularly during the 1990s. 
However, some states, particularly low-income territories, still maintain capital 
account restrictions. This chapter attempts to assess whether the process of 
liberalisation has had any significant impact on economic growth in the two groups.
The theoretical literature surveyed in Chapter 2 suggests that capital account 
liberalisation should have positive benefits for small states in terms of economic 
growth. Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), using a neoclassical model of 
firm growth, show that foreign capital flows, enhances the country’s long-term 
growth rate by reducing borrowing cost, providing new financing options and 
expanding the existing stock of skilled labour force. Similarly, Barro, Mankiw and 
Sala-I-Maitin (1995) argue that by opening the capital account, the country attains 
greater access to physical capital investment and therefore countries that are more 
open should converge to higher income states at a faster rate than closed economies.
The findings of the theoretical literature on the relationship between financial 
integration and growth predict that economies that are more open should grow at a
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faster rate. Some papers attempt to measure these gains by calibrating theoretical 
models and comparing two economies that differ in their level of financial 
integration. Using this approach, Obstfeld and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) 
report large gains from financial integration. In contrast, Gourinchas and Jeanne 
(2004), employing a detenninistic growth model find that the gains from risk sharing 
are small. Similar results are reported by Epaulard and Pommeret (2005) who build a 
stochastic endogenous growth model of a small open economy and calibrate it on 32 
emerging market and developing countries. The authors report that the average 
welfare gain from financial integration is about 10 percent of initial wealth or about
0.4 of a percentage point increase in growth per year.
Rather than using calibrated models, a number of studies attempt to use cross-country 
data to examine whether gi'owth differs in those countries that have capital controls 
relative to those that do not. Quinn (1997) presents one of the earliest o f these cross­
country studies. The author augments a basic growth regression, with a capital 
account index and finds that between 1960 and 1989 international financial 
integration had a positive and statistically significant influence on average growth, 
raising the average annual expansion in economic activity by about 1.6% per annum.
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundlad (2001) utilising a stock market liberalisation dummy as 
a measure of capital account restrictiveness and a sample of both developed and 
developing countries also find a positive association between capital account 
openness and growth. The authors evaluated the robustness of the model by using 
alternative sets of liberalisation dates, different groupings of countries and four 
different tinie-horizons for measuring economic growth. The results did not change 
appreciably. Henry (2003) also finds analogous results for the effects of stock market 
liberalisation based on observations on a sample to 18 developing countries. The 
author finds that, on average, output per worker rises by 2.3 percentage points per 
year as a result of opening the capital account. Edwards (2001) and Klein (2005)
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obtain similar results, but argue that the effects of liberalisation depend on the level of 
financial development and institutional quality, respectively.
A number of other studies, also using observations on a cross-section o f countries, in 
contrast find no significant relationship, and in some instances an inverse 
relationship, between liberalisation and growth (see for example, Rodrick, 1998, 
Kraay, 1998, and Edison, Levine, Ricci and Slok, 2002).
Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok (2004) attempt to reconcile these differences found in 
the literature. The authors estimate regressions that encompass the essential elements 
of previous studies and a wide variety of capital account liberalisation indicators. 
However, Edison, Klein, Ricci and Slok also find that integration has an insignificant 
effect on growth, except when interacted with government reputation or GDP. The 
authors suggest that these results could imply that an intermediate level of 
development may be a precondition for a country to benefit from capital account 
liberalisation.
The link between the removal of capital account controls and growth is somewhat 
fragile. One of the reasons is that there is not a single standard measure of capital 
account restrictiveness. To avoid this problem, this Chapter examines a number of 
liberalisation indicators. This approach has two main benefits: (1) it allows one to 
assess the robustness of the relationship between capital account liberalisation and 
growth, and (2 ) compares the results in this study to those for larger countries done in 
previous studies. After the introduction. Section 4.1 presents stylised facts 
concerning output growth and liberalisation. Section 4.2 outlines the empirical 
approach employed in the Chapter while Section 4,3 presents the empirical results of 
the relationship between liberalisation and growth, testing the robustness of the model 
by investigating numerous econometric specifications. Section 4.4 summarises the 
main results and the policy implications for small states.
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4.1 STYLISED FACTS
In this section, stylised facts regarding economic growth and capital account 
liberalisation are presented. The data on real gross domestic product (GDP) is taken 
from the United Nations’ National Accounts database, available at unstats.un.org. 
The series are obtainable on an annual frequency over the period 1970 to 2004 for the 
group of 51 small states.
To provide an initial evaluation of the impact of liberalisation, the countries are 
divided into two samples -  countries with capital account restrictions (26) and those 
without capital account restrictions (25). The separation is done using the capital 
account liberalisation dummy derived in Chapter 3, noting that it is strongly 
correlated with most of the other indicators.
Table 4.1 gives the average rate of growth for the full sample o f countries between 
1970 and 2004, as well as the two groups of countries highlighted earlier. The 
average rates of growth are also calculated for four periods: 1970-1979, 1980-1989, 
1990-1999 and 2000-2004. Using the full sample, the data presented in the table 
suggests that countries with less open capital accounts tend to report a higher rate of 
economic growth (2.3% per year) relative to their counterparts with more liberal 
capital account policies (1.1% per year). While somewhat surprising, this result 
should be taken in the context that there may be some other intervening variables that 
could have been influencing economic growth over the period. It could, for example, 
have been the case that the sample of countries with more liberal capital account 
policies experienced relative declines in their terms of trade. Such an occurrence 
would have lowered growth in the sample of more open countries relative to their 
closed peers. It is important to account for the effects of these intervening variables 
before definitive statements are made with respect to the relationship between capital 
account openness and economic giowth.
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Table 4.1: Growth in More Financially Integrated Economies
Full
(1970
2004)
Sample
to
1970
Decade 
1980 1990 2000
Growth
All Countries 0.035 0.050 0.034 0.031 0.023
More Open Capital
Account 0.011 0.013 0.010 0.012 0.010
Less Open Capital
Account 0.023 0.037 0.024 0.018 0.013
Splitting the data into four time periods, Table 4.1 shows, however, that while 
countries with less open capital accounts have experienced declining rates of growth 
(from 3.7% in the 1970s to less than half that between 2000 and 2004), those nations 
with more liberal policies have had steady, although not extraordinary, rates of 
economic expansion.
Figure 4.1 plots the average annual rates of growth for the two groups of countries. 
The figure shows that most of the difference in the average percentage change in 
GDP between the two groups occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. However, from 
1990 onwards giowth rates between the two groups were quite even.
To evaluate the impact o f the other indicators of capital account liberalisation derived 
earlier, correlation ratios between the liberalisation indicators and growth are 
calculated. The results are presented in Table 4.2. The first seven series (net capital 
flows, portfolio investment assets, portfolio investment liabilities, direct investment 
assets, direct investment liabilities, portfolio and direct investment assets and 
liabilities and foreign direct investment all as a percentages of GDP) are ex-post 
macroeconomic barometers of capital account liberalisation. The results for these 
seven measures, in relation to growth are broadly consistent. They reveal that capital 
account openness is positively associated with economic expansion. The interest rate 
indicators, however, provide a contradictory story. The correlation ratio between the
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Figure 4.1: Growth and Capital Account Restrictiveiiess
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interest rate spread (the difference in the spread between domestic and foreign 
interest rates) and growth suggests that more liberal capital account policies is 
positively correlated with growth, while the higher the correlation between domestic 
and foreign interest rates lowers economic growth.
The results obtained from using the regression-based indicators (time varying p  
from Feldstein-Horioka model and time-varying y/ from Edwards and Khan Model) 
are in line with the previous results for the ex-post macroeconomic indicators: 
liberalisation is positively associated with economic growth. All the dummy variable 
indicators (dummy variable for the existence of capital controls and the proportion of 
years that the capital account was not open), with the exception of the stock market
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Table 4.2: Correlation Liberalisation and Economic Growth
Growth
Net Capital Flows (% o f GDP) 0.055
Portfolio Investment Assets (% GDP) 0.026
Portfolio Investment Liabilities (% GDP) 0.023
Direct Investment Assets (% GDP) 0.011
Direct Investment Liabilities (% GDP) 0.028
Portfolio and Direct Investment Assets and Liabilities(% of GDP) 0.037
F D I(% ofG D P ) 0,052
Domestic and Foreign Interest Rate Spread -0.003
Domestic and Foreign Interest Rate Correlation -0.148
Time Varying Beta fiom Feldstein-Horioka Model -0.053
Time Vaiylng Psi from Edwards and Khan Model 0.058
Dummy Variable o f the Existence o f Capital Controls -0.100
Proportion o f Years for Which the Capital Account was NOT 
Open -0.096
Stock Market Liberalisation Dummy (1 = stock market is 
liberalised) 0.000
liberalisation indicator (which has a correlation ratio of zero), also had a positive 
association between capital account liberalisation and growth.
These stylised facts can provide an initial picture of the impact of liberalisation on 
growth. However, a number o f other phenomena could also contribute to the 
evolution of economic growth in the countries under examination. To disentangle 
these effects, a general model of growth in small states is specified which is then 
augmented with the various measures of liberalisation calculated in Chapter 3 to 
obtain a more robust assessment of the impact of capital account liberalisation.
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4.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH
4.2.1 EMPIRICAL MODEL
In this section of the chapter, this section outlines the model of economic growth. 
The basic strategy is to relate the natural logarithm of per capita GDP growth to a set 
of conventional determinants. The liberalisation indicators presented in Chapter 3 are 
then added to this basic specification to investigate whether they add additional 
information to the explanation of growth dynamics in small states.
The empirical growth equation is motivated through the use of the Solow growth 
model. The Solow gi'owth model is employed since it effectively captures the 
constraints that limited factors of production can have on the growth prospects of 
small states. Henry (2006) also argues that the model illustrates quite effectively how 
capital account liberalisation can influence economic growth: it causes a temporary 
increase in capital flows and therefore the capital-labour ratio jumps to a new steady- 
state level. In the transition to a new steady state, economic growth temporarily 
increases.
Using a Cobb-Douglas production function, output (f^ ) is given as:
(4.1)
where K, is the capital stock, is technology, Z, is the labour force and a  is 
assumed to be between zero and one, which implies diminishing marginal 
productivity of capital. Assume that the change in the capital stock (K ,) is given as 
the difference between investment and depreciation:
K ,= s Y ,-S K ,  (4.2)
where s is the investment share of output (savings) and 6 is the depreciation rate. 
Following Flail and Jones (1997), output per worker is expressed as a function of the 
capital-output ratio ( X, ):
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~  = A X }-‘ (4.3)A
This specification is advantageous since it captures the effects o f on long-run
output, while more traditional specifications have technology affecting output per 
worker indirectly.
The growth in the capital-output ratio can then be expressed as:
V  A A  y (4 4)
Denoting ^  as g and ^  as n and using the equation of motion for the capital
stock, Equation (4.2), Equation (4.4) can be re-written as:
X.
X.^  — (1 — (%) g — n — 0 (4.5)
XIn steady state —^ = 0 and the capital output ratio converges to a steady-state level 
given by:
r = - ^ .  (4.6)g  + n + o
The convergence to steady state can then be written as:
zz/LCJT' - ; r , )  (4.7)
with the convergence parameter Â = (1 ~ a ) (g  + w + 5 ) .
Equation (4.7) can now be used to derive the evolution of output per worker. 
Expressing Equation (4.3) in logarithms one obtains:
+ (4.8)l - a
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using lower-case to denote logarithms. Since the steady-state path of output per 
worker is that which is consistent with the steady-state capital output ratio, one 
obtains that:
(4.9)l - a
From Equation (4.7) the log change in output per worker can be written as:
y, = s - ^ K y , - y , )  (4.10)
Equation (4.10) states that growth is a function of technological progress as well as 
the gap between actual and steady state output. Since y] is not observed, the typical
cross-country growth regression assumes that it is a linear function of a number of 
structural variables such as the human capital and trade (see for example, Mankiw, 
1995). The cross-country growth regression can be specified as:
À  (4.11)
where / ( / = 1, . . . ,# )  denote countries, 77. are the country-specific effects and captures 
differences in technological progress across countries, X., are the obseiwations of the 
variables controlling for different levels o f long-run per capita output across countries 
and is an error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance cr^.
Levine and Renelt (1992), employing extreme bounds analysis to test the robustness 
of a various macroeconomic indicators in explaining cross-country growth 
differentials, find that very few macroeconomic variables are robustly correlated with 
cross-country growth rates. Since the authors’ main interest is the impact of capital 
account liberalisation on per capita GDP growth, the regressions in this Chapter only 
incorporate variables that have a robust impact in cross-country equations. These 
variables include investment, population growth, trade openness, terms of trade, 
inflation, government fiscal deficit and world GDP growth.
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A priori, investment, since it leads to faster rate of capital accumulation, should be 
positively correlated with economic growth, while population growth, should be 
inversely related to per capita output as a greater number o f workers leads to a 
reduction in the capital stock per worker. Trade openness is expected to be positively 
correlated with gi-owth, as it provides economic agents access to low cost capital 
goods, best practice technology and ideas and the opportunity to exploit comparative 
advantages. As noted in Chapter 2, most small states depend on larger countries 
(usually previous metropolises) as markets for their goods and services (such as 
tourism and other primary commodities). Therefore, an acceleration in the world 
economy should lead to rise in the demand for goods and services sold by these 
countries and by extension an expansion in per capita GDP growth.
Since small open economies rely primarily on commodity exports, whose prices are 
more volatile than manufactured goods, developing countries that have a high degree 
of openness to foreign trade could suffer from large swings in economic activity. 
These effects are captured through the inclusion of changes in the terms of trade. 
Inflation is anticipated to have a harmful effect on economic activity as it usually 
increases uncertainty that then influences consumption, savings, borrowing and 
investment decisions and distorts relative prices. Fiscal deficits reduce national 
savings and consequently capital accumulation. As a result, a deterioration in 
governmenf s fiscal deficit should have a damaging impact on growth through it 
effects on investment, inflation expectations or uncertainties associated with possible 
fiscal policy changes.
The consequence of capital account liberalisation is investigated by augmenting the 
basic growth equation. Equation (4.11), with a measure of capital account 
liberalisation (Lib.^):
y,r + r'^u+ P L ib ,, +£„ (4.12)
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The sign of the coefficient p  is ambiguous. If it is positive this means that capital 
account liberalisation enhances economic growth by providing access to finance and 
therefore increases the rate of capital accumulation. In contrast, if the coefficient is 
negative, it suggests that by enhancing economic uncertainty, liberalisation can 
reduce the overall rate o f capital accumulation and economic growth. Finally, if the 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero it suggests that capital account 
liberalisation is not an important determinant of growth in small states.
4.2.2 ECONOMETRIC APPROACH
There are two basic approaches to estimating economic models when panel data is 
available: fixed effects and random effects. The fixed effects model, assumes that the 
77,., which capture differences in technological progress across countries, are N  fixed
unknown parameters. In contrast, the random effects model treats the 77. as random
draws from a distribution with mean p. and variance cr^. Intuitively, the fixed effects
model is more appropriate if one is focussing on specific set of firms or countries 
(OECD, or if the individual effects are correlated with other regressors, see Baltagi, 
2005).
The fixed effects specification is used throughout the study. However, the empirical 
validity of the model is also verified using a Hausman (1978)-type test. The test 
builds on the observation that if  77, and X., are correlated then the random effects 
model leads to inconsistent estimates, as it ignores this correlation. The Hausman test 
evaluates the null hypothesis that 77, and X,., are uncorrelated. The random effects
model, consequently, is only consistent when the null hypothesis holds, while the 
fixed effects estimator is consistent under both the null and alternative hypotheses. If 
there is a significant difference between the two estimators, the null hypothesis 
cannot be accepted. The test statistic can be written as:
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' '{P fë (ÂtTC- Pre) (4.14)
where <j{ }is the covariance matrix. The Hausman test has an asymptotic Chi- 
squared distribution with K  (the number of regressors) degrees of freedom.
To obtain the fixed effects estimator one can include a dummy variable (<7) for each 
country in the model:
N
ÿi, = +r'^i, + PLib,, + s„ (4.15)
y=i
where =1 if i = y and zero otherwise. Equation (4.15) can then be estimated 
using ordinary least squares and the covariance matrix is:
0^' = ^ (A A '/) (4.16)
4.2.3 ENDOGENEITY
One of the principal assumptions o f the fixed effects model is that all the variables in 
X„are independent of alls,.,. This assumption is obviously violated with the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In addition, some variables, such as 
investment and the fiscal deficit, may depend on previous values of GDP growth. If 
the explanatory variables are not all strictly exogenous then coefficient estimates 
derived from the fixed effects model are biased. However, Nickell (1981) shows this 
bias falls as T  increases.
To correct for this bias, Blundell and Bond (1998) recommend a two-step Generalised 
Method of Moments system estimator that jointly estimates the equation in levels and 
first-differences, with first differences instrumented by lagged levels of the dependent 
and independent variables and levels instrumented by first-differences of the 
regressors. The matrices used for estimation are defined as:
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y,-
T /s  “  T /2 T / 2 - T /1 A 's  -  A '2  '
T :4  “  T /S T /3  “  y n A '4  -  A 's
y r r  ~  A r - i y iT-\ ~  y iT=l y! - x '•^ xT -^(T-1
J^/3 T /2 A '2
. T / r  _ T / r - i X J^
(F/ =
( T jI 5-^/l 5 ■^ |2 )  ^  ••• ^
^  ( t f 1 5 ^ ( 2 5  A l  ’  A ' 2  )  A s  )  • • • ^
0 0 0
0 0 (.F/l > J ’/2 ’ • * • ) T /T -2  5 A l  ’ A s  ) ) A t -1 )
[dyi^,dx\2,dx]^) 0
0 {dy,2^ dy,^ ,dx]2,dx',^ ,dx'iA) • • •
0 0
0 0 i.dy ^2 j * • • > Ay ,f_2 5 dXj2 5 • • • ? dXjj._^  )
where d  is the first difference operator and
'w ;^ 0
0 W
The first-step estimator uses a covariance matrix that accounts for autocorrelation that 
may occur in the enlarged level equations:
= fw ; G J ¥ ,  (4.17)
/=!
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where G = D ,L
GD,l ^ 'w,^ 0
0 I f /
G ^ =
~ 2 - 1  0" ‘1 0 O'
- 1 2 :
G ^  =
0 1 I
; ■*. - 1 : 0
0 — 1 2 0 ... 0 1
, I is an identity matrix and ® is the kronecker product. In the
second step, the residuals from the first-step are employed to estimate the covariance 
matrix:
N
àls^M2 = iy :F rê ,ê :F ^W ,
/=1
The final GMM estimator is given as:
(4.18)
(4.19)
The assumption of no serial correlation in the residuals is essential for the consistency 
of both the fixed effects and system GMM estimators. Tests for the absence of first- 
order serial correlation are therefore done using AR tests of the residuals. The tests 
have an asymptotic normal distribution under the null o f no autocorrelation. It is also 
necessary to evaluate the validity of the instruments employed by the system GMM 
estimators. The paper utilises the Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions:
V  i-i /  V  ' = 1
(4.20)
where Aj  ^ =
 ^ 1 yv / Y ‘
— ^  individual specific weighting matrix.
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4.2.4 SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS AND MISSING DATA
The models presented all assume that a country’s decision to open its capital account 
is exogenous. However, it is possible, for example, that countries with better past 
economic performance are more likely to pursue more liberal capital account policies. 
If the decision to liberalise is endogenous, then both the fixed effects and GMM 
approaches may lead to biased estimators and misleading test statistics (Verbeek, 
2000). Similarly, if the missing observations in the panel are not exogenous, the 
parameter estimates are inconsistent.
Defining the indicator variable s^ , as j., = 1 for given values of X,., and 0 otherwise. 
If .S’,, is independent of 77, and , then this suggest that the decision to open the
capital account varies randomly across the sample (missing observations are random). 
In this case, the selection process does not affect the conditional distribution of the 
dependent variable or the liberalisation indicator. However, if s., depends on the 
equation’s error term then the estimators above suffer from selection bias.
Verbeek and Nijman (1992) propose a simple test for sample selection bias. The 
authors recommend the inclusion o f some function of 5’,j, ..., .y,, in the estimated 
equation and checking its significance. The null hypothesis states that indicator 
variable should not provide any additional information about the unobserved errors 
(i.e. E { ( x ., -  x,)^„ I 5„ ,.. . ,  } = 0 ). To avoid problems of multicollinearity, Verbeek
T T
and Nijman recommend functions ofi-,, , . . . , .y,,, such a s5„_,, c, = or/, = ^ .y „  .
t=l /= !
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4.3 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION AND GROWTH
This section of the Chapter presents the empirical results. A number of tests are 
performed on the basic regression to ensure it provides a reasonable specification of 
growth dynamics in small states before augmenting the equation with the 
liberalisation indicators. Given that the impact of capital account liberalisation may 
differ by region, the regressions are also provided for three areas: Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific. The robustness of the results is also 
evaluated by testing for sample selection bias, non-randomness of missing 
observations, non-linearity, omitted variables and exchange rate regime.
4.3.1 BASIC GROWTH REGRESSION
Table 4.3 displays the basic growth regressions, unaugmented with the liberalisation 
indicators. The first column presents the basic pooled regression results which does 
not allow the regression intercept to vary across countries, while the remaining 
columns provides the fixed-effects and GMM estimators.
With the exception of initial income and the change in terms of trade variables, all the 
other regressors are significant at normal levels of testing. The Wald test statistic, 
which evaluates the joint significance of the regressors, is significant at the 1 percent 
level. The insignificance of the initial income variable suggests that over the sample 
period, incomes across small states are not in the process of converging. This finding 
probably reflects the differences in levels o f development that exist across these states 
that were refeiTed to earlier in Chapter 2.
Government consumption is significant and, in accordance with a priori expectations, 
is inversely related to economic activity. The coefficient estimate suggest that on 
average, a 1 percentage point rise in government consumption (as a percentage of
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GDP) lowers growth in GDP per capita by 0.09 percent. This estimate is generally in 
agreement with recent growth regressions. Bekaert, Campbell and Lundblad (2004) 
obtain an estimate of 0.035, while Levine and Renelt (1992) report that the statistic 
usually lies between 0,004 and 0.616.
Table 4.3: Basic Growth Regression Results
OLS Fixed
Effects
GMM GMM — 
Africa
GMM
Latin
America and 
the
Caribbean
GMM — 
Asia and the 
Pacific
Initial Income 0.032 -1.742 -1.305 -0.189 -0.105 -2.774
(0.285) (0.469)*** (0.980) (1.507) (0.907) (0.450)***
Government -0.093 -0.146 -0.253 -0.123 -0.291 -0.186
Consumption (0.026)*** (0.031)*** (0.064)*** (0.077) (0.081)*** (0.059)***
(% o f GDP) 
Investment (% 0.066 0.072 0.080 0.070 0.095 0.121
o f  GDP) (0.014)*** (0.025)*** (0.037)** (0.030)** (0.047)** (0.052)**
Trade 0.016 0.013 0.032 0.030 0.028 -0.026
Openness (% (0.009)* (0.013) (0.022) (0.020) (0.027) (0.023)
o f  GDP) 
Population -0.388 -0.459 -0.431 0.784 -0.652 -0.101
Grow th (%) (0.118)*** (0.157)*** (0.235)* (1.057) (0.130)*** (0.366)
Change in -0.001 -0.001 0.015 -0.025 0.012 0.028
Terms o f Trade (0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.111)
(%)
Inflation (%) -0.078 -0.075 -0.060 -0.103 -0.038 -0.082
(0.021)*** (0.021)*** (0.027)** (0.040)** (0.044) (0.030)***
World GDP 0.132 0.098 0.085 0.112 0.076 0.113
Growth (%) (0.023)*** (0.022)*** (0.055) (0.038)*** (0.033)** (0.057)**
0.419 0.457 0.459 0.353 0.294 0.566
Sigma 5.344 5.243 5.297 4.705 4.665 5.970
Wald Joint, 313.500 317.400 264.200 771.400 295.500 452.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR Test, 3.264 2.445 2.610 0.270 2.034 1.230
N(0,1) [0.001] [0.014] [0.010] [0.787] [0.042] [0.219]
Sargan Test n.a. n.a. 532.000 168.800 524.800 389.900
Observations 1446 1446
[0.939]
1446
[1.000]
191
[0.962]
693
[1.000]
562
Notes: (1) Stand aid enors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing, respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
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Investment (as a percentage of GDP) is also highly significant in the regression, with 
a coefficient value of 0.066. Small states usually report capital scarcity as a major 
constraint to their growth (see Armstrong and Read, 1998). These countries therefore 
need to pursue more investment-friendly policies in order to stimulate investment 
levels and by extension per capita GDP growth.
The degree of trade openness also enters the regression with a positive and significant 
coefficient. The coefficient is estimated at 0.016, which is also in line with previous 
studies in the growth literature. Population growth has a large, negative and 
significant effect on economic growth. The coefficient estimate implies that a 1 
percent decline in population growth could boost growth by 0.388 percent per annum. 
This estimate is relatively large and could reflect the effects of capital scarcity in 
these countries, and limited land resources. An alternative explanation is that this 
variable might also be influenced by sample selection bias owing to the missing 
variables issue referred to in Chapter 3. The effects of sample selection bias on the 
coefficient estimates are evaluated later in this section.
The changes in the terms of trade had an insignificant impact on growth, while in 
accordance with a priori expectations inflation is found to have a negative and 
significant impact on growth. The final explanatory variable, world GDP growth, 
which captures the dependence of these economies on foreign income to stimulate 
growth in key export industries, such as tourism and commodity exports, was 
significant at the 1 percent level. As alluded to earlier in Chapter 1, the fundamental 
characteristics of small states make opportunities for internally generated growth 
somewhat difficult. Most small states are highly integrated and exposed to the 
international economy and thereby global economic trends. This finding also 
correlates with that of Armstrong and Read (2002), which suggests that export-led 
growth is likely to be relatively more significant in small states. Greater dependence
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on externally driven growth also, however, implies that small states are more likely to 
have an unstable growth path.
The residuals from the OLS regression, however, seem to be autocorrelated: the AR 
test statistic is significant at the 5 percent level of testing. Given that the growth 
dynamics of small states are likely to differ across countries, the intercept is allowed 
to vary by estimating a fixed effects panel model. This result is also presented in 
Table 4.3. The signs of the coefficients do not change appreciably. In the case of 
government consumption, the (absolute) size of the estimated marginal impact of a 
change in government consumption rises from 0.093 to 0.146. Thus once cross­
country differences are taken into account an expansion in government size has a 
greater negative influence on economic growth. The negative effect of greater 
population growth also climbs in the fixed effects regression. A 1 percent increase in 
population growth now reduces growth in per capita GDP by about 0.459 of a 
percentage point. The coefficient estimates on the other variables: investment, trade 
openness, change in terms of trade, inflation and world GDP, do not change 
substantially. The test statistics suggest that the variables are jointly significant at the 
1 percent level, while the AR test results, in contrast to the pooled model, imply that 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals cannot be rejected at the 1 
percent level o f testing.
As indicated in the previous section, it is likely that not all the explanatory variables 
may be exogenously determined. To allow for endogeneity, the basic growth 
regression is also estimated using the GMM estimator presented by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). Again, the signs affixed to coefficients do not change appreciably. 
However, the magnitude of the coefficients attached to government consumption, 
investment and population growth vary somewhat.
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The GMM estimator suggests that the marginal effect of government consumption is 
more than twice the size of the estimate obtained from the pooled model. Investment 
is significant at the 5 percent level o f testing and the size of the coefficient is larger 
than from the pooled and fixed effects specifications. The negative impact of 
population changes on per capita GDP growth falls somewhat to 0.431. Therefore, a 
1 percent increase in population lowers per capita giowth by almost half o f a 
percentage point.
The p-value for the Sargan over-identifying restrictions test is insignificant, which 
indicates that the selected instruments are appropriate and can be accepted. In 
addition, the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals cannot be rejected 
and the coefficients are jointly significant at normal levels of testing. Given that the 
GMM estimator accounts for possible endogeneity problems, it is employed in the 
remainder of the study.
Table 4.3 also presents estimates of the basic growth regression for the three main 
country regions: Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Asia-Pacific. 
The p-value for the Sargan test statistic is insignificant in all three regressions, and 
autocorrelation does not seem to be present in the residuals of the regression. 
Additionally, all the coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 percent level.
Most of the coefficient estimates vary across the three regions. The size of 
government acts as less of a drag on growth in Africa, relative to Asia and Pacific and 
Latin America and Caribbean countries. The impact of an additional percentage point 
increase in investment (as a percentage of GDP) on growth in GDP per capita is less 
productive in Afiica. This may reflect differences in the type of investment being 
undertaken and/or government (over) regulation.
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Inflation also has a large negative effect on growth in Aflica, suggesting that output 
in this region is more responsive to price changes relative to Latin America and the 
Caribbean, where this variable is insignificant in the growth regression. Finally, 
world growth has a larger impact on the average percentage change in economic 
output in Africa and the Asian and the Pacific regions relative to Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Latin America and Caribbean countries are therefore less dependent 
on the global economy to engender growth in their economies.
4.3.2 THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION
Given that the model in Table 4.3 provides a useful explanation of giowth in small 
states, the basic growth model is augmented with various indicators of capital account 
liberalisation to identify whether they are significant determinants of growth 
dynamics even after controlling for the main variables used in the empirical growth 
literature.
The impact of the ex-post capital account liberalisation indicators are analysed first 
and the results are given in Table 4.4. The basic growth regression, estimated using 
GMM, is provided for comparison purposes. The test statistics indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation could not be rejected for the residuals for any of the 
models. Additionally, the regression coefficients are jointly significant at the 1 
percent level o f testing, and the Sargan test statistic is insignificant. The signs of the 
coefficients of all the variables are relatively unchanged; however, the marginal 
impact of some variables rises because of the inclusion of the liberalisation indicator.
The coefficients on the policy variables: government consumption, trade openness 
and inflation expand, indicating that bad policies have a greater negative drag on 
economic growth. This result is in line with Kim (2003), who reports that capital 
account liberalisation tends to have a disciplinary effect on government policies.
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Those countries that pursue bad policies are penalised, probably through capital 
outflows or reduced capital inflows, as international and domestic investors adjust 
their risk perceptions of the country.
In addition, the marginal impact of changes in foreign GDP on domestic growth in 
GDP per capita also rises. This has both positive and negative implications. It 
suggests that as a result of opening its capital account, a country may be better able to 
benefit from expansions in world growth. However, the finding also suggests 
downturns in the world economy will have a greater negative impact on the country.
Net capital flows (NCF), Portfolio investment assets (PIA) and liabilities (PIL) are 
used to augment the basic growth regression. PIA enters the regression with a 
positive sign, and is significant at classical levels of testing. In contrast, NCF and 
PIL are both insignificant. The positive coefficient on PIA suggests that by opening 
their capital accounts, countries provide domestic investors greater opportunities to 
invest abroad, which enhances domestic growth.
Portfolio investments assets and liabilities are usually thought of as short-term flows 
chasing the highest returns. Direct investment flows, which are more long term, 
should also rise with capital account liberalisation since foreign investors will only 
invest in long term projects if they are reasonably convinced that they can easily 
repatriate profits. As a result, the basic growth regression is augmented with direct 
investment assets (DIA) and liabilities (DIL). Both capital account liberalisation 
indicators are positively associated with economic growth. However, the coefficient 
estimates for both variables are statistically insignificant.
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An alternative liberalisation indicator can be derived from the sum of portfolio and 
direct investment variables expressed as a ratio of GDP (PAD!) -  somewhat like the 
trade openness variable. This coefficient is positive and statistically significant. 
Given the insignificance of the NCF variable, one can conclude that netting out 
financial flows, seems to average out important fluctuations in the liberalisation 
indicator.
Foreign direct investment, which should rise because of capital account liberalisation, 
is also positively associated with economic growth. The final two ex-post capital 
account liberalisation indicators are the interest rate spread and the correlation 
between foreign and local rates. Ceteris paribus, capital account liberalisation should 
lower the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates, as well as increase the 
correlation between domestic and foreign interest rates. The coefficient on the 
interest rate spread and correlation are, however, insignificant.
With the exception therefore of PIA and PADI, the results from augmenting the basic 
growth regression with ex-post liberalisation indicators indicate that liberalisation has 
a weak but positive influence on economic growth in small states. This result holds 
over seven of the nine ex-post liberalisation indicators.
Ex-post indicators can be criticised, however, since they depend on the assumption 
that capital account liberalisation reduce restrictions on capital flows and lead to 
greater flows. As an alternative, the regression and dummy variable type indicators 
of liberalisation derived in Chapter 3 are employed as proxies for capital account 
liberalisation. The regression-based indicators are the Feldstein-Horioka p  and the 
Edwards-Khan y/ . A priori, a decline in p  suggests that the country is becoming 
more open, while a rise in y/ suggest that foreign interest rates have a greater impact 
on domestic rates and should be positively associated with capital account 
liberalisation. The results are provided in Table 4.5.
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In line with a priori expectations, the coefficient of the Feldstein-Horioka is 
inversely related with economic growth. Thus, as the country opens its capital 
account growth expands. The regression coefficient is, however, insignificant at j
normal levels of testing. Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987) argue that the |
Feldstein-Horioka P can be influenced by deviations from purchasing power parity, .
exchange rate risk, limited integration of domestic financial markets and the effects of 
government policies. Given the fixity of exchange rates in most small states and the 
use of capital controls alluded to in Chapter 1, this result is somewhat expected. In 
contrast, the Edwards-Khan xj/ is significant at classical levels of testing and carries 
the correct a priori sign. This indicator, unlike the Feldstein-Horioka jS, is derived 
only from deviations of the domestic interest rate from international interest rates and ;
therefore provides a more direct measure of the effects of capital account resti ictions.
The final three liberalisation indicators in Table 4.6 are a dummy variable (which 
takes a value of 1 if the country had capital controls and 0 otherwise), the proportion 
of years the capital account was not open and a stock market liberalisation dummy 
(which takes a value of 1 if  the country’s capital account is open to foreign investors 
and 0 otherwise). Both the Dummy and Proportion variables are significant at 
classical levels o f testing, suggesting that the existence of capital controls acts as a 
drag on domestic growth. In addition, the coefficient on the Dummy variable 
suggests that liberalisation can boost per capita growth in small states by about 4 
percent per annum. The stock market dummy was statistically insignificant. The 
significance of the regression and dummy variable type indicators of liberalisation 
suggest that these variables are better able to capture the relationship between growth 
and liberalisation in small states.
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Table 4.5: Growth Regression (Reg. and Dummy Indicators, All Countries)
Basic Beta Psi Dummy Proportion 
o f Years
Stock
Market
Initial Income -1.305 -2.777 -8.007 -1.162 -1.422 -0.796
(0.980) (1.387)** (2.617)*** (0.786) (0.825)* (0.794)
Government -0.253 -0.177 -0.279 -0.229 -0.223 -0.255
Consumption (% 
o f GDP)
(0.064)*** (0.043)*** (0.113)** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** (0.061)***
Investment (% of 0.080 0.067 0.091 0.099 0.098 0.101
GDP) (0.037)** (0.037)* (0.037)** (0.031)*** (0.031)*** (0.040)**
Trade Openness 0.032 -0.003 0.048 0.018 0.020 0.036
(% o f GDP) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017)*** (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
Population -0.431 -0.716 -2.005 -0.638 -0.626 -0.456
Grow th (%) (0.235)* (0.080)*** (0.694)*** (0.114)*** (0.116)*** (0.228)***
Change in Terms 0.015 -0.045 0.027 -0.018 -0.018 0.030
o f Trade (%) (0.027) (0.022)** (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Inflation (%) -0.060 -0.052 -0.053 -0.042 -0.043 -0.071
(0.027)** (0.026)** (0.041) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026)***
World GDP 0.085 0.097 0.030 0.094 0.095 0.088
Grow th (%) (0.055) (0.026)*** (0.038) (0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.028)***
Capital Account - -0.052 3.411 -4.186 -13.385 0.033
Openness (1.131) (1.804)* (1.492)*** (5.686)** (1.148)
0.459 0.537 0.410 0.437 0.435 0.429
Sigma 5.297 4.630 4.245 5.122 5.132 5.380
Wald Joint, 264.200 411.200 726.1 382.900 340.900 257.400
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
AR Test, N(0,1) 2.610 -0.157 1.193 1.629 1.689 2.497
[0.010] [0.875] [0.233] [0.103] [0.091] [0.013]
Sargan Test 532.000 492.600 428.700 499.700 499.600 565.400
[0.939] [0.959] [1.000] [0.995] [0.995] [0.692]
Observations 1446 705 434 1149 1149 1446
Notes: (1) Standaid errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels o f testing, 
respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
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4.3.3 REGIONAL DIFFERENCES
Growth and the marginal impact of the factors that affect growth tend to vary across 
regions, as shown in Table 4.3. To account for these differences, the growth 
regressions for the three regions (Afi'ica, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the 
Caribbean) are augmented with the seven main correlation indicators. The results for 
Africa are presented first in Table 4.6. All of the test statistics for the residuals 
indicate that they are well behaved. Turning to the coefficient estimates for the 
liberalisation indicators, in contrast to the regression using the full sample, the FDI 
indicators is positive and significant, while the interest rate spread is significantly 
related to economic growth. The two liberalisation dummy indicators (Dummy and 
Stock Market) are also both significant at classical levels of testing.
The results for Latin America and the Caribbean are presented in Table 4.7. The 
pattern is quite similar: FDI, Psi, Dummy and Stock Market Liberalisation indicators 
are all significant determinants of per capita GDP growth, while NCF, PADI and 
Correlation are insignificant at normal levels of testing. The main difference between 
the results for Latin America and the Caribbean compared to the other regions is in 
terms of the marginal effect of the liberalisation indicators. The absolute values on 
the coefficients of most of the liberalisation indicators are larger than those for either 
Africa or the Asia Pacific group o f countries, indicating that the removal of capital 
controls has a larger impact on the group among Latin America and Caribbean 
countries.
The results for the third and final region, Asia-Pacific are presented in Table 4.8. 
Again, the specification tests suggest that the models provide reasonable explanations 
of the growth process in these countries and most of the capital account liberalisation 
indicators are significant. However, there are some key differences between the 
results obtained for Asia-Pacific and the overall regression results. First, the stock
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market liberalisation indicator is positive and significant at the 5 percent level of 
testing. These results seem to agree with those obtained by Bekert et al (2000). In 
addition, the size of the coefficient is large. It suggests that countries in Asia-Pacific 
that opened their stock markets to foreign investors have, on average, grown by 2.7 
percentage points faster than those that have not. The potential size of the benefits 
that might accrue to countries in Asia-Pacific is also reflected in the coefficient 
liberalisation dummy indicator (-4.0) for Asia-Pacific countries or almost twice that 
obtained African countries.
4.3 A  SAMPLE SELECTION AND MISSING DATA
To evaluate the robustness of the results, tests for sample selection bias are conducted 
and presented in Table 4.9. It is possible that certain types of countries are more 
likely to open their capital account. To test this hypothesis a number of 
macroeconomic variables are regressed on the indicator of liberalisation to test 
whether they significantly explain the decision to liberalise. The second regression 
uses the stock market liberalisation indicator as the dependent variable.
In both regressions, most of the macroeconomic indicators are insignificant at normal 
levels of testing, with the exception of initial income. In addition, the coefficients are 
jointly insignificant which indicates that the regressions are unlikely to be affected by 
sample selection bias.
The final two auxiliary regressions tests whether the missing data is random or non- 
random. If the missing data occur randomly throughout the sample, the econometric 
estimators used earlier are still unbiased. However, if the missing observations are 
not random, for example low-income countries are more likely to have missing 
observations, then the estimators used earlier are biased. This hypothesis is tested by 
including functions of the missing variable indicator.
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Table 4.9: Growth, Sample Selection Issues and M issing Data
Sample Sample M issing Data Missing Data
Selection 1 Selection 2 1 2
Initial Income -0.148 0.287 -0.370 -0.370
(0.083)* (0.085)*** (0.357) (0.357)
Growth -0.004 0.002 - -
(0.003) (0.002)
Government Consumption (% 0.001 0.001 -0.227 -0.227
o f GDP) (0.003) (0.005) (0.039)*** (0.039)***
Investment (% o f GDP) 0.002 0.000 0.079 0.079
(0.002) (0.002) (0.028)*** (0.028)***
Trade Openness (% of GDP) 0.001 -0,003 0.032 0.032
(0.001) (0.001)* (0.014)** (0.014)**
Population Growth (%) 0.005 -0.001 -0.740 -0.740
(0.006) (0.013) (0.101)*** (0.101)***
Change in Terms of Trade (%) -0.000 0.000 -0.022 -0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.023) (0.023)
Inflation (%) 0.001 0.000 -0.034 -0.034
(0.001) (0.001) (0.028) (0.028)
World GDP Growth (%) 0.003 -0.001 0.174 0.107
(0.002) (0.001) (0.189) (0.047)**
Capital Account Openness - - -1.584 -1.584
(0.720)** (0.720)**
M issing Data - - -1.312 -0.132
(3.804) (0.380)
0.827 0.200 0.426 0.426
Sigma 0.183 0.215 5.172 5.172
Wald Joint, %  ^ (9) 6.044 18.790 433.600 433.600[0.735] [0.027] [0.000] [0.000]
Obsewations 1149 1446 1149 1149
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels o f  testing,
respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
Missing Data 1 lags the indicator one period, while Missing Data 2 uses the 
cumulative sum of the indicator (the number of periods for which the country had 
missing observations). In both cases, the variables have an insignificant impact on 
the basic growth regression at classical levels of testing, and therefore suggest that the 
missing observations occur randomly throughout the sample and that the estimators 
are unbiased.
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4.3.5 NON-LINEARITY AND OMITTED VARIABLES
Some previous studies, such as that by Klein (2005), note that the link between 
capital account liberalisation may not be linear. Those countries that have more 
liberal trading policies or more developed financial sectors may best be able to 
exploit the potential benefits of capital account liberalisation. To test this hypothesis, 
the capital account openness indicator, NCF is interacted with trade openness and 
financial development (proxied by the ratio o f credit to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP), and the results are presented in Table 4.10.
Regression 1 interacts capital account openness with the trade openness variable. 
Due to the high correlation between the level and interaction terms, both indicators 
are insignificant at classical levels of testing. Besides this change, most of the other 
coefficient estimates are basically unchanged and the regression specification tests 
statistics are satisfactory.
Regression 2 includes the financial development variable only, while Regiession 3 
adds both the proxy for financial development and an interaction term with capital 
account liberalisation. The financial development variable and the interaction term 
are both insignificant at classical levels of testing. The results for trade openness and 
financial development therefore both suggest that in small states, the relationship 
between capital account liberalisation and growth is linear; gains can be made from 
liberalising the capital account, even in the presence of a restrictive trading regime 
and a low level of financial development.
Regressions 4, 5, and 6 augment the basic gi'owth regression with other variables that 
have been found to be significant determinants of gi'owth in some studies. These 
include the adult literacy rate, oil price changes and the exchange rate regime. These 
variables are added to the basic model to test whether their exclusion significantly
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Table 4.10: Growth, Non-Linear Effects and Omitted Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
Initial Income -1.166 -1.772 -1.765 -1,588 -0.371 -0.417
(0.779) (1.069)* (1.088)* (0.487)*** (0.359) (0.368)
Government Consumption (% o f GDP) -0.237 -0.153 -0.154 -0.231 -0.227 -0.226
(0.053)*** (0.066)** (0.065)** (0.066)*** (0.039)*** (0.038)***
Investment (% o f GDP) 0.102 0.035 0.036 0.096 0.079 0.079
(0.031)*** (0.028) (0.028) (0.050)* (0.027)*** (0.027)***
Trade Openness (% o f GDP) 0.040 0.014 0.015 0.049 0.032 0.030
(0.022)* (0.020) (0.021) (0.014)*** (0.014)** (0.014)**
Population Growth (%) -0.657 -0.618 -0.620 -0.261 -0.740 -0.717
(0.110)*** (0.134)*** (0.132)*** (0.231) (0.100)*** (0.097)***
Change in Terms o f  Trade (%) -0.019 -0.010 -0.010 -0.002 -0.021 -0.020
(0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Inflation (%) -0.041 -0.035 -0.035 -0.058 -0.035 -0.036
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)** (0.028) (0.028)**
World GDP Growth (%) 0.099 0.116 0.116 0.225 0.106 0.108
(0.023)*** (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.059)*** (0.048)** (0.049)**
Capital Account Openness -0.747 -3.536 -4.129 -1.403 -1.591 -1.408
(3,641) (1.469)** (2/292)* (0.766)* (0.714)** (0.679)**
Capital Account Openness*Trade -0.029 - - - - -
Openness (0.025)
Financial Development -0.004
(0.018)
-0.016
(0.046)
Financial Development*Capital Account - - 0.014 - - -
Openness (0.042)
Adult Literacy 0.062
(0.026)**
Oil Prices -0.001
(0.004)
Liberalisation*Floating -0.570
(0.814)
0.439 0.434 0.434 0.450 0.426 0.426
Sigma 5.114 4.570 4.573 4.271 5.173 5.170
2 391.600 242.100 247.100 402.500 510.600 418.600Wald Joint, % (9) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
A R T est,N (0 ,l) 1.415 0.510 0.500 2.810 2.646 2.684
[0.157] [0.610] [0.617] [0.005] [0.008] [0.007]
Sargan Test 499.600 545.100 544.100 322.800 475.200 475.000
[0.994] [0.861] [0.862] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
Observations 1149 835 835 468 1149 1149
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels o f testing, 
respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
affects the main results. In all three cases, the results, as it relates to the impact of 
liberalisation on economic growth do not change: capital account liberalisation has a 
positive and significant impact on per capita GDP growth.
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4.3.5 AGGREGATION ISSUES
The regressions done in this section all employed annual observations. However, 
averaging procedures have been used in the literature to smooth out business cycle 
fluctuations; such as three-year, five-year and ten-year averages. Note that it is not 
necessarily the case that the averaging procedure will be synchronised with the actual 
business cycle.
The regressions using three-year averaged observations are given in Table 4.11. 
Looking at the coefficients on the control variables, these do not change significantly. 
Turning to the liberalisation indicator, the main results are quite similar: the capital 
controls dummy is negative and significant indicating that removing capital controls 
enhances per capita GDP growth.
In terms of the regressions using five-year and ten-year averages, again the 
coefficient on the control variables are quite similar to those obtained earlier. In 
terms of the liberalisation indicators, the indicator suggests that liberalisation 
enhances per capita GDP growth in small states. These results therefore imply that 
the aggregation does not significantly alter the main results of the study.
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Table 4.11: Growth and Liberalisation Results (Averaged Data)
Three-Year Five-Year Ten-Year
Initial Income -2.835 -3.712 -5.339
(0.958)*** (0.850)*** (0.767)***
Government Consumption -0.132 -0.058 -0.201
(% o f GDP) (0.087)* (0.046) (0.189)
Investment (% of GDP) 0.210 0.064 0.048
(0.086)** (0.018)** (0.022)**
Trade Openness (% of -O.OII 0.025 0.015
GDP) (0.051) (0.013)* (0.020)
Population Growth (%) -0.680 -0.052 -0.254
(0.273)** (0.128 (0.351)
Change in Terms o f Trade 0.020 -0.068 -0.018
(%) (0.079) (0.057) (0.040)
Inflation (%) -0.148 -0.073 -0.028
(0.064) (0.046) (0.096)
World GDP Grow th (%) 0.204 0.104 -0.017
(0.048)*** (0.077) (0.014)
Capital Account Openness -4.546 -2.906 -3.994
(1.980)** ( I .143)** (1.624)**
0.547 0.490 0.746
Sigma 3.192 2.813 1.899
Wald Joint, %  ^ (9) 209.700 84.910 71.630[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 380 219 108
Notes: (1) Standard enors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** Indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels o f testing, 
respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
4.4 SUMMARY
This Chapter studied the empirical relationship between various measures of capital 
account liberalisation and per capita GDP growth. A basic model of economic 
growth is specified that uses the key variables found in the literature to be the main 
determinant of growth: initial GDP, government consumption, investment, trade 
openness, population growth, changes in the terms of trade, inflation and world GDP 
growth. This model is found to provide a robust specification of economic growth, 
after controlling for possible endogeneity issues by using the Blundell and Bond 
(1998) GMM estimator.
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The basic model is then augmented with nine ex-post liberalisation indicators, two 
regression indicators and three dummy variable indicators of capital account 
liberalisation. The study finds that, in general, liberalisation had a positive and 
statistically significant impact on economic growth. On average, capital account 
liberalisation has increased per capita growth in small states by approximately 4 
percent per annum. This result is robust to changes in the liberalisation indicators 
used and region. In addition, robustness tests could not find evidence of bias arising 
from sample selection, missing data, non-linearity, omitted variables, exchange rate 
regime or aggregation.
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CHAPTER 5 -  DOES CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION
INFLUENCE ECONOM IC VOLATILITY?
Small states -  due to their limited resource base, narrowness of output and exports 
and natural disasters -  usually have a higher rate of economic volatility relative to 
larger economies (see Easterly and Kraay, 2000). Briguglio (1995) posits that the 
main disadvantages faced by small states relate to size, insularity, remoteness and 
proneness to natural disasters. Chapter 4 of this thesis also shows that small states are 
highly dependent on trade and therefore world economic developments as a source of 
growth. As a result, exogenous shocks are likely to be more important in small states 
relative to larger economies. Briguglio, in an attempt to quantify these 
vulnerabilities, develops an index of economic vulnerability. The index captures 
three of the main determinants of vulnerability: (1) exposure to foreign economic 
conditions; (2) insularity and remoteness, and; (3) proneness to natural disasters. 
When the methodology is applied to a database of 114 countries, small states, in line 
with expectations, were more vulnerable than other groupings of countries.
Given the greater vulnerability of small states, one should expect a higher degree of 
economic volatility. Easterly and Kraay (2000) estimate a standard cross-country 
growth regression for small states and include the standard deviation of economic 
growth as a measure of the greater vulnerability of small states. The results in the
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study, in line with a priori expectations, suggested that the greater volatility of small 
states could partially offset some of the advantages of small states (e.g. higher 
secondary enrolment rates and greater openness to trade). Easterly and Kraay 
estimate that the standard deviation o f GDP growth in small states is about 1.4 
percentage points more than other countries. The study also reports much larger 
terms of trade shocks in small states.
Armstrong and Read (2002) also attempt to measure the effects of volatility on 
growth in small states. In contrast to Easterly and Kiaay (2000), the index of 
economic vulnerability proposed by Briguglio (1995) is used rather than the standard 
deviation of economic giowth. The authors use growth rates between 1980 and 1993 
for 93 countries. Contrary to expectations, however, the coefficient on the 
vulnerability index was positive and statistically significant; leading to the perverse 
conclusion that vulnerability is positively correlated with economic growth. 
Armstrong and Read attribute this result to possible correlation between openness 
(used as a proxy for exposure to external economic conditions) and economic growth.
Given their precondition to economic variability, it is likely that the effects of capital 
account liberalisation on economic fluctuations may be more important to these states 
than the effects of liberalisation on economic giowth. This Chapter therefore 
attempts to investigate the effects of capital account liberalisation on economic 
volatility. The literature investigating the impact of capital account openness and 
economic volatility is a relatively new area o f research, and important advances are 
now being made. This Chapter represents one of the first attempts to explicitly model 
the determinants of volatility in small states. Contrary to much of the literature, 
volatility is measured using an indicator that employs the full database, rather than 
averages in growth rates over arbitrary periods. The Schwert (1989) volatility 
measure is a generalisation o f the rolling standard deviation estimator, but since it 
employs all the observations, it is less sensitive to noise and outliers in the data.
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Chapter 2 of this thesis and Buch (2002) both provide useful surveys of this 
burgeoning body of literature.
Lucas (1982) was the first to show that it was possible for a country to diversify away 
output shocks by opening its capital account. Building on this work, more recent 
models evaluating the impact of capital account liberalisation use the new open- 
economy macroeconomic (NOEM) models developed by authors such as Svensson 
and van Wijnbergen (1989) and popularised by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Many of 
these recent papers, for example Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (1999) and 
Kouparitsas (1996), show that the relationship between liberalisation and volatility 
may be non-linear due to the effects of financial development and overall economic 
development. Aghion, Bacchetta and Baneijee’s results suggest that liberalisation 
may destabilise the economies of countries at an intermediate stage of development. 
The authors therefore recommend that countries postpone full capital account 
liberalisation until they reach a certain level of financial development. Similar 
findings are obtained by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and Kouparitsas 
(1996).
The predictions from the theoretical literature seem to suggest that there should be a 
non-linear link between capital account liberalisation and economic volatility. 
Evidence of non-linearity has been indirectly reported by Buch, Doepke and 
Pierdzioch (2002). Based on observations on OECD countries for 40 years, the 
authors find that monetary and fiscal policy shocks have been the main sources of 
business cycle fluctuations in the 1980s and 1990s, when most countries opened their 
capital accounts. Similarly, authors such as Denizer, lyigun and Owen (2000), 
O’Donnell (2001), and Calderon, Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2005), using data on a 
wide cross-section of countries, explicitly take into account the effects of financial 
development on the volatility-liberalisation relationship. In line with the theoretical 
models, all the authors report that business cycle volatility depends on the degree of
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financial development, with those countries with more developed financial sectors 
being better able to reduce output volatility through financial integration.
Similarly, Bekaert, Harvey and Lundbald (2004) based on series for 95 countries find 
that equity market liberalisation (also regarded as a measure of financial 
development) leads to a significant decline in both output and consumption volatility 
that is larger than overall capital account liberalisation. Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2004) employ the IMF’s 0/1 dummy and estimate and an equity market 
liberalisation indicator, and the authors report that consumption volatility falls by 
1.7%.
Some empirical studies have also attempted to test whether the non-linear relationship 
between financial integration and macroeconomic volatility also depends on whether 
the country has a diversified trading regime and the size of the economy. Kose, 
Prasad, and Terrones (2003), Kose (2002) and Senhadji (1998), which all draw on 
cross-country databases, show that countries with an undiversified trade structure are 
more susceptible to terms of trade shocks and foreign demand shocks after financial 
integration. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) also find that after gross capital flows 
pass a particular threshold, it has a negative impact on volatility. Kose and Prasad 
(2002) note that small states that exhibit higher degrees of trade and financial 
openness tend to be more prone to terms of trade shocks.
This chapter examines the relationship between capital account liberalisation and 
volatility in small states. After the introduction. Section 5.1 evaluates the measures 
of volatility used in the empirical literature and examines trends in these volatility 
indicators for the group of small states. The section also presents a preliminary look 
at the association between capital account liberalisation and volatility. Section 5.2 
outlines the empirical approach employed in the study. Section 5.3 presents the 
empirical results of the relationship between liberalisation and volatility and evaluates
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the robustness of the results. Section 5.4 summarises the main results and provides 
policy implications for small states.
5.1 VOLATILITY IN SMALL STATES
5.1.1 MEASURING VOLATILITY
Volatility is a statistical measure of the tendency of a series to rise or fall sharply 
within a given period. There have been numerous measures of volatility used in the 
empirical literature, mainly because theory provides little guidance in this area. 
Authors such as Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) and Karras and Song (1996) use 
the standard deviation of output growth over a particular period. Razin and Rose 
(1994) and Denizer, lyigun and Owen (2000) consider the standard deviation of 
consumption, investment and output growth. The investigation of consumption and 
investment alongside output volatility has greater theoretical foundations, since most 
NOEM models make predictions about consumption and investment volatility, rather 
than output variability.
One of the drawbacks of the standard deviation measure is that it is sensitive to 
outliers and noise in the series. As a result, authors such as Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2005) and Mobarak (2005) both use a measure of volatility based on the 
high-low range of output or consumption growth over a given period. This approach 
avoids the problems associated with standard deviation measure of volatility, but does 
not capture volatility in between the two extreme points.
Both measures of volatility (the standard deviation approach and that proposed by 
Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) and Mobarak (2005)) calculate volatility over 
relatively short periods of time, i.e. 5 or 10 years. This implies that a large amount of 
the data is discarded if one makes use of these measures in cross-country regressions 
and the degrees of freedom associated with these sample standard deviation measures
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are very small. In addition, as volatility arising from opening the capital account is 
likely to impact on short run rather than long-run economic volatility, using an 
indicator composed from over five year intervals may smooth-out fluctuations arising 
from liberalising the capital account and result in little or no correlation between 
volatility and openness.
This Chapter uses an alternative measure of volatility developed by Schwert (1989). 
Schwert originally applied the approach to evaluate the relationship between stock 
volatility with real and nominal macroeconomic volatility, economic activity, 
financial leverage and stock trading activity between 1857 to 1987. Given that the 
sample period included the Great Depression, using the rolling standard deviation 
approach may have produced biased results. As a result, the stock price volatility of a 
composite Standard and Poor’s portfolio is assessed using a regression approach. 
The procedure first estimates an autoregression for the growth rate of the series under 
consideration (the maximum lag length is set at 2). The residuals from this regression 
are generated from an autoregression of the absolute values of the residuals (the 
maximum lag length is also set at 2). The fitted values from the second 
autoregi'ession, scaled by the sample mean for each country, provide a measure of 
volatility. Schwert notes that this approach is a generalisation of the rolling standard 
deviation estimator and is similar to the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model of Engle (1982). Davidian and Carroll (1987) observe that this 
technique is also more robust than the basic standard deviation measure of volatility.
Countries are more likely to be concerned about volatility when growth has the 
potential to become negative: volatility that results in GDP giowth varying between 3 
and 5 percent per annum is likely to be less problematic than when growth varies 
between -1 and 1 percent. As a result, Mobarak (2005) also generates an indicator of 
the frequency of times growth changed sign (from positive to negative or vice versa).
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and interacts this with the volatility indicator. A similar approach is employed in this 
study.
5.1.2 TRENDS IN  VOLATILITY IN  SMALL STATES
This section of the Chapter summarises the stylised facts concerning the volatility of 
consumption, investment and output growth. An investigation of main trends in 
volatility is provided, along with basic correlation analysis. Figure 5.1 plots the 
standardised volatility of consumption, investment and output over three decades 
(1970s, 1980s and 1990s) and the five-year period ending in 2004. A number of 
important conclusions regarding volatility can be gleaned from the figure. The figure 
shows that volatility has decreased in most countries during the 1990s. Output 
volatility during the 1990s was on average 4.5 percent below that for the entire 
sample period and was 8.6 percent below the sample average between 2000 and 2004. 
Given the dependence of small states on developments in the world economy (see 
Chapter 4), most of this decline in volatility can be attributed to reduced volatility in 
larger more developed countries -  the main purchasers of the primary products and 
services sold by small states on the international market (such a decline could also be 
due to a reduction in goods prices from more developed countries) The figure also 
shows that, by and large, investment volatility has fallen during the latter half of the 
sample period, while consumption volatility has remained virtually unchanged 
throughout the sample period. For the five-year period 2000-2004, investment 
volatility was 3.2 percent below that experienced by small states during the 1970s.
To identify any regional differences in volatility (using the Schwert and standard 
deviation measure), the sample was split into three areas -  Africa, Latin America and 
the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific -  and then volatility measures for the four periods 
identified earlier are calculated. Table 5.1 presents the results. The table shows that, 
in general, output volatility has declined in the latter half of the sample period in all
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three regions -  albeit to varying degrees. Asia-Pacific witnessed the most rapid 
decline in volatility, average output volatility in this region was 10.4 percent below 
the average for the entire period between 2000 and 2004, compared to a 7.8 percent 
decline in Latin America and the Caribbean and 5.5 percent in Africa. As a result, 
while starting the period as the most volatile region, by the end of the sample period
Figure 5.1: Macroeconomic Volatility Over Four Decades
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Asia-Pacific was the least volatile area. In contrast, volatility actually rose between 
2000 and 2004 in Africa, after falling during the 1990s. Latin America and the 
Caribbean, on the other hand, witnessed a steady decrease in volatility throughout the 
sample period. The trends in consumption and investment volatility were quite 
similar: the Asian-Pacific group of countries experienced the largest declines in
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consumption and investment volatility, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean 
and finally Afi'ica. Given that the Asian-Pacific group of countries have more open 
capital accounts, this provides some preliminary evidence of the impact of capital 
account liberalisation on economic volatility. To make any definitive statements in 
this area, however, one must also control for some of the other major determinants of 
economic volatility.
Table 5.1: Regional Consumption, Investment and Output Volatility
Schwert I970-I979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2004
Africa
Consumption Volatility 1.028 I.OOO 0.981 I.0 I2
Investment Volatility 0.978 0.997 1.007 I.0I6
Output Volatility 1.076 1.082 0.907 0.945
Latin America and the Caribbean
Consumption Volatility 1.004 1.004 0.997 0.991
Investment Volatility 0.990 I.0I5 0.997 0.983
Output Volatility 1.047 1.030 0.985 0.922
Asia-Pacific
Consumption Volatility 1.004 1.008 0.998 0.982
Investment Volatility 1.045 1.009 0.985 0.957
Output Volatility 1.154 1.043 0.934 0.893
Standard Deviation I970-I979 I980-I989 I990-I999 2000-2004
Overall
Consumption Volatility 9.090 10.433 9.817 7.247
Investment Volatility 21.558 18.680 16.794 10.957
Output Volatility 6.962 5.750 4.306 2.689
More Open Capital Account
Consumption Volatility 11.009 11.264 9.140 2.986
Investment Volatility 21.386 17.848 12.566 9.733
Output Volatility 8.277 6.803 3.386 2.009
Less Open Capital Account
Consumption Volatility 8.542 10.196 10.016 8.501
Investment Volatility 21.607 18.918 18.002 11.306
Output Volatility 6.586 5.450 4.569 2.884
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From the survey of previous literature, one of the most important determinants of 
economic volatility is the level of economic development. More developed countries 
are better able to accumulate capital, diversify risk and achieve stable growth. To 
examine whether volatilities differ in countries at various levels of development. 
Figure 5.2 plots consumption volatility against the log of per capita income level — 
taken as a measure of economic development. The figure shows that there is not a 
simple relationship between volatility and economic development in small states:
Figure 5.2: Consumption Volatility and Per Capita Income
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high-income nations are just as likely as low income countries to experience periods 
o f volatility. This result could indicate that the relationship between the two 
variables, rather than being linear, is actually non-linear. In the case of investment 
and output volatility, Figures 5.3 and 5.4, there is slight inverse relationship between
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volatility and the log of per capita GDP, suggesting that as per capita income rises, 
the volatility of investment and output declines.
Figure 5.3: Investment Volatility and Per Capita Income
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It is also of interest to see how volatility changed from the 1980s to the 1990s (the 
period when some countries removed capital controls) for the group of small states. 
Figures 5.5-5.7 therefore provide scatter plots of volatility in the 1980s relative to that 
in the 1990s. The figures show that, in general, current volatility tends to be highly 
dependent on past volatility.
Figure 5.5: Consumption Volatility in the 1980s and 1990s
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Figure 5.6: Investment Volatility in the 1980s and 1990s
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Figure 5.7: Output Volatility in the 1980s and 1990s
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Table 5.2 shows the cross-sectional average volatility of output and consumption 
growth for three decadal periods: 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and for the five year 
period ending in 2004 for countries with more open capital accounts and those with 
numerous capital account restrictions. The results in the table shows that, in general, 
countries that removed restrictions on capital flows during 1990s experienced larger 
declines in average volatility during the latter half of the sample period. This finding 
was true for whatever measure of volatility was employed. Output volatility between 
2000 and 2004 in small states with relatively few capital controls was 11 percent 
below the sample average while those that have more restrictions on capital flows 
experienced a 6.7 percent contraction in volatility.
Table 5.2: Capital Account Openness and Volatility
1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2004
More Open Capital Account
Consumption Volatility 1.018 1.019 0.987 0.983
Investment Volatility 1.019 1.050 0.961 0.954
Output Volatility 1.121 1.087 0.908 0.890
Less Open Capital Account
Consumption Volatility 1.009 0.999 0.999 1.001
Investment Volatility 0.995 1.000 1.011 0.994
Output Volatility 1.085 1.038 0.965 0.933
5.2 EMPIRICAL APPROACH
5.2.1 BASIC ECONOMETRIC MODEL
The previous theoretical and empirical literature suggested that the relationship 
between capital account liberalisation and economic volatility is likely to be non­
linear in terms of financial development, economic development and trade policies. 
A basic test of this prediction can be done by estimating an equation of the following 
form:
Vf, = n, +A, -\rj5^Lib„ + +v,, (5.1)
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where V,., is the standard deviation of per capita consumption, investment or output 
growth over 5 years at time t for country i , ^ . are country-specific effects, X, are 
time-specific effects, Lib,, is a measure of capital account liberalisation, X., includes 
the three possible non-linear interaction terms (financial development, economic 
development and trade policies) and is the variability of consumption, investment 
or output gi'owth not explained by the regressors. As is standard, the empirical model 
assumes that v,., is well behaved: it is uncorrelated with the regressors and is
normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of cjI .
Equation (5.1) allows one to test whether capital account liberalisation has a 
significant impact on economic volatility and/or whether the relationship between 
liberalisation and volatility is nonlinear. The hypothesis can be stated mathematically 
as:
Failing to reject the hypothesis would indicate that the relationship between volatility 
and liberalisation is non-linear.
Given that some of the explanatory variables may be endogenous (as discussed in the 
previous Chapter) the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) 
is employed. This model jointly estimates the equation in levels and first-differences, 
with first differences instrumented by lagged levels of the dependent and independent 
variables and levels instrumented by first-differences of the regressors.
Equation (5.1) assumes a very basic non-linear relationship in capital account 
liberalisation. However, it is likely that the variables themselves might be non- 
lineaiiy related to volatility, therefore a more unrestricted functional form that nests 
Equation (5.1) is examined:
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Vf, -  jXf +Â, + p^Libf, + f3^Libf,Xf, + ^ 3^ ,, +P^Xf,  +v„ (5.2)
This specification would suggest that the relationship between liberalisation and 
volatility changes at a particular threshold, i.e. a particular level of financial or 
economic development or trade openness.
5.2.2 CONTROL VARIABLES
Besides the variable of interest (capital account liberalisation), it is probable that 
other factors may be important determinants of economic volatility. The basic 
specification is therefore augmented with various control variables. Unfortunately, 
theory does not provide any assistance in this regard, so previous economic research 
is used to provide a guide of the variables to be included in the regression. These 
variables are inflation volatility, volatility o f the terms of trade, volatility of foreign 
growth, fiscal policy variability, real exchange rate volatility, changes in oil prices, 
trade openness, financial development and economic development.
Inflation volatility raises price level uncertainty and leads to high-risk premia for 
long-term contracts, increases the costs of hedging inflation risks and causes a 
redistribution of national income. Inflation volatility should therefore lead to 
increased economic uncertainty. Changes in oil prices are also included to capture 
the direct effect of this external shock on economic instability.
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2001) and Rodrik (1998) argue that openness to trade 
raises exposure to trade-transmitted volatility in world goods markets. As a result, 
one should expect that trade openness should be positively associated with economic 
volatility. In contrast, financial development and economic development should 
allow the country to better diversify and accumulate capital and is consequently 
anticipated to be inversely related to economic volatility.
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It has been argued that since developing countries usually specialise in the export of a 
few commodities, fluctuations in the price of these commodities can have a 
significant impact on economic volatility. These fluctuations lead to large changes in 
the return to capital that then influences domestic investment demand. Moreover, 
large price fluctuations can also give rise to a significant expansion (decline) in 
domestic deposits, which may occasion a credit boom (bust) that can have 
destabilising effects in both the short- and long-run.
Associated with terms of trade volatility is the volatility in foreign income. Since 
small states depend on the demand of larger economies to sustain their pace of 
economic expansion, if global growth fluctuates significantly, one should therefore 
expect growth in small states to fluctuate in line with that of the world economy. The 
impact of policy volatility on economic volatility is a controversial area of economic 
research. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) and Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman (2004) contend that economic policies are unimportant in the 
process of economic development. The authors claim that these policy variables are 
only important since they are proxies for institutions. Fatas and Mihov (2005), 
however, suggest that policy volatility has a strong negative impact on economic 
growth.
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) argue that exchange rate fluctuations affect the economy 
through indirect and direct channels. The direct channel is based on the assumption 
that people have a distaste for fluctuations and would for this reason prefer a constant 
value of consumption rather than one which is uncertain, but which may be higher or 
lower. The indirect effect of exchange rate volatility occurs due to the risk premium 
added to the price of goods by producers to cover the cost of exchange rate 
fluctuations. This risk premium leads to a higher price for goods and could reduce 
national demand, production and consumption. A lagged dependent variable is also
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included in the volatility model to capture the effects that previous shocks have on 
current volatility.
5.2.3 DATA
The three main dependent variables used are consumption, investment and output 
growth volatility. Consumption growth is measured as the annual change in real per 
capita private consumption growth. Observations on private consumption are taken 
from the United Nations Statistics Division National Accounts Main Aggregates 
database. The series is expressed in real US dollar terms. Investment and output 
growth are measured using a similar approach. The volatility indicators are then 
obtained using the approach suggested by the Schwert (1989) and described in 
Section 5.1.1.
The capital account liberalisation indicators are those derived in Chapter 3. They 
include ex-post macroeconomic indicators (net capital flows, portfolio investment 
assets, portfolio investment liabilities, direct investment assets, direct investment 
liabilities, portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities and foreign direct 
investment all as a percentage of GDP, the interest rate spread between domestic and 
foreign interest rates, and the congelation between foreign and local interest rates), 
regression-based indicators (the Feldstein-Horioka f3 and Edwards-Klian y/)  and 
three dummy variable indicators (the IMF dummy, indicators for capital account 
liberalisation, the proportion o f years the capital account was open and a stock market 
liberalisation variable).
Financial development is proxied by the ratio of private credit to GDP, which 
measures financial depth (King and Levine, 1993). Observations on this ratio are 
taken from the CD-Rom version of the International Monetary Fund’s International 
Financial Statistics (2006) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
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(2005). Economie development is proxied by the level of real GDP per capita in US 
dollars and is taken from the UN’s National Accounts Main Aggregates database. 
Economic development is also alternatively approximated by life expectancy and 
infant mortality, both taken from the CD-Rom version of the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (2005). Trade openness is proxied by the ratio of imports 
plus exports to GDP, all measured in US dollars, and are taken from the UN’s 
database.
The series employed to construct the control variables are all taken from the UN’s 
National Accounts Main Aggregates database. Inflation volatility, terms of trade 
volatility, fiscal policy volatility, world growth volatility and real exchange rate 
volatility are obtained using the approach outlined by Schwert (1989). The terms of 
trade is the ratio of export to import prices, foreign growth is the change in World 
GDP, fiscal policy is the ratio of government consumption to GDP and real exchange 
rate is the bilateral real exchange rate with the US.
The sample of countries employed in this chapter includes 51 small states and annual 
observations from 1970 to 2004. Note that the database makes up an unbalanced 
panel: not all the variables are available for all countries across all periods for each 
country. As a result, robustness tests are done to investigate the effects of bias arising 
from missing observations.
5.3 CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALISATION AND VOLATILITY
5.3.1 BASIC REGRESSION RESULTS
In this section, the results of the basic econometric regression results are reported. 
These are presented to evaluate whether the model specification provides a 
reasonable representation of volatility in small states. The basic regression estimates
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are provided in Table 5.3 and gives regressions for consumption, investment and 
output volatility.
Table 5.3: Basic Consumption, Investment and Output Volatility Regression
Results
Consumption Investment Output
Lagged Dependent -0.283 0.050 0.578
variable (0.042)*** (0.038) (0.045)***
Inflation Volatility 0.084 0.054 0.194
(0.057) (0.042) (0.112)*
Terms o f Trade Volatility -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)
World Growth Volatility 0.346 0.036 0.169
(0.037)*** (0.012)*** (0.075)**
Fiscal Policy Volatility 0.070 0.149 0.086
(0.045) (0.052)** (0.075)
Real Exchange Rate 0.001 -0.028 0.089
Volatility (0.026) (0.031) (0.071)
Oil Price Volatility 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)
Financial Development -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Openness 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Development -0.091 -0.025 -0.124
(0.024)*** (0.025) (0.044)***
0.250 0.061 0.447
Sigma 0.124 0.115 0.157
Wald Joint, %  ^ (2) 810.700 26.620 1012.000[0.000] [0.003] [0.000]
A RTest, N(0,1) -2.810 0.010 0.921
[0.005] [0.993] [0.357]
Sargan Test 534.700 329.500 261.100
[1.000] [0.993] [1.000]
Obsei-vations 731 802 737
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels o f testing, 
respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
The econometric model specification chosen is able to explain 25 percent of annual 
consumption volatility over the review period. The variables employed are jointly
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significant at the 1 percent level of testing and the Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions test suggests that the selected instruments are appropriate.
Turning now to the regression coefficients, most of the variables have their a priori 
expected signs. The lagged dependent variable is negative and significant at the 1 
percent level of testing. Therefore if there is large consumption volatility shock in 
one year, it would take approximately three and a half years to dissipate. Inflation 
volatility has a positive impact on fluctuations in consumption but it is not 
statistically significant. Fluctuations in the terms of the trade, in comparison, is 
significantly related to consumption volatility, with the negative coefficient sign on 
this variable suggesting that negative terms of trade shocks (those that reduce export 
prices) tend to increase consumption volatility. As expected, fluctuations in world 
growth and oil prices have a significant and positive impact on volatility, while more 
developed countries are usually characterised by lower rates of economic volatility. 
The other variables, fiscal policy volatility, real exchange rate volatility, financial 
development and trade openness had an insignificant effect on consumption 
volatility.
In the case of investment volatility, the results are quite similar. Only two of the 
capital account liberalisation indicators are statistically significant at normal levels of 
testing: world growth volatility, fiscal policy volatility and changes in oil prices. 
Shocks to world growth have a similar impact on investment volatility relative to 
consumption volatility. However, there is still a positive relationship between the 
two variables. Investment volatility was the only regression where fiscal policy 
shocks were positive and statistically significant, which suggests that government 
spending can lead to increased investment volatility. This could reflect greater 
uncertainty within the private sector regarding government’s plans to finance the 
rising spending bill. Oil price shocks also had a positive impact on investment 
fluctuations.
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For the case of output volatility, previous values of instability, inflation, world 
growth volatility and economic development were the main determinants. The 
positive coefficient on the lagged dependent variable indicates that there tends to be 
output volatility clustering, that is large shocks are usually followed by further 
volatility shocks. In accordance with a priori expectations, inflation volatility had a 
positive and statistically significant impact, reflecting the negative influence that 
uncertainty can have on output growth. Fluctuations in world growth also have a 
positive and statistically significant influence on output volatility in small states. 
This result is as anticipated given that these countries depend on imported inputs to 
facilitate production and consumption. Finally, economic development had a 
negative and statistically significant influence on output volatility, thus more 
developed countries tend to experience significantly lower rates of output instability.
Given that the basic regression model provides an adequate representation of 
economic volatility, the estimated equation is then augmented with various measures 
of liberalisation. This approach allows us to test whether, even after controlling for 
the other main determinants of volatility, whether capital account liberalisation can 
provide any additional information regarding the process of economic volatility in 
small states.
The augmented regressions for consumption, investment and output volatility are 
presented in Tables 5.4-5.6. Examining the results for consumption volatility. Table 
5.4, the basic regression (provided in the second column for comparison puiposes) is 
augmented with net capital flows as a percentage of GDP, portfolio and direct 
investment as a proportion of GDP, foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP, 
the correlation between domestic and foreign interest rates, the Edwards and Khan 
(1985) I// , variable for the existence of capital controls and finally a dummy variable
to capture whether or not foreigners are allowed to invest on the domestic stock 
exchange.
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The inclusion of the capital account liberalisation indicators does not significantly 
change either the size of the significance of the control variables. In addition, the 
Sargan Overidentifying test statistic is insignificant, while the Wald test for the joint 
significance of the variables was statistically significant in all the regressions at 
normal levels of testing.
Turning to the variable of interest, capital account liberalisation, the results reported 
in Table 5.4 indicate that the restrictiveness of the capital control regime did not have 
a statistically significant impact on volatility in small states over the sample period 
considered. This finding was robust to changes in the indicator employed to proxy 
for capital account liberalisation. In the case of investment, there was some evidence 
of a link between volatility and capital account liberalisation. These findings are 
somewhat at odds with those obtained by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundbald (2004), 
which finds that opening the capital account reduced consumption as well as output 
volatility. The divergence in results could reflect differences in countries studied 
(Bekaert, Harvey and Lundbald used a database of 95 countries, while this paper 
focuses specifically on small states) and/or indicator of volatility employed (Bekaert, 
Harvey and Lundbald employ observations averaged over 5 to 10 year intervals, 
while this Chapter generates volatility through a measure that employs the entire 
database).
Table 5.4 shows that NCF and Dummy are statistically significant determinants of 
investment volatility. However, the results are contradictory. In the case of the NCF 
regression, countries that benefit from relatively larger flows of capital tend to be 
more volatile. In contrast, the Dummy regression shows that states with relatively 
greater restrictions on capital flows tend to have higher rates of economic volatility. 
Given that the NCF variable is an ex-post indicator of capital account liberalisation, it 
is possible that the variable is capturing other influences on investment volatility; not 
just the removal of capital controls. This explanation seems to be supported by the
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finding that the other ex-post indicators are all insignificant determinants of 
investment volatility.
Table 5.6 provides the regression results when volatility is proxied by the instability 
of the rate of growth of GDP per capita. Again, most of the capital account 
liberalisation indicators suggest that the restrictiveness of the capital account regime 
has an insignificant impact on volatility. Only two proxies for capital account 
liberalisation are significant at normal levels of testing: NCF and Correlation. Unlike 
the case of investment, both variables suggest that opening the capital account can 
increase the volatility of output growth.
S.3.2 NON-LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS
The literature reviewed earlier suggested that there might be a non-linear relationship 
between capital account liberalisation, trade openness, economic development, 
financial development and volatility. As a result, squared terms for financial 
development, economic development and trade openness as well as interaction terms 
between the levels of the variables and capital account liberalisation are added to the 
basic regiession model. The regression results for consumption, investment and 
output volatility are provided in Tables 5.7-5.9.
In the case of consumption volatility. Table 5.7, financial development was linearly 
related to consumption volatility, as both the levels, squared and interaction terms 
were statistically insignificant. However, there was evidence of non-linearity in 
relation to economic development and trade openness. These findings agree with 
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2002) who argue that since small states tend to have a 
higher degree of trade and financial openness they may be more prone to terms of 
trade shocks. It is therefore not surprising that the indicators of economic 
development and trade openness were non-linearly related to volatility in the sample
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Table 5,7: Non-Linear Consumption Volatility Results
Financial
Development
Economic
Development
Trade
Openness
Lagged Dependent variable -0.290 -0.295 -0.246
(0.044)*** (0.043)*** (0.038)***
Inflation Volatility 0.058 0.060 0.102
(0.052) (0.052) (0.055)**
Terms of Trade Volatility -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
World Growth Volatility 0.345 0.515 0.082
(0.034)*** (0.208)** (0.033)**
Fiscal Policy Volatility 0.067 0.070 0.104
(0.045) (0.043)* (0.049)**
Real Exchange Rate Volatility -0.007 -0.008 -0.014
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Oil Price Volatility 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000)*** (0.001)** (0.000)
Financial Development -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001* (0.001) (0.000)**
Trade Openness -0.000 -0.000 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)***
Economic Development -0.088 -0.423 0.051
(0.024)*** (0.286) (0.008)***
Capital Account Liberalisation 0.032 0.736 0.304
(0.065) (0.211)** (0.054)***
Financial Development‘^ 2 -0.000 -
(0.000)
Financial Development*Capital Account -0.001 -
Liberalisation (0.001)
Economic Development^2 - 0.029
(0.020)
Economic Development*Capital Account - -0.088
Liberalisation (0.025)**
Trade Openness'^2 - - 0.000
(0.000)
Trade Openness*Capital Account - - -0.002
Liberalisation (0.001)***
0.247 0.255 0.228
Sigma 0.124 0.123 0.125
Wald Joint, %^(2) 867.200 979.500 744.800[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ARTest,N(0,l) -2.706 -2.605 -2.120
[0.007] [0.010] [0.034]
Sargan Test 509.500 337.800 514.800
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
Observations 712 712 712
Notes: (I) Standard errors given in pai'entheses betow coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing, respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
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Table 5.8: Non-Linear Investment Volatility Results
Financial
Development
Economic
Development
Trade
Openness
Lagged Dependent variable
Inflation Volatility
Terms of Trade Volatility
World Growth Volatility
Fiscal Policy Volatility
Real Exchange Rate Volatility
Oil Price Volatility
Financial Development
Trade Openness
Economic Development
Capital Account Liberalisation
Financial Development'^2
Financial Development*Capital
Liberalisation
Economic Development^2
Economic Development*Capital
Liberalisation
Trade Openness^2
Openness*CapitalTrade
Liberalisation 
Sigma
Wald Joint, %  ^ (2) 
ARTest,N(0,l)
Sargan Test
Observations
Account
Account
Account
0.032
(0.040)
0.049
(0.040)
- 0.000
(0.000)
0.033
(0 .012)***
0.118
(0.054)**
-0.048
(0.026)*
- 0.000
(0 .000)*
- 0.001
(0.002
- 0.000
(0.000)
-0.007
(0.026)
- 0.001
(0.069)
- 0.000
(0.000)
0.002
(0 .001)
0.052
0.116
38.670
[0.000]
0.964
[0.335]
324.100
[0.995]
779
0.033
(0.038)
0.058
(0.036)
- 0.000
(0.000)
0.033
(0 .012)***
0.114
(0.053)**
-0.050
(0.026)*
- 0.000
(0.000)*
- 0.001
(0 .001)
- 0.000
(0.000)
-0.077
(0.312)
0.713
(0.243)***
- 0.001
(0 .022)
-0.078
(0.030)***
0.052
0.116
87.950
[0.000]
0.928
[0.354]
322.100
[0.996]
779
0.031
(0.038)
0.044
(0.041)
- 0.000
(0.000)
0.032
(0.012)**
0.122
(0.050)**
-0.054
(0.026)
- 0.000
(0.000)*
- 0.001
(0 .000)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.006
(0.029)
0.301
(0.114)***
- 0.000
(0.000)
- 0.002
(0 .001)**
0.050
0.116
37.380
[0.000]
0.949
[0.343]
319.200
[0.997]
779
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing, respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
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Table 5.9: Non-Linear Output Volatility and Capital Account Liberalisation
Results
Financial
Development
Economic
Development
Trade
Openness
Lagged Dependent vaiiable
Inflation Volatility
Terms of Trade Volatility
World Growth Volatility
Fiscal Policy Volatility
Real Exchange Rate Volatility
Oil Price Volatility
Financial Development
Trade Openness
Economic Development
Capital Account Liberalisation
Financial Development^2
Financial Devel opment * Capital
Liberalisation
Economic Development'^2
Economic Development*CapitaI
Liberalisation
Trade Openness'^2
Trade Openness*Capital
Liberalisation
Sigma
Wald Joint, X   ^ (2)
ARTest, N(0,1)
Sargan Test
Observations
Account
Account
Account
0.569
(0.049)***
0.154
(0.104)
- 0.001
(0 .000)
0.194
(0.079)**
0.046
(0.080)
0.047
(0.075)
0.001
(0 .001)
- 0.001
(0.002
0.000
(0.001)
-0.125
(0.044)***
0.076
(0 .100)
0.000
(0 .000)***
- 0.002
(0.002)
0.426
0.156
125.700
[0.000]
0.980
[0.327]
239.900
[1.000]
718
0.580
(0.047)***
0.155
(0.107)
- 0.000
(0.000)
0.367
(0.209)*
0.060
(0.078)
0.059
(0.071)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.000
(0 .001)
-0.460
(0.275)*
0.512
(0.306)*
0.028
(0.019)
-0.059
(0.038)
0.437
0.155
121.300[0.000]
0.272
[0.785]
249.100
[1.000]
718
0.588
(0.047)***
0.153
(0.104)
- 0.000
(0.000)
0.027
(0.030)**
0.061
(0.074)
0.055
(0.076)
- 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0 .001 )
0.001
(0 .002)
- 0.012
(0.014)
0.083
(0.069)
0.000
(0.000)
- 0.001
(0.001)
0.438
0.154
262.500
[0.000]
-0.236
[0.814]
254.200
[1.000]
718
Notes; (1) Standard errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at tire 1, 5 and 10 percent levels o f testing, respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
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of small states utilised in this thesis. The regression results show that once the 
country’s level of development and trade openness is taken into account, capital 
account liberalisation had a positive and statistically significant impact on 
consumption volatility. However, the negative signs on the interaction terms (capital 
account liberalisation with economic development and trade openness) indicated that 
this effect declines for more developed economies as well as those states that have 
relatively liberal trade policies. The results for investment volatility, Table 5.8, were 
similar to those obtained for consumption volatility. However, in the case of output 
volatility there was no strong evidence of non-linearity in the capital account 
liberalisation-volatility relationship.
5.3.3 CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING
One of the key predictions of the theoretical literature on capital account 
liberalisation is that it should lead to greater risk sharing or consumption smoothing. 
These gains can occur due to a lower variability of income shocks or an improvement 
in economic agent’s ability to smooth these shocks. To investigate whether capital 
account liberalisation leads to a change in the ability of small states to diversify risk, 
the main determinants of the ratio of consumption growth volatility to output growth 
volatility are examined. The results are given in Table 5.10.
Capital account liberalisation does not have a statistically significant impact on the 
ratio in small states. These results are in line with Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2005), who find that with the exception of a stock market liberalisation dummy 
variable, other capital account liberalisation indicators were statistical insignificant in 
a similar volatility regression. Like Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, the coefficient on 
the stock market variable is negative but is insignificant.
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Table 5.10: Consumption Smoothing Results
NCF PADI FDI Correlation PSI Dummy Stock
Market
Lagged Dependent 0.122 0.132 0.125 0.194 0.044 0.137 0.136
variable (0.058)** (0.066)*** (0.061)** (0.063) (0.073) (0.063)** (0.059)**
Inflation Volatility -0.092 -0.129 -0.179 -0.073 -0.091 -0.112 -0.084
(0.126) (0.117) (0.118) (0.144) (0.206) (0.138) (0.135)
Terms of Trade -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
Volatility (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
World Growth 0.086 -0.056 -0.045 -0.032 -0.027 -0.041 -0.041
Volatility (0.101) (0.024)** (0.024)* (0.026) (0.031) (0.024)* (0.023)*
Fiscal Policy -0.071 -0.096 -0.069 -0.075 -0.064 0.004 -0.010
Volatility (0.089) (0.082) (0.080) (0.103) (0.111) (0.102) (0.103)
Real Exchange Rate -0.204 -0.225 -0.123 -0.047 -0.198 -0.109 -0.146
Volatility (0.083)** (0.089)** (0.074)* (0.096) (0.103)* (0.082) (0.079)*
Oil Price Volatility 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.000)** (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000)** (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Financial 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Development (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Openness -0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic 0.005 0.097 0.088 0.122 -0.021 0.100 0.113
Development (0.061) (0.059)* (0.055) (0.063)* (0.092) (0.056)* (0.054)**
Capital Account -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.042 0.013 -0.064 -0.016
Liberalisation (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.033) (0.082) (0.048) (0.034)
0.251 0.198 0.161 0.192 0.237 0.174 0.174
Sigma 0.185 0.189 0.192 0.191 0.187 0.190 0.191
W îilH  Tnînl" V  , ?  \ 404.700 190.000 148.700 200.200 87.760 88.970 105.800[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ARTest, N(0,1) 1.404 1.142 2.365 0.711 1.008 1.576 1.466
[0.160] [0.254] [0.018] [0.477] [0.314] [0.115] [0.143]
Sargan Test 273.700 306.900 310.100 331.800 332.200 325.000 322.500
[1.000] [1.000] [0.999] [0.989] [0.984] [0.995] [1.000]
Observations 698 673 729 606 424 743 764
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing, respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
The negative coefficient on the world growth volatility variable indicates that positive 
shocks to world growth allow small states to benefit from risk sharing and therefore 
smooth their consumption, while oil price shocks fi'ustrate consumption plans and 
increases the ratio, or make consumption smoothing more difficult. The other 
significant variables were real exchange rate volatility and economic development. 
The negative coefficient associated with the real exchange rate volatility term 
indicates that negative exchange rate shocks have a more disruptive impact on 
consumption smoothing than positive shocks. In contrast, the positive coefficient on
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the economic development variable implies that development tends to have a 
relatively larger negative impact on output volatility relative to consumption 
volatility.
5 J Â  SENSITIVITY TESTS
Generally, policymakers are more interested in negative volatility changes than 
positive shocks. As a result, two variables are created that capture negative volatility 
shocks: the first is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one for negative 
volatility shocks and zero otherwise, and the second is the number of times GDP per 
capita changes sign over a rolling five-year interval. These variables are then 
interacted with the volatility of growth in GDP per capita and employed as the 
dependent variable.
Tables 5.11 and 5.12 presents the coefficient estimates when these new dependent 
variables are used. Table 5.11 shows that capital account liberalisation has little 
impact on negative growth shocks; only NCF is just significant at the 5 percent level 
of testing. In general, inflation and fiscal policy volatility are the most likely cause of 
negative output shocks, while more developed countries are less likely to be subjected 
to negative output shocks. Table 5.12, which interacts the volatility of output with 
the number of times growth changes sign during a five-year interval, give greater 
weight to those periods characterised by a number of sign changes in economic 
growth. The results are quite similar to those obtained earlier: capital account 
liberalisation has an insignificant impact on economic volatility. Table 5.12 also 
shows that the most likely cause of frequent sign changes in economic growth are oil 
price shocks, fiscal policy shocks and changes in the pattern of world growth.
To further test the sensitivity of the results, an investigation of the impact of outliers 
on the estimation results is also undertaken. Outliers should be expected to be
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important in cross-country regressions, especially those investigating volatility. As a 
result, a dummy variable was included to capture large spikes in the volatility of per 
capita output. The results are also given in Table 5.13. These show that the main 
findings of the study are unchanged in the presence of outliers.
Table 5.11: Output Volatility, Number of Sign Changes and Liberalisation
NCF PADI FDI Conelation PSI Dummy Stock
Market
Lagged 0.094 0.090 0.090 0.056 -0.048 0.087 0.088
Dependent
variable
(0.041)** (0.042)** (0.046)* (0.057) (0.311) (0.049)* (0.048)*
Inflation 0.571 0.539 0.347 0.284 0.246 0.399 0.513
Volatility (0.283)** (0.252)** (0.267) (0.237) (0.311) (0.251) (0.246)**
Terms of Trade -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
Volatility (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)
World Growth 0.094 0.110 0.066 -0.155 -0.623 0.085 0.099
Volatility (0.220) (0.205) (0,229) (0.311) (0.354)* (0.054) (0.055)*
Fiscal Policy -0.528 -0.453 -0.623 -0.461 -0.189 -0.423 -0.555
Volatility (0.241)** (0.241)* (0.227)*** (0.312) (0.291) (0.214)** (0.212)***
Real Exchange 0.123 0.107 0.101 0.118 0.128 0.116 0.104
Rate Volatility (0.176) (0.168) (0.174) (0.219) (0.230) (0.159) (0.158)
Oil Price -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.009 0.000 0.000
Volatility (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.001) (0.001)
Financial -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.004
Development (0.002)*** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002)**
Trade Openness -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)* (0.001) (0.001)
Economic 0.158 0.150 0.171 0.229 0.599 0.205 0.240
Development (0.160) (0.148) (0.146) (0.192) (0.244)** (0.097)** (0.115)**
Capital Account 0.006 0.002 0.002 -0.075 -0.482 -0.158 -0.003
Liberalisation (0.003)** (0.003) (0.005) (0.103) (0.315) (0.161) (0.098)
0.458 0.231 0.233 0.244 0.187 0.190 0.193
Sigma 0.214 0.456 0.453 0.438 0.458 0.452 0.456
Wald Joint, 206.600 140.500 175.600 42.380 404.900 124.800 127.500
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ARTest, N(0,1) 1.223 1.285 0.640 1.745 2.563 1.398 1.582
[0.221] [0.199] [0.522] [0.081] [0.010] [0.162] [0.114]
Saigan Test 286.500 288.600 305.100 204.900 310.700 328.200 334.400
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [0.999] [1.000] [1.000]
Observations 677 652 708 605 429 718 737
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing, respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
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Table 5.12: Output Volatility, Frequency of Sign Changes and Liberalisation
NCF PADI FDI Correlation PSI Dummy Stock
Market
Lagged 0.141 0.121 0.115 0.134 0.079 0.134 0.141
Dependent
variable
(0.044)*** (0.043)*** (0.045)** (0.043)*** (0.054) (0.045)*** (0.041)***
Inflation 0.252 0.278 0.226 0.215 0.613 0.331 0.304
Volatility (0.213) (0.216) (0.235) (0.244) (0.345)* (0.200)* (0.196)
Terms of Trade 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001
Volatility (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
World GroMh 0.087 0.093 0.095 0.079 0.110 0.112 0.111
Volatility (0.056) (0.060) (0.056)* (0.057) (0.077) (0.056)** (0.056)**
Fiscal Policy 0.464 0.385 0.395 0.401 0.349 0.332 0.388
Volatilitj' (0.273)* (0.272) (0.243) (0.255) (0.196)* (0.242) (0.236)*
Real Exchange 0.072 0.058 0.149 0.048 0.064 0.167 0.094
Rate Volatility (0.126) (0.125) (0.134) (0.142) (0.233) (0.134) (0.133)
Oil Price -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
Volatility (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.000)** (0.001)
Financial 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
Development (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade Openness -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.002 -0,002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)** (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic -0.097 -0.138 -0.186 -0.119 -0.239 -0.085 -0.118
Development (0.138) (0.143) (0.132) (0.175) (0.256) (0.120) (0.145)
Capital Account -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.135 0.126 -0.061 -0.030
Liberalisation (0.004)** (0.003) (0.006) (0.081)* (0.143) (0.113) (0.084)
0.158 0.163 0.160 0.163 0.142 0.146 0.153
Sigma 0.456 0.456 0.452 0.439 0.469 0.454 0.455
Wald Joint, 52.460 58.970 52.580 46.440 163.900 64.730 58.760
%^(2) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ARTest,N(0,l) -1.870 -1.775 -0.296 -0.491 0.621 -0.843 -1.523
[0.062] [0.076] [0.767] [0.623] [0.535] [0.399] [0.128]
Sargan Test 332.300 325.700 337.700 355.700 341.300 337.200 353.500
[0.986] [0.993] [0.999] [0.990] [0.961] [0.999] [0.992]
Observations 677 652 708 605 429 718 737
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses belov '^ coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing, respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
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Table 5.13: Sensitivity Tests o f the Output Volatility and Liberalisation Result
Outliers
Lagged Dependent var iable 0.482
(0.040)***
Inflation Volatility 0.133
(0.086)
Terms of Trade Volatility -0.000
(0.000)
World Growth Volatility 0.172
(0.058)***
Fiscal Policy Volatility -0.004
(0.050)
Real Exchange Rate Volatility 0.076
(0.075)
Oil Price Volatility 0.000
(0.000)
Financial Development -0.001
(0.001)
Trade Openness -0.000
(0.001)
Economic Development -0.079
(0.038)**
Capital Account Liberalisation 0.061
(0.039)
Outliers 0.538
(0.075)***
0.596
Sigma 0.131
Wald Joint, % ^ 2 ) 1403.000[0.000]
ARTest,N(0,l) 2.274
[0.023]
Sargan Test 275.900
[1.000]
Observations 718
Notes: (1) Standard errors given in parentheses below coefficients
(2) *, ** and *** indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels of testing, respectively.
(3) P-values given in [square brackets] below test statistics.
5.4 SUMMARY
In many instances, countries may be more interested in the impact that policy changes 
have on economic volatility than economic growth. As a result, this Chapter sought 
to investigate the possible consequences of capital account liberalisation on economic 
volatility in small states. The theoretical literature surveyed either suggested that 
opening the capital account could increase or decrease economic volatility, depending 
on the assumptions of the model /the conditions prevailing in the country. The
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theoretical literature also suggested that this relationship might be non-linear in 
financial development, economic development or trade openness.
Given the exclusion of small states from most previous empirical studies, mainly due 
to data limitations, this study uses a database on 51 countries over the period 1970 to 
2004 to investigate the effects of capital account liberalisation. A basic analysis of 
the data suggest that consumption, investment, output and inflation variability have 
all declined in most nations during the 1990s. Splitting the countries into two groups: 
those with more liberal capital account policies and those with more capital account 
restrictions, the results suggest that countries with relatively few capital account 
restrictions have experienced a greater fall in consumption, investment and output 
volatility during the 34 year period under investigation.
This simple analysis, however, does not control for the effects of other potential 
explanations of economic variability. Therefore, panel GMM techniques are 
employed to investigate the empirical determinants of volatility in small states. The 
empirical results presented indicate that, for the most part, there is not a simple linear 
relationship between volatility and capital account liberalisation. The regression 
estimates, instead, suggest that there is non-linear relationship between liberalisation 
and consumption and investment volatility: by itself capital account liberalisation 
increases volatility, however, more developed countries and those with more open 
trade policies, had lower rates of fluctuation after opening their capital accounts.
To investigate the robustness of this result a number of sensitivity tests are done. 
These include controlling for other macroeconomic determinants of economic 
volatility, weighting the dependent variable by the number of times growth changed 
from positive to negative and the frequency of sign changes and outliers. However, 
the main results of the study are unchanged.
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CHAPTER 6 -  CONCLUSIONS
Capital controls refer to any government imposed restrictions on cross-border capital 
flows. They can take the form of quantitative restrictions on portfolio, real estate 
and/or direct investments into or out of the country, taxes on international financial 
transactions or dual exchange rate regimes. These controls have, since the 1960s, 
been used by small states to protect their economies against the effects of large 
capital outflows or inflows. This belief, however, runs contrary to traditional 
international macroeconomic thought. For example, Lucas (1982) shows that by 
opening its capital account, a country can insure effectively insure against country- 
specific shocks. Further theoretical studies have also showed that removing capital 
controls should have positive effects on key macroeconomic variables, such as 
growth and investment.
The empirical evidence on liberalisation has, however, not supported these theoretical 
predictions. For example, the link between growth and capital account liberalisation 
is flagile. Most studies find that liberalisation only has a positive influence on 
growth if certain institutional factors are in place (e.g. investor protection legislation 
and good supervisory standards) and if the country has reached a certain level of 
financial or economic development. Indeed, some studies (Stiglitz, 2000, 2004a and 
2004b) go as far as to argue that opening the capital account to international capital
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flows can actually increase economic instability, since capital flows tend to be pro­
cyclical.
Unfortunately, there is little or no empirical evidence on the effects of capital account 
liberalisation on small states, since most researchers tend to exclude them due to their 
size or limited data availability. This thesis attempts to develop indicators of capital 
account openness as well as investigates the impact of opening the capital account on 
economic growth and volatility in small states. An investigation of the impact of 
liberalisation in these countries is important given that these states are more 
vulnerable to exogenous shocks given their size and dependence on international 
trade. In addition, the majority of previous studies investigating the impact of 
liberalisation have for the most part excluded these countries, thus limiting the 
usefulness of policy recommendations arising from these past studies for small states.
Chapter 2 provides a survey of the evidence to-date on the effects of capital account 
liberalisation, particularly in relation to developing countries. The chapter shows that 
while theory suggests that opening the capital account should allow a country to 
diversify away economic shocks, increase capital inflows, expand economic growth 
and efficiency and encourage governments to pursue good policies, the empirical 
evidence with regard to these theoretical predictions are in some instances debatable. 
One of the key drawbacks of the capital account liberalisation literature is the variety 
of indicators used to quantify restrictions. Indicators of financial integration range 
from ex-post macroeconomic indicators such as private capital flows and interest rate 
differentials, to capital account restriction indices derived from the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and regression-based 
indices derived from aggregate macroeconomic relationships. The wide variety of 
indicators used makes it difficult for researchers in the field to compare and replicate 
results. In addition, many of the indicators used in the literature are not calculated for 
most small states and are therefore excluded from many research databases.
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Chapter 3 therefore develops indicators of liberalisation are developed for 51 small 
states over the period 1970 to 2004. Three types of series are developed to track the 
openness of a country’s capital account over time: ex-post macroeconomic indicators, 
regression based measures and indices. Thirteen indicators of capital account 
liberalisation are calculated for the sample of small states: net capital flows as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), portfolio investment assets as a 
percentage of GDP, portfolio investment liabilities as a percentage of GDP, direct 
investment assets as a percentage of GDP, direct investment liabilities as a percentage 
of GDP, the sum of portfolio and direct investment assets and liabilities as percentage 
of GDP, the spread between domestic and foreign interest rates and the correlation 
between domestic and foreign interest rates; three indices derived from qualitative 
information on the country (dummy variable of the existence of capital controls, the 
proportion o f years for which the capital account was not open and a dummy variable 
for the opening of the stock market to foreign investors), and two regression based 
series (a time-varying jS, fi-om the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) model, and a time- 
varying If/ fi'om the Edwards and Khan Model (1985).
The chapter represents one of the first attempts to build a database of capital account 
liberalisation indicators for small states. As with most researchers looking at small 
states, the main challenge encountered was a lack of data. The indicators calculated 
and derived in this section could aid in developing a fuller picture of the effects of 
capital account liberalisation. These indicators could also be used to examine related 
topics in the area of international macroeconomics.
One of the most contentious issues in the areas of small states research is the 
definition o f this group. This thesis uses those states identified by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. These countries include six African 
territories (Cape Verde, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe 
and Seychelles), twenty-three Latin American and Caribbean states (Anguilla,
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Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, The British Virgin 
Islands, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, The Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and United States 
Virgin Islands) and twenty-two Asia and Pacific countries (American Samoa, 
Bahrain, The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Cook Islands, Fiji, French 
Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, The Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, The 
Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu).
Observations on these 51 small states between 1970 and 2004, is employed to derive 
the capital account liberalisation indices. The Chapter finds that most small states 
seemed to have reduced restrictions on capital flows during the period, particularly 
during the 1990s. Low-income countries, however, still maintained restrictions on 
the flows of capital. This general observation was fairly consistent across indicators. 
Simple correlation analysis also suggested that those regions that have removed some 
restrictions have benefited fr om a significant jump in capital inflows. O f the regions 
studies, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as Asia and the Pacific seemed to 
have been more aggressive in terms of opening their capital accounts. This could 
reflect the relatively higher levels of income in these states.
Chapter 4 of the thesis then investigates the impact that capital account liberalisation 
had on economic growth in small states using the indicators developed in Chapter 3. 
The empirical link between capital account liberalisation and growth is fragile. Part 
of the issue is that the previous empirical literature tends to employs a wide variety of 
indicators which could lead to somewhat conflicting results. To address this issue, 
this Chapter compares and contrast the findings from the indicators of liberalisation 
employed.
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The results from augmenting a standard cross-counti'y growth model suggest that, in 
general, liberalisation is positively correlated with economic growth. The ex-post 
liberalisation indicators generally indicated that liberalisation has a weak but positive 
influence on economic growth in small states. This finding was consistent over seven 
of the nine ex-post liberalisation indicators. Similarly, the regiession indicators, the 
Feldstein-Horioka J3 and the Edwards-Khan y/ , both indicated that opening the 
capital account was positively correlated with economic gi'owth. However, the 
Feldstein-Horioka f3 was statistically insignificant. This could be due to the effects 
that deviation from purchasing power parity, exchange rate risk, limited integration of 
domestic financial markets and government policies have on the indicator. O f the 
final three liberalisation indicators (a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the 
country had capital controls and 0 otherwise, the proportion of years the capital 
account was not open and a stock market liberalisation dummy) both the Dummy and 
Proportion variables are significant at classical levels o f testing, and indicate that 
removing capital controls can stimulate gi*owth in small states. More specifically, the 
coefficient on the dummy variable for the existence of capital controls suggests that 
liberalisation can boost per capita growth in small states by about 4 percent.
The robustness of the results is evaluated to account for sample selection bias arising 
from correlation between economic performance and the decision to open the capital 
account as well as non-random missing observations. These tests, however, indicated 
that the overall results were not affected by any of these issues. In addition, the 
findings were also robust to changes in the averaging procedure applied to the 
database.
Given that small states are more vulnerable to external economic shocks, these 
countries may be more interested in the impact of liberalisation on volatility rather 
economic growth. Chapter 5 of the thesis examines this relationship. Rather than 
looking at output volatility only, the chapter also investigates the impact of
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liberalisation on consumption as well as investment volatility. To the author’s 
knowledge this is also the first attempt to model volatility in small states.
Unlike much of the literature, which uses the standard deviation of real GDP growth 
to approximate volatility, this Chapter employs an alternative measure of volatility 
developed by Schweit (1989). The approach improves on the standard deviation 
measure as it is not subject to the degrees of freedom criticism. In addition, by 
utilising the full database to calculate volatility, it does not discard or smooth-out any 
important information.
A basic analysis of the data suggest that consumption, investment, output and 
inflation variability have all declined in small states during the 1990s. Splitting the 
countries into two groups: those with more liberal capital account policies and those 
with more capital account restrictions, suggest that countries with fewer capital 
account restrictions experienced a larger fall in consumption, investment as well as 
output volatility.
This approach does not account for the impact that other potential explanatory 
variables might have on economic variability. Using panel G MM techniques, the 
empirical results indicated that there is not a linear relationship between volatility and 
capital account liberalisation. Instead, there exist a non-linear relationship between 
liberalisation and consumption and investment volatility: capital account
liberalisation enhances volatility, but in relatively more developed small states and 
those with liberal trade policies, opening the capital account reduced economic 
volatility.
To investigate the robustness of these results a number of sensitivity tests are done. 
These include controlling for other macroeconomic determinants of economic 
volatility, weighting the dependent variable by the number of times growth changed
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from positive to negative and the frequency of sign changes and outliers. However, 
the main results of the study are unchanged.
The key policy recommendations arising from this thesis is that capital account 
openness, in general, should not be feared by small states. It leads to gains in terms 
of economic output, without any significant changes in output volatility. If small 
states desire to reduce economic volatility they should attempt to reduce the 
occurrence of fiscal policy shocks, invest more resources in economic development 
and focus monetary policy on either price or exchange rate stability. In addition, 
much of the volatility that has accompanied countries that have liberalised can be 
reduced if the country focuses first on economic development and the reduction of 
barriers to trade before removing capital controls.
Data limitations and the quality of the data employed was the main shortcoming of 
this project. Many small states, particularly dependent territories, are not included in 
the major databases available from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and 
United Nations. Observations on these states therefore had to be sourced from non- 
traditional databases. Even then, however, observations were still missing for some 
o f the sample period for a few countries. Data limitations inhibit the amount of 
research that can be done on small island states and also impedes a scientific 
approach to policy formulation. It is imperative that policymakers and officials from 
international organisations advising these states communicate the importance of data 
generation.
In terms of future research, there is a need to under-take regional and country-level 
evaluations of the effects of liberalisation, maybe through the use of case studies. 
These studies could also consider the role that liberalisation can play in the 
transmission o f economic shocks as well as the disciplinary effects it can have on 
economic policy. Given the importance of the financial sector in most small states,
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the indicators of capital account liberalisation could also be used to look at the role 
that capital account liberalisation can have on bank interest rate spreads. In terms of 
volatility, the indicators can also assist researchers investigating the role that capital 
account liberalisation can play in terms of volatility transmission.
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